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ESSENTIALS OF ARGUMENT

BY

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DEDICATED

TO

George Pierce Baker

PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

IN RECOGNITION OF

THE DEBT THAT THE AUTHORS IN COMMON

WITH ALL TEACHERS OF ARGUMENT

OWE TO HIM FOR HIS PIONEER WORK IN THE

CONSTRUCTIVE TEACHING OF THIS SUBJECT

2500-515

PREFACE

A DOWN-EAST farmer whose given name was Aminadab was wont to tell his friends that he was the tenth son of his parents, and that all the good names had been used up when they got down to him. We are not apologizing for the title of this book, but certain it is that the number of books written on this subject is legion. It is true that some of these come to our attention at the present time merely as curiosities, but many have survived and are popular on account of admirable qualities. Why, then, should there be a new text-book?

It may be that the controlling reason is the desire which comes to every teacher to put his particular theories into print. Yet the authors of this work believe that their book has another reason for existence. If we thought that we had some peculiar hobbies or novel methods of instruction, it would indeed be doubtful if anything was being added to the literature of the subject. In fact the criticism that we find, as teachers, of the text-books which have been offered to us is that they seem to attempt to produce something new in the way of teaching argumentation. We believe that it is extremely improbable that anyone in this twentieth century will discover new principles of dealing with this subject, the teaching of which was an old story long before the Christian era. Our first endeavor, therefore, has been to go back to the simpler forms of instruction, and to produce a book which could be

used by teachers and pupils who were content to follow the ordinary principles of rhetoric. Argument is not a hybrid or freak form of composition in which analysis, evidence, and reasoning are the only things to be considered. It has been customary, it must be admitted, for most text-books to devote a few pages to a discussion of the principles of style. The student, however, very often receives the impression that in argument the rules which govern the other forms of composition are of minor importance. This is very far from the truth, and we have included chapters on the qualities of style with some attempt to apply the principles specifically to argument. There is, however, nothing new in these chapters; they aim to be merely a summary of the best thought upon the subject of composition. If, therefore, within these pages there seems to the reader to be in any place a novel idea, we would beg that it be first carefully examined to see if it is not an old principle in new dress, and if after due consideration it turns out to be a genuine novelty, we are content to have it discarded as probably untrue.

The second criticism which we think fairly attaches to many of the existing text-books is that they go into the subject too much in detail. They are exhaustive treatises complicated by numerous classical illustrations which, as we have discovered, comparatively few of the pupils are inclined to read. These books attempt to teach too much. Some are bound down by a too rigid adherence to the artificial phraseology of the rules of logic and rhetoric, while some that escape this criticism seem to be merely manuals for preparing students for collegiate debates. We believe that it is possible to include the general principles which underlie the subject without

attempting to be exhaustive or to cover all contingencies. The successful text-book is not an epitome but a book which inspires and suggests. A compendium of useful information may be good for reference, but *Æsop's Fables* are better for teaching purposes. And Professor Wendell tells us that the younger Dumas explained the appeal of his style with the words: "‘Il y a fier dessous,’—there is no end of it out of sight." We have therefore deliberately included only the fundamental principles on each topic; we have purposely made our illustrations suggestive rather than comprehensive, and unlike the examples to be found in a college argument for the very reason that to translate them will require an actual mental effort on the part of the student.

As the wording which is employed is more or less a paraphrase of lectures which the authors have given to classes in school and college, it has been inevitable that the personal relation between teacher and student should obtrude itself in the text. If we use too often the familiar and informal style of the class room the explanation lies in the fact that we have hoped the book will be serviceable to a class. After all it seems that in an endeavor to teach this subject in particular, directness is necessary even if some of the more severe rules of rhetoric suffer. To those who would apply our own advice to our own confusion we can only say with Henry Ward Beecher, "Do as I say, not do as I do."

Taken as a whole, the book should serve as the foundation for an extended course in argument. We have had in mind, however, the fact that many schools and colleges for one reason or another are obliged to consider this subject in a somewhat limited time. Teachers who feel that

the book is too expanded for their purposes are recommended to omit from the consideration of their classes Chapters I, VII, VIII, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV. The remainder of the book will, it is believed, prove available for a less extended course.

Special attention is called to the chapters on delivery and debating. While somewhat out of place in a book which intends to treat only the construction of an argument, they are inserted out of deference to those who are obliged to teach delivery and construction at one and the same time. Each of these chapters easily could be amplified into a book in itself. The only merit that is claimed for them is that they are not theoretical, but are the practical results which have been obtained by one of the authors not only in teaching the subject, but also in practicing it in more than one of its varied forms.

It is always difficult to say how much of our thought is our own and how much is suggested by others. We have endeavored when conscious of borrowing to make due acknowledgment. If, however, any predecessor in this field finds in these pages his own ideas whether expressed in his words or in ours, we can only plead guilty of unconscious plagiarism and urge him to take satisfaction in thinking that after all he thought of it first. How much we owe to these others we probably do not appreciate. We wish, however, in addition to acknowledging our indebtedness to Professor Baker, which we recognize in another place, to express our thanks to Mr. William T. Gunraj for work which appears in the appendix, and to Professor Albert R. Chandler of Ohio State University for valuable suggestions on "Reasoning" and "Fallacies."

This book, then, is offered to the public at its face value. It has been written after some years of experiment in teaching and practice. We believe that it contains the essential principles which underlie the teaching of argument presented in a form and manner not difficult to understand.

A. P. S.

S. L. G.

CONTENTS

STRUCTURE

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. ARGUMENT.....	1
II. THE SUBJECT.....	10
III. EXPLANATION.....	28
IV. THE MAIN ISSUES.....	38
V. THE BRIEF.....	51

SUBSTANCE

VI. EVIDENCE.....	69
VII. REASONING.....	99
VIII. FALLACIES.....	115
IX. PERSUASION.....	129

FORM

X. CLEARNESS.....	142
XI. FORCE.....	154
XII. BEAUTY.....	165
XIII. WRITING THE ARGUMENT.....	179

PRACTICE

XIV. DELIVERY.....	203
XV. DEBATING.....	222

SUBJECTS OF HARVARD-YALE-PRINCETON INTERCOLLE- GATE DEBATES.....	249
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APPENDIX

SPECIMEN ARGUMENT: "SHOULD IRELAND HAVE HOME RULE"	
AUTHORS' NOTE.....	255
BRIEF.....	257
ARGUMENT.....	267

MATERIAL FOR BRIEFING:	PAGE
ROBESPIERRE, "AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT" . .	297
"THE MOUSETRAP QUOTATION"	302
EXERCISES	307
INDEX	327

ESSENTIALS OF ARGUMENT

CHAPTER I

ARGUMENT

“WHO is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?” With the above question, according to the Old Testament, begins the record in the *Book of Job* of what may perhaps be called **What argument is** the first recorded debate in history. A writer on the subject of argument can find no better text than this, for the whole purpose of his writing must be to prevent men from darkening counsel by mere words. *An argument is the endeavor to make the thoughts of other people conform to our own.* While it may be possible to mislead the thoughts of men by means of empty words, any advantage gained in this way can be only temporary. Man’s thought is affected finally not by words, but by knowledge. The purpose of courses in argument in our schools and colleges, therefore, should be not so much to stimulate a flow of speech as it should be to add to it that which makes it effective, knowledge and understanding. It is the purpose of this book, therefore, to stimulate the art of adding knowledge to words in order that the counsel given may not be darkened. It is worth while undoubtedly to teach men to improve their physical speech and to improve their manner of delivery. We are all glad to hear a man who clothes

his thought in graceful language and delivers it pleasingly, but no matter how pleasing the outward form may be, if he has not a thought to express, he makes but little impression. The way to study argument is, first, to learn how to think, then to learn how to express the thought in good English, and finally to learn how to deliver the thought in as pleasing a manner as possible. To think, to write, and then to speak is the logical order in which argument should be developed. Too often we see those who invert this order, meriting the denunciation of the Lord as expressed above; they literally darken counsel by words without knowledge.

Too many people, moreover, think argument is merely a taking of opposite sides, or the act of disputing or quarreling. They forget that its true purpose is to make those who disagree with you change their minds. There is a certain type of mind that invariably disputes everything that is said. It was said of the old common-law pleadings that if a man accidentally in his plea spoke of the sunrise, his opponent would call upon him to prove not only that the sun had risen, but also that there was a sun. People who take the opposite view of everything that they hear sometimes flatter themselves that they are mighty in argument. Many a fond mother has destined a child for the ministry or the bar because he seemed to have the faculty of disputing readily. Generally such children need physical correction and lessons in good manners rather than encouragement in talking. **Argument** is not dispute or contention. The student who takes it up with the idea that it is a mere competition with his fellows and the winner is he who proves himself to be the

better man, cannot too early in his study dismiss such an idea from his mind. Student debating is perhaps responsible for a feeling that the purpose of argument and of courses in argument is to enable the students to win this game which they have evolved from the oldest of the arts. Nothing is further from the truth. A debating coach of some prominence was accustomed to tell his teams to forget that they must make good speeches, and to forget even that they must convince the judges that they were efficient debaters, but to remember that they must convince those same judges that the proposition for which they stood was right. The advice was good. In argument the end and aim of all that is done is to produce in the mind of another person a belief that the theory asserted is true. Everything that tends to do that is good. Everything that does not tend to that end is useless, and in argument anything that is useless is bad. Contentiousness is the term that is applied to that method of discussion where the object is not to convince, but to dispute. As might be expected, it flourishes among the uneducated and the immature. Children quarrel with each other, ending up with a "'Tis" and "'Taint" form of controversy which frequently degenerates into physical conflict. Two cabmen will obstruct traffic while they engage in a wordy warfare which is as useless as it is vehement, and afterwards they will take great pleasure in retelling to an admiring audience the bright things that they either did say or would have said if they had thought of them. From these primitive contenders to the man who thinks he shows his erudition by disputing even the most casual statement is but a step. The vital fault of all such people is that they are seek-

ing approbation and are not trying to establish the truth. Even if we are mistaken in our belief, an honest endeavor to establish this belief is worth while, but to dispute for the sake of disputing is to waste our time. While argument is a recognized form of literary expression, contentiousness is never knowingly taught by anyone.

Argument is the most complex form of English composition. Without raising the question as to whether it is a higher form than description, narration, or exposition, it is certainly true that from its very nature it gives the student more work to do. In description the keynote is the drawing of a verbal picture of a physical object; in narration the keynote is the telling of a story; in exposition the keynote is the explaining of a method, plan, or theory; but in argument we have a twofold task. In the other three it is sufficient if our hearer sees our verbal picture, hears our story, or understands our plan. In argument he must not only see, hear, and understand, but he must also believe. A student may describe a certain type of automobile engine, or he may tell us the story of the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, or he may explain to us the Central Reserve Banking Act; but in argument he must also make us believe that his type of engine is best, that the Queen was justly executed, or that the banking act is advantageous. Any of the other forms of literary expression may achieve its full purpose and still leave the minds of our hearers as passive as before we spoke. Argument, however, cannot stop there. From its nature it must produce agreement in the minds of our hearers, or it has failed of its purpose.

We must next consider how the minds of men are affected. Why is it that some speakers produce results while others do not? A little thought shows us that there are two ways of approaching the mind. We believe a man because he either **Conviction and persuasion** *convinces* or *persuades* us that what he says is true. As a matter of fact in nearly every argument we find these two impressions are being produced upon our minds. When you wish to instruct a child that two and two make four, you will perhaps take two of his blocks, place them opposite two others, and let him count the result. It makes no difference who arranges the blocks for him, his parents, his teacher, or a stranger. He believes you after he has counted because he has seen. We may call this pure conviction. But when the same child's mother wishes to show him that he should not be afraid in the dark she does not spend as much time upon explaining the theory of the absence of light, if she is a wise mother, as she does in comforting and sympathizing until his little doubts disappear and he knows that everything is right. This is persuasion.

While both conviction and persuasion are found in every good argument, and while they are distinct methods of approaching the mind, they are not ordinarily found apart. They are compounded, as it were, chemically rather than physically. **Conviction and persuasion closely connected** Both hydrogen and oxygen are distinct forms of matter, and we recognize their existence in water, but it is in a combination in which they cannot be distinguished. So conviction and persuasion, although we recognize each when we find it, are indissolubly combined in a good argument. The methods of producing conviction

tion and persuasion, however, will be studied separately for it is difficult to imagine two processes more dissimilar than these two methods of influencing human thought. Conviction rigidly excludes from consideration anything that is emotional in its nature. At first thought it would seem as if there was something unworthy in any other means of producing belief. If man is a rational being, why should we ever appeal to anything but his reason? A dearly bought experience, however, has taught most of us that we have erred perhaps as frequently when logic has had full sway as when it has not. If the men of olden times allowed their prejudices and their passions to persuade them into an unfounded belief in witchcraft, it was the unfailing evidence of their senses and the logical teaching of history, as they understood it, which convinced them that the world was flat. No emotion contributed to the theory of the flat earth, and the men of science for centuries proved its flatness by the coldest reasoning. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how even a false logic could ever have justified the atrocities committed under the universal delusion of witchcraft. Both these views, one the product of conviction and the other of persuasion, were wrong, yet both were firmly believed. Perhaps if those eminent logicians who knew that the earth was flat had used their logic less and their imaginations more, the error would have been discovered earlier, and perhaps if the eminent theologians had modified their passions and their prejudices with a little common sense, a cruel error would have disappeared long before it did. Conviction and persuasion, therefore, must go hand in hand in any effort to produce belief, and a student who neglects either deliberately sacrifices half his power of effective

argument. With the full realization then that the process of logical conviction is but half the battle, let us pay attention to that process of producing belief in the minds of others by an appeal solely to human reasoning.

An argument consists of three parts which we may call the *Introduction*, the *Proof*, and the *Conclusion*. A little thought shows us that this division is necessary because it is natural. Our evidence may be ever so good and yet produce no effect if stated baldly without any preceding explanation. Before our hearers can accept a statement of fact as proof of anything, they surely must know the purpose for which the fact is offered. If they do not know what it is intended to prove, it may interest them but it certainly cannot convince them that a proposition of which they have never heard is true. It is just as essential to tell the audience what we are talking about as it is for the student who proves a problem in geometry first to write his problem, then to set down his proof, and finally to conclude with the *Q. E. D.* which shows that he has done that which he set out to do.

**The parts of
an argument**

The introduction, then, is that part of the argument in which we explain to our audience that which we intend to prove. It is naturally expository in its nature, and the style of composition in the introduction is that of exposition rather than that of argument. A student about to write an argument is not unlike a woodsman going to the forest to cut down a tree. He can seldom march up to the tree and without any anticipation strike into it with his axe. He must first observe its position, calculate the direction in which it will fall, see if there is any other tree in which

**The intro-
duction**

it may lodge, and perhaps clear away the underbrush that surrounds it so that he may get a good place to stand and a clear swing for his axe. It may be considerable time before he is ready to begin the actual work of felling his tree. So the student of argument must spend considerable time and space in telling us what he is going to do in order that we may thoroughly understand his purpose before he starts in upon his proof.

The proof The proof is that part of the argument which actually produces conviction. It consists of the presentation of facts and the reasoning from those facts to the results which lead up to the establishment of our proposition. To continue the simile of the woodsman, it begins when the first blow is struck, and ends when the tree has fallen. It probably comprises the bulk of the argument although frequently a proper introduction will shorten the proof considerably. The legal adage, "A case well stated is half proven," is as true in argument as it is in law. Still we may reasonably expect that in volume at any rate the proof will be the principal part of our argument.

The conclu- As an introduction is necessary to show what we intend to do, so a conclusion is necessary to show that we have done it. The *Q. E. D.* of the geometrical proposition is not a meaningless form. The mind demands some final closing of an argument which makes the conclusion more than a mere matter of form. If, after we have presented our last fact and drawn our last inference from it, we leave the subject, there is an abruptness which is displeasing to our hearers. The argument becomes far more effective if briefly but nevertheless logically we review what we have done, and

show them that our proof has been after all a logical statement leading back to the proposition with which we started.

An argument then in substance as well as in form is the statement of a theory, the proving that it is true, and its restatement as an established fact.

CHAPTER II

THE SUBJECT

THE schoolboy who has to write a composition, too often prepares himself for the task about as follows:

He first sees that a fresh pen is inserted in the penholder; then possibly he fills the inkstand. Next he obtains a number of sheets of smooth white paper, and in his very best handwriting he writes the subject of his composition at the top of the first page. Having thus pledged himself to the momentous discussion of the cause of Rome's decay, or some other equally interesting topic, he stops, and with a mind as vacant as the paper before him, he begins to think. It is at this point that he really begins his argument. The trouble, however, with the schoolboy is that he does not keep on thinking long enough. He is trying to think of words and sentences when he should be trying to think of ideas. Yet the schoolboy is not alone in his error. Frequently in argumentative composition we pay too much attention to the way we clothe a thought and too little to the thought itself. A course in argument, if you trust to the catalogues and announcements of our schools and universities, is a course in English composition either written or oral as each particular institution decides from time to time. A course in argument really is a course in psychology, in logic, in law, in public speaking, and lastly and perhaps chiefly a course in the use of the English language.

But he who thinks of it only as the latter will find difficulties that he will never be able to overcome.

The basis of all the foregoing evidently lies in the word "thought," and it is through the door of clear thought and through that door alone that we may go out to the wider country that awaits the public speaker and the orator. The student who wishes to step upon the public platform and astonish the world with his eloquence cannot realize too soon or too strongly that his work upon the platform is but a minor part of his preparation. No man was ever eloquent who did not have behind his speech the ability to think clearly; and the ability to think clearly is not necessarily an inborn gift. Most of us will find considerable consolation in the reflection that it can be acquired by study and practice. But the reader may say at this point, "I have but little desire and no real hope of becoming an orator. I only wish to be able to make a good argument in the ordinary affairs of life." There is the more need if this is so that you should realize that an argument is not necessarily an oration, nor even a written forensic, and certainly not a "composition." Fundamentally an argument is what a man does when he wishes to bring some other man's mind into conformity with his own. Not only the lawyer who pleads his case in court argues, but the doctor who tries to drive his reluctant patient to take a vacation, the minister who is endeavoring to turn the life of his parishioners upon a different and better way, the engineer who wishes to convince a board of directors that they should appropriate money for further extensions, the school teacher who desires to make his pupil think with him and not merely accept his words, the business man who is trying to obtain some one's money

for something that he has to sell,—all are arguing, and as far as the principle of the thing goes, it does not make much difference whether you are saving a nation or selling a nutmeg; you have got to go about both tasks in the same way, and the beginning of this process lies in clear thinking. So the schoolboy before he got his new pen and his clean paper should have begun to think, and he should have thought a long time comparatively before he began to write, and to come directly to the subject of this chapter, he never should have written his subject in his best handwriting at the top of his page until he had made his thought upon it clearer than his best handwriting. The first thing that a man who argues must do is to think, and his first thoughts take the form of analysis, and the first step in analysis is to establish clearly in his mind what he is thinking about. Analysis as applied to argument has been said to be *the investigation of the subject for a central idea or group of ideas*,¹ and the first step in that investigation is of necessity the wording of the subject itself.

The subject comes into our minds first not in the form of an arguable proposition, but in the form of a term.

Necessity of a proposition “Immigration,” “the tariff,” “woman suffrage,” or whatever you choose, will be the subject of this argument that you are going to write, but there is no argument until you say something about the tariff, or immigration, or woman suffrage. A man may write volumes upon any one of those subjects, and his writing may be good or bad, but so far it is not an argument. It will take one of the other forms of English composition until he takes his next

¹ Baker and Huntington, *Principles of Argumentation*, p. 14.

step and says something about the tariff, for instance. The moment he adds a verb to his subject he gets something that may be a subject of argument. "The tariff should be repealed" then is a subject in form of words at any rate. The salesman cannot say "automobile" to his customer and expect any response. He must put it in the form of "you should buy an automobile" before it is a subject for argument. An illustration of this principle which seems so apparent and yet which is too often ignored may be noted in the contests for the Pasteur Medal at Harvard University. This medal is awarded for excellence in what is called an annual debate upon a subject drawn from contemporary French politics. The contest is conducted generally by the student debating authorities under the direction of members of the French Department of the University. Disliking, and justly, the artificiality which too frequently is the most prominent characteristic of college debates, the instructors have from time to time tried the experiment of announcing, instead of a debatable subject, a term. In recent years they have discussed the proposition, "The president of the French Republic should be elected by popular vote," and at another time the subject, "The policy of the French government in Morocco." The first proposition, which is in form debatable, led to a real discussion in which men argued. In dealing with such a proposition as the second one quoted, two things happened. Some of the men immediately transposed it into a debatable question and really argued that "the policy of the French government in Morocco is to be commended," while others who did not go through that process either actually or mentally, did not deliver arguments and

too often did not deliver anything but words. It is possible, perhaps, for a man to write description, narration, and exposition with nothing in his mind but a subject, but he cannot write an argument without a proposition.

In putting our subject into the form of a concrete proposition, what must we bear in mind? In dealing with the substance we must consider about what we are to argue. As to the subject matter there are two requirements: first, that it be *evenly balanced*; and second, that it be *capable of decision*; both of these terms being used relatively and not with exactness.

The subject must be fairly evenly balanced. If it is not, then it is not a subject for argument but for exposition. The essential difference between argument and exposition is that in the former you must prove your case to have it accepted, while in the latter you have but to explain. If your audience, or your hearer, or your reader then admits that you are right, it is obviously useless to argue. It may be objected that the application of this principle leaves us without any question to argue, for there is a right and wrong to every question, and no question is evenly balanced. There is undoubtedly a state of mind which in some people becomes continuous and leads them to accept this proposition as fundamental. All things are to them right or wrong, good or bad, to be praised to the extreme limit or to be condemned with equal vigor. Such people cannot argue, or at any rate they ought not to argue. The great majority of subjects concerning which men differ are after all relatively right or wrong. There are, to be sure, number-

less questions which are obviously not capable of argument. In the community where we live theft is both a crime and a sin, and the proposition, "Thou shalt not steal," has a positive right and a positive wrong side and is therefore not open to discussion. But to most minds the proposition, "Thou shalt not change the tariff," even if it be accepted as true, must be admitted to be only relatively true and is therefore a question for discussion. By a refinement of theory we may say that there is a positive right and wrong in every subject. Indeed we argue because we believe this to be true. While there may as a matter of theory be a positive right and wrong, the question may still be open for discussion. We may differ as to whether the tariff should be changed or not; theoretically one side must be right and the other wrong, but practically the world does not agree as to which one of us is right, and in order to come to that conclusion it is necessary for us to argue the question.

This principle applies equally to what have been called questions of fact and questions of policy. The law courts deal principally with questions of fact, the forum more generally with questions of policy, but it does not follow that even questions of fact are not debatable. It is undoubtedly true that in a question of fact there is an absolute right and wrong. The accused man either did or did not kill the deceased, but it is still debatable if we do not know which is right. The evidence in a question of fact may be fairly evenly divided, and so the proposition is open for discussion. On the other hand, in a question of policy, not only the evidence may be divided evenly, but

Question of
fact or policy

also the good and bad of the question. For instance, in the question of the expediency of woman's suffrage it is fair perhaps to consider two points of view, the social and the political effects of granting suffrage to women. Now the evidence on each of these two points may be fairly evenly divided, while as an absolute fact it is perhaps true that the social effect of woman suffrage is bad and that the political effect is good, or vice versa. That is to say, we may fairly say that in no case does the existence of an absolute right or wrong prevent a balance of sides. All that we need to ask then of our question is that independent of its final truth, which is what we are trying to find, there be a reasonable difference of opinion as to what that final truth is.

The question may be raised as to which is preferable for student discussion, a question of fact or a question of policy. The difference when reduced to its lowest terms seems to be this. In a question of fact you consider whether a thing actually happened or did not happen in the past. In a question of policy you consider whether the result in the future will be desirable or undesirable, prudent or imprudent, good or bad. One is a question of history, the other a question of expediency. It follows that a question of policy may well become a question of fact. At the time when this is written whether we should actually intervene in Mexico is a question of policy. At the time when the words are read it well may have become a question of fact. Therefore it is immaterial whether the question be one of fact or policy, provided there is enough difference of opinion in the minds of those who have it under discussion so that one man can say "yes" to the proposition and another can say "no" to it, and

both have a reasonable hope of obtaining converts to their views.

The second test of substance which a question must fulfill is this: The question must be reasonably subject to decision. That the pen is mightier than the sword may be fairly evenly balanced, but it is certainly not a debatable subject because it cannot be decided, and in fact, it is not worth while deciding. Two elements are necessary in order that a question may be reasonably subject to decision.

**Capability
of decision**

In the first place it must be physically possible to procure evidence. In many instances the evidence has disappeared, or has become so obscure, or so difficult to procure that the task is beyond the average student. For instance, it would

**Possibility
of procuring
evidence**

be a waste of time in all probability to argue whether or not the battleship Maine was destroyed in 1898 by an internal or external explosion. There is, perhaps, sufficient dispute with regard to this question so that we might say that it was evenly balanced, but it would seem at the present time to be purely a matter of opinion and one upon which there was not sufficient ascertainable evidence. It is true that the Maine has been raised, but it would be impossible to examine her personally and equally impossible to get information from the naval authorities. If they have any, they have suppressed it for diplomatic reasons. Such a subject, therefore, would be a poor one for discussion because there is little material out of which to construct a discussion, and consequently the student who selected this subject would probably find himself manufacturing merely empty words and phrases.

In the second place in order that a question may be reasonably capable of decision, all parties should have a common basis of judgment. You, your audience, and your opponent must look at things in the same way, not necessarily to the extent that you agree, but at least to the extent that you understand each other. If this principle is true, it is apparent that any æsthetic questions are dangerous. If the only standard is the standard of taste, there is but little value to the discussion. Whether the lily or the rose will grow better in certain soil is perhaps a subject for discussion, but whether the lily or the rose is the more beautiful flower is entirely a matter of taste. Questions of morals are, likewise, rarely satisfactory. To argue with a Mohammedan upon a subject relating to polygamy would probably be a waste of time. If your question of morals becomes also a question of religion, there is an additional difficulty. An argument with an atheist upon the divinity of Christ where your evidence is almost entirely found in the Bible would probably end in a mass of contradictory assertions upon each side. Those questions, however, in which your opponent while he does not believe that you are right yet can see that you may be right are generally productive of the best discussion from the standpoint of pure argument. As a matter of substance, then, we see that the question must be evenly balanced; that is to say, it must have two debatable sides and it must be capable of decision.

If, then, you have a subject which is debatable, that is to say, there are two sides to it and it can be decided, the next problem is one of form. How shall the subject selected

**Wording
the subject**

be worded? Here again there are two requirements or tests.

In the first place the wording must be clear. In order that the wording may be clear it is best that it be concise. The advantage of making the subject attractive is self-evident, and the clearer and the shorter, within reason, a subject can be, the more attractive it becomes. Indeed, it has been said that the success of many plays and of more novels depends upon the subject. We all know as we read a daily paper or a magazine how much our decision as to what we shall read is influenced by the mere wording of the title. Most of us would skip a magazine article entitled "Resolved; that Bill No. 708 before the Massachusetts legislature providing that all employers in industries and businesses involving the use of materials dangerous to the health or being of their employees be compelled to insure said employees against accident or disability arising from the use of said dangerous materials in a bonded corporation licensed to do business in the state of Massachusetts." Yet we might be interested in reading the same article if it were worded simply, "Should a contractor be made to insure his painters against lead poisoning?" To secure simplicity you must be concise, you must exclude all matter not absolutely necessary to make your subject intelligible; you must include nothing that is to any extent irrelevant or superfluous; and you must use no long terms where a short word can be found. The use of unnecessary long words and the inclusion of unnecessary details arises from a misapprehension of the importance of technicality. It seems sometimes to the lay mind that most cases in

Wording
should be
concise

court are decided on whether or not a certain word in a certain document was spelled in a particular way. On the other hand the lawyer realizes that when the lay mind attempts to legislate, it is almost sure to try to provide for every possible minute contingency that may ever arise in the interpretation of a law. Both errors are committed through a desire to obtain clearness by means of precision, and it is fortunate indeed that there is a tendency in the community away from such conceptions. Legal pleadings, laws, and questions for argument should be clearly stated, but the clearness should be the clearness that comes through simplicity and not the clearness that we attempt to obtain by over-elaboration. Whatever may be the importance of technicalities in law, they are of no importance to-day in ordinary argument. The day of trick debating is gone, if it ever existed. Any argument which the stupidity of both sides allows to turn upon a technicality is an argument decidedly not worth while. Indeed, it is sophistry, not argument. It may be said, however, that if the subject is not stated with the completeness of legal comprehensiveness, opportunity is given to wander away from it. The opposite is really the case. If the compulsory accident insurance subject mentioned above be stated with legal over-completeness as it was first given, the argument might very possibly turn on whether insurance should be limited to Massachusetts companies, but if it be stated simply and concisely, it would of necessity turn upon the desirability of the insurance itself. Those people who endeavor by amplifying phrases so to limit a question that no possibility of confusion may exist generally end in creating confusion. No man can make many mistakes if he uses but few words,

so that the fewer the words in a subject for argument, the less possibilities exist that any one of them may be misunderstood. But while conciseness will prevent the discussion of a technicality or a side issue, it may, if abused, lead to ambiguity, and because of that ambiguity the opposing sides may discuss entirely separate and even mutually exclusive questions.

You must take care, therefore, that in being concise you do not become ambiguous. If the subject were stated merely, "Should contractors insure their painters against accident," one side, knowing what was proposed, might discuss lead poisoning, while the other side very probably would consider accident insurance in general at the expense of the employer. If you cannot be concise without being ambiguous, then you must sacrifice conciseness. If you find yourself, however, in this position, look to yourself and do not blame the principle. Ambiguity frequently arises from using a general term without a qualifying adjective or clause. In the question, "Is socialism desirable?" one side might discuss political socialism, the ownership by the state of public utilities; the other might point out the undesirable features of economic and social socialism, the doctrine of the destruction of the family unit. If the subject for discussion had been, "Is Marxian Socialism desirable?" that ambiguity could not have existed. We see, therefore, that while we are endeavoring to attain a concise statement of our question we must be careful that we do not open the door for ambiguities. If we are concise without being ambiguous, we satisfy the first requirement of form in wording the question, which is clearness.

**Subject
must not be
ambiguous**

The second requirement of a subject in form is: the question must be worded so that the burden of proof falls upon the affirmative. It is in the violation of this principle that students and even teachers of argument most often err. Moreover, it is fair to say that no one mistake in the history of the law has led to so much confusion as the misuse of the term, "burden of proof." It is obvious that it can be used with two meanings. In the first place it may mean that one side has placed upon it the responsibility of satisfying us that it is right. That burden always remains with the side which originally takes it up. If you accuse a man of stealing your watch, the burden of proof that he stole it rests upon you from beginning to end, and if the discussion stops at any point, the question to be decided is whether or not you have shown that the man stole your watch. The burden of proof, then, when used in this sense, which is the correct one, never shifts. It does not follow, however, that the man on the other side has no obligation and that a burden of a different sort does not fall upon him. For instance, if you show that the accused man has your watch in his pocket, the question still is whether he stole the watch or not, and the burden of proof still rests upon you. You have, however, gone far enough so that you can rest your case and look to him for explanation, and it is sometimes said that at such a time the burden of proof shifts. That is not true. The burden of proof remains the same, but the accused has a burden thrust upon him by the circumstances which is sometimes erroneously called the burden of proof, but which is better named as *the burden of going forward*. In discussion, as one side or

the other offers convincing arguments, the burden of going forward will shift from side to side, but the burden of proof never shifts; it always remains with those who offer the proposition.

With this understanding, then, of the words, "burden of proof," let us see why it is that the subject should be so worded that the burden of proof must fall upon the affirmative. The rule is only a recognition of the invariable process of the human mind. A negative idea cannot exist until there has been a positive idea which it contradicts. One cannot say that the sun is not shining until he knows that the sun does sometimes shine. If this principle be applied to argument, it is evident that one cannot say that any proposition is untrue until somebody has formulated an idea that it is true. In other words, to compel the negative to go first in any discussion would be to compel them to assume that their opponents had already said something, and if, as a matter of fact, their opponents did not say exactly what was expected, the result must be confusion. It is, therefore, logical to say that the affirmative of any proposition shall start the discussion. If you do not give the burden of proof to the side which starts the discussion, then you require the so-called affirmative to talk for some time before anyone has advanced any definite argument. An audience that hears such a discussion will inevitable feel that something is wrong, even if it does not see wherein the error really lies.

When we have recognized what the burden of proof is technically and that the affirmative should be required to begin a discussion because it has the burden of proof, we must consider for a while how you can determine as a matter of fact where

**How to find
the burden
of proof**

it lies. It is safe to say that it is always upon those who desire to do something. In both the physical world and in the mental world inertia requires no justification. A physical body stays still until some force operates to move it. A judge, or an audience, or a voter, or any human being, who is called upon to make a mental decision will remain quiescent until something occurs to make him change his mind. If you have an automobile and your customer has money in his pocket, his money will stay in his pocket until you do something. To apply the same principles to larger affairs, whether the present tariff is good or bad, *it is the present tariff* and will remain such until its opponents show cause for a change. The burden of proof, then, is always upon him who tries to prove that the present state of affairs should be changed in a particular way. Legislative bodies recognize this proposition. A bill is formed to change existing law and the proponents of the bill are always required, as a matter of form, to prove that it should be adopted, and because they have to prove that it should be adopted, they are expected to open the discussion both before committees and upon the floor of the legislative chamber. In other words, they desire to make a change and have the burden of proof. They are, therefore, the actual affirmative, and consequently are expected and required to open the discussion. The whole scheme is simple and any departure from it will inevitably lead to confusion. It is sometimes attempted, where one side appears stronger than the other, to equalize matters by giving the weaker side to the affirmative. If the weaker side is the one that is really bringing forward the proposition no harm is done, but if the opposite is true, the teacher or student who tries that

experiment will only spoil the discussion without accomplishing the result desired.

It is not difficult in concrete cases to observe this rule of placing the burden of proof on the affirmative. If, for example, the proposition under discussion is the desirability of lengthening the term of the president of the United States, it is obvious that the question should read: "The term of office of the President of the United States should be extended to six years." It is absurd to suppose that you could get a good discussion if the proposition were to read: "The term of office of the President of the United States should remain at four years," because the mind naturally demands that anyone who is desirous of changing the present situation should show us why it should be done. Again, in the dispute as to whether Shakespeare or Lord Bacon was the author of the dramas which are usually attributed to the former, the adherents of the Baconian theory may have evidence to support their contentions. Whether we agree with them or not, we will agree that they have the burden of proof and should start the discussion. To call upon any man to open the discussion and bring forward his evidence when he believes that Shakespeare was the author of the plays which have for some centuries been attributed to him is to attempt the impossible, and to try to make the human mind work backward. It has been said that in formal debate the affirmative need not be given the first speech to propose a change because the presiding officer has done this already when he states the question. The statement of the presiding officer may perhaps in a sense satisfy the proposition that the man who proposes a change should be compelled to go first, but

it does not do anything to sustain the other requirement that he who proposes a change must start to show why the change should be made.

It has been suggested that the burden of proof depends upon the community in which you are; that is to say, that the burden of proof is upon him who disagrees with the person or persons who are listening. This is not necessarily so. It is true that the beliefs or prejudices of your audience may increase or diminish the difficulties of your task, but the burden of proof, as a matter of argument, does not necessarily depend upon any such considerations. The mistake here is that those who make this assertion fail to recognize the distinction between what constitutes the burden of proof in a question of fact and in a question of policy. In a question of fact it is indeed true that the person who proposes a change is he who contends that present accepted facts about an act in the past are incorrect. He is the one who is proposing both to change the existing state of things and also to change the views of his audience. But in a question of policy the burden of proof is on him who favors a change in the present status in favor of a different one for the future. It is immaterial whether the audience agrees with him or not. If the question of national prohibition is being discussed, the burden of proof remains with him who desires its adoption as a national policy no matter whether he is arguing in Maine where there is State Prohibition or in New York where there is not. The preconceived ideas and prejudices and the beliefs of the people you are trying to convince are material only because in questions of fact, that is, concerning things which happened in the past,

they decide what the existing views are. Whether Shakespeare or Bacon wrote the plays is a question of absolute fact and may be open to discussion, but the world has said for many years that Shakespeare wrote them, and consequently in such a case the existing opinion of the people does place the burden of proof upon the adherents of Bacon. In a question of policy as to what course of action should be adopted for the future, the beliefs of a majority, however large, are absolutely immaterial except that such beliefs make the task of one side harder or easier as the case may be. It is plain, therefore, that in all questions whether of policy or of fact the burden of proving that existing conditions should be changed must be given to the affirmative.

For the student, then, who desires to write a forensic, or to deliver a debate, or to construct an argument in any form, this is the gist of this chapter. Your subject must fulfill these four requirements:

**Summary of
this chapter**

1. It must be fairly evenly balanced.
2. It must be reasonably subject to decision.
3. It must be worded concisely but without ambiguity.
4. It must place the burden of proof upon the affirmative.

CHAPTER III

EXPLANATION

It has been said, and well said, that when a proposition is clearly stated, it is half proved. Now a clear statement includes not only a correct wording of the **Necessity of explanation** subject but also an explanation of it. Before there can be any profitable discussion of a question, the minds of both the speaker and the hearer must be brought upon the same plane of understanding. Only the beginning of this is done when the question is stated and the next task for the student is to give his hearers such information as they will need in order that they may understand his arguments. Even the few instances where the arguments begin abruptly are really the exceptions that prove the rule. It may be that under peculiar circumstances a subject has been so treated or so rests in the minds of the hearers that one can begin immediately with the proof, but this is so only when the explanation has been previously provided. At some time and in some way the explanation must be made. The student must realize, however, that instances where he can dispense with an explanation of the question seldom occur in academic discussions.

The explanation of the question generally can be based upon three steps:

- (1) The immediate interest of the question.
- (2) The history of the question.
- (3) A definition of its terms.

We shall discuss these steps in this order but it is not necessarily in this order that the student must treat them. In perhaps a majority of the cases it is true that a definition of the terms may well wait until something is said about the history, but there are undoubtedly cases where the student will feel that the first logical step is to explain some of the technical terms that are found in the wording. For the purposes of discussion, however, we will follow the above order which may perhaps be termed the normal order of the development of the question.

**Steps of the
explanation**

We first consider, then, *the immediate interest of the question*. In other words, you must try to answer the universal interrogation point that greets any new statement, "Why?" What is the reason that we discuss any of the questions of the day? It is in answering this that you begin to make the question clear. It is a common habit of schoolboys, and even of college students, to open a debate with some such words as these: "The proposition under discussion this evening is, Resolved: that United States coastwise shipping should pay tolls when passing through the Panama Canal." This is mechanical and artificial. It does not state why it is being discussed. Suppose on the other hand the debater should begin like this: "*President Wilson on Thursday, March 5, 1914, addressed Congress in part as follows: 'I have come to ask for the repeal of that provision of the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, which exempts vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States from payment of tolls.'* It is this question which is being discussed this evening, whether or not that Act exempting our coastwise shipping should be repealed."

**Immediate
interest of
the question**

The superiority of this opening over the other is apparent. It states not only what is being discussed, but also why it is being discussed. Such an introduction serves a double purpose. It is obvious that it tends to create an interest in the discussion by showing that it is a timely matter to consider, but the very fact that you have shown that it is timely also enables your audience to understand it better. As originally stated, it was a bald proposition to be answered in the affirmative or the negative; now it has taken on human interest, it has become connected with the affairs of this world, and we understand it better and see it clearer because it is humanized. For this reason then a statement of the immediate interest of a given question rather than a mere restatement of the question itself should be the first step in the explanation.

It may be objected that everyone will know why that particular question is being discussed, and that therefore it is useless to tell them. The answer is twofold.

In the first place it is generally not true that your whole audience will know exactly the present status of any proposition. Their ideas upon it may be hazy. As Matthew Arnold says, "The amount of muddy thought that arises from people who do not see clearly and think straight is enormous." In the example given above probably a large majority of the thinking people of the United States knew that the abolition of the exempting clause in the Panama Canal Act was being considered generally, but it is safe to assert that probably a majority of these same thinking people did not appreciate that the President of the United States had advocated it in a mes-

**Indefinite
knowledge
of subject
by audience**

sage to Congress. The statement of this concrete fact cannot help but dispel the haze. Furthermore, we are constantly surprised to find that things which are well within our own knowledge have never come even to the attention of other people. Our interests and those of our friends may by environment and in other ways be closely associated, for instance, with the woolen interests of this country. To us Schedule K of the tariff and its various provisions may be familiar and interesting and we think at first that everyone with whom we come in contact will have that same general interest and same knowledge. Yet it is undoubtedly true that there are people equally intelligent as ourselves who are perfectly willing to be enlightened upon the tariff but who have never even known that the letter "K" was used to designate the schedule of duties on woolens. It is safe, therefore, to call to the attention of any audience the immediate interest of the proposition for the purpose of giving them accurate information.

In the second place, even if by chance your whole audience knows clearly why the question is of immediate interest, good and not harm will be done by calling attention to it. It serves as a natural starting point and avoids ambiguity. In President Lincoln's famous letter to General McClellan the first two paragraphs are as follows:

Immediate
interest a
natural start-
ing point

"You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac, yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

"If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours."

It is impossible to suppose that McClellan did not have full and accurate understanding of the subject under discussion, and yet, nothing is plainer than that this was an admirable beginning for the letter to follow.

The first step then of the explanation is the immediate interest of the question; its purposes are to state the proposition and to tell why it is of particular interest at the present time.

The second step of the explanation is the *history of the question*. While the proposition has been stated and while we may now know the reason that it is at present of interest, its meaning has not been clearly explained. This may be done most effectively by tracing the development of the proposition from its origin to the present day. Each question is necessarily bound up with past conditions and events. It may be one phase of a widespread movement. Such considerations may and do affect vitally our decision in practically every matter. Our judgment is as a rule formed upon the background of past experience. Suppose the question be whether Ulster is justified in opposing home rule for Ireland. It may have been made clear to us where Ulster is and what it is and we may realize that the Home Rule Bill is pending or has just been passed in the English Parliament, but even then, it is an utter impossibility to understand the full import of the question unless we have a complete knowledge of the past political relations between Ulster, the remainder of Ireland, and England. Who can possibly understand the question of Home Rule for Ireland if he is ignorant of the fact that Ireland once had a parliament of its own?

The length and completeness of this historical sketch will vary with the subject and the circumstances. It is a common error to forget that in introducing an argument, the history of the question is a means only and not an end in itself. Nothing should be included in the history which is not essential for the fulfillment of its purposes. These are to clear up all doubts as to what actually is proposed and to offer a background of experience against which this proposal is to be judged. If the history is over-long and over-complete, the argument will be top-heavy and cumbersome. If, on the other hand, it is too concise, essential ideas necessary to the understanding of the question may be omitted. The student in writing this part of his introduction, as well as the other parts, should bear in mind that it is written, not as an exercise in narration or exposition, but for the sole purpose of enabling the audience to understand the question more clearly.

**Extent of
the history
that is nec-
essary**

This sketch of the development of the question brings you to the third step, a definition of the terms of the proposition itself. You have now told why it is of interest and you have shown its relation to past events. It must by these means have become better known to your audience, and yet, there may be some things about it which they do not understand. You must now explain briefly as is consistent with clearness what are the provisions of the measure or what are the essentials of the movement under discussion. The importance of a thorough and accurate definition of the question can hardly be exaggerated. The casual arguments one hears every day, in which each party is equally positive, usually end by each finding that he

**Definition of
the terms**

agrees with the other but that he was talking about a different thing. For instance, a discussion arose as to whether a certain state official had passed the Civil Service. One person said he had, another said he had not. It finally appeared that the one meant that he had been approved by the Civil Service Board, while the other felt sure that he did not have to take Civil Service examinations. Both were right. The official had been approved by the Board but he did not have to pass an examination of any sort. There could have been no argument if either party had taken the trouble to explain what was meant by "passing the Civil Service."

The need of definition arises under one or more of three conditions,—when a term is ambiguous, or is used in an unusual sense, or is entirely unfamiliar to your audience. In each case the dictionary furnishes but little help. Any word needing definition will probably be used in a peculiar and special sense not given by the dictionary but dependent upon the context. The very fact that it requires definition suggests that it is not used in the general sense that the dictionary will give. In some instances the word may be perfectly well understood by everyone and yet its application to the question under consideration may be in doubt. For instance, in the question, "Should our navy be materially increased?" no one is in doubt as to what the word "materially" means and no dictionary need be consulted, and yet, until the meaning of that word in its application to this question is settled, it is impossible for the discussion to proceed with effectiveness. One side might claim that two battleships would constitute a material increase to our navy, while the other would say that twenty should

be constructed before the increase could be really material. Whichever is right, it is obvious that as long as the meaning of the word remains unsettled, the discussion will not be a discussion with regard to the increase of the navy, but a discussion with regard to the meaning of the word "material." In academic work, such as classroom exercises and debates, the meaning of such words can frequently be arbitrarily settled, but if an agreement cannot be reached, you must convince your audience that your interpretation is the correct one. The most effective method is by means of the history of the question. If you are able to show what meaning has been put on the question in the past, it is fair to assume that that meaning naturally governs its meaning at the present. Again, the unfamiliar term may be a technical or foreign one, or it may embody a whole system of action. In the first you have the exception where a dictionary definition is sometimes allowable. For instance, in the question, "Is rear axle transmission better than body transmission for a heavy automobile?" a later edition of Webster gives this definition: "Transmission (mechanical). The gear, including the change gear and the propeller shaft or driving chain (or chains) by which the power is transmitted from the engine of an automobile to the live axle." Such a definition as this may well serve as a starting point in an explanation of the mechanical problem involved. While it is still too technical to be absolutely plain, it does tell us that the word is used to describe that portion of the machinery through which the power is applied. Or suppose that the question is, "Should the Glass-Owen currency bill be adopted?" Here the dictionary is useless, and the history of previous currency measures, while it

helps us to understand, does not clearly explain. It is evident that you must explain the vital provisions of the proposed bill. No material feature should be omitted, and yet, no immaterial ones should be included.

Too frequently in academic work students are inclined to define in one sentence each of the terms of the proposition, whether it needs explanation or not.

Artificial definitions Nothing can be more useless and nothing more fatal to clear thought. Suppose you have for discussion the proposition, "All elective state officers should be nominated by direct primaries." A categorical definition of "elective state officers," "nominated," "direct" and "primaries" not only does not throw light upon the meaning of the proposition but actually confuses the mind, and yet, all three of the means of explanation which we have been discussing can be applied to that question with advantage. Surely it will help us to understand this question if we are made to realize that there is a present tendency in the United States toward direct primaries, that many experiments and trials have been made in the past of various systems, and finally what are the essential features of the system under discussion.

It should be noted that there are some cases where any definition of terms is unnecessary. This applies especially when you have been preceded by a speaker whose introduction has been satisfactory to you; or when the question is simple and of very widespread interest. It would hardly add to the clearness of the question, "The President of the United States should be elected for a single term of six years" for you to define any of the terms.

From the foregoing pages it is evident that we may do three things to make the question clearly understood by our hearers, and it is submitted that generally we ought to do all these three things.

Summary

In the first place we must satisfy their legitimate curiosity as to why the question is being discussed at all. This in itself is effective in making the meaning of the subject clear to our hearers. This we have called *the immediate interest of the question*. In the second place we must tell them all the facts in the past which have led up to the present situation and which have a logical bearing upon its discussion. In this way it ceases to be an abstract proposition, existing, if it exists at all, in a theoretical world, and becomes a matter logically connected with some particular portion of the world's activities. It has a past and by means of the past the present may be understood and the future predicted. This we term the *history of the question*. And finally we take up the very wording of the question itself, and if the origin and the history have not made it plain, we must carefully and accurately define any of its terms which may still leave a hazy impression upon the minds of our audience. When all of these three things have been done or when we are sure those that have not been done are unnecessary, we have taken our second step and have come to a clear understanding of the meaning of the question to be discussed.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAIN ISSUES

THE human mind, even the most imperfect human mind, is naturally analytical. "It looks to the essence of a thing, whether it be a point of doctrine, of practice or of interpretation."¹ Therefore, if we are to convince the minds of other people of the correctness of our proposition, we must show them what the essence of it is. The process of conviction in the human mind is not accomplished by pouring into it a torrent of words, no matter how impressive they may be. The words must express ideas, and the more we think upon any subject, the more we realize that the essential ideas in its discussion are comparatively few. The speaker who can find most accurately and state most clearly the fundamental points that underlie his discussion will possess an advantage over his competitor who does not adopt such a course that the latter can never overcome. Valuable and suggestive as the work that we have done in stating and explaining the question may be, it is but two preliminary steps leading to the real purpose of this general process of analysis. If, as we have seen, analysis of a proposition is an investigation for a central idea or group of ideas, it is evident that the next and last step of this process of analysis is the investigation proper.

The question that now confronts us is what are the

¹ *Meditations*, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.

fundamental points upon which our discussion rests, and how can we find those fundamental points. The answer is obvious. They must be found by thinking; and experience has shown that we can train our minds in accurate thought. Suppose that we have carefully stated our proposition and explained its meaning. If we then examine the contents of our minds with regard to it, we will find that we have a large number of ideas more or less closely connected with the question. Figures, facts, incidents, illustrations and opinions of other men are all present, and constitute a mass of knowledge which has but little order. The process of stating the question and explaining it has done something to clear up and arrange this mass of information, but it is still confused. Yet in it we see certain ideas recurring frequently, stated perhaps a little differently but nevertheless beginning to stand out. These ideas we must see more clearly in order that our hearers may see them most clearly. Gradually it dawns upon us that there are, underlying the whole discussion, one or two or more questions of vital importance which, if we can answer them successfully, would be decisive. These essential ideas or fundamental points are the points at issue around which our discussion is to be waged, and we therefore call them the *main issues*. For illustration let us suppose that we are discussing the question of the abolition of capital punishment, and that we have thought about the subject and read about it until we are amazed at the variety of our knowledge. Phrases like "judicial murder," "murder in the first degree," "beyond reasonable doubt," "rights of organized society," etc., all more or less suggestive of ideas, are ever present with us, but we find that,

Nature of
the main
issues

instead of helping, they seem to confuse us. In the midst of the confusion, however, we are aware that many of these ideas seem to center around and bear upon the question of the prevention of crime, and it is not long before we realize that the question as to whether capital punishment is justified or not is to a large degree dependent upon a subsidiary question as to whether capital punishment is an efficient means of preventing crime. We realize that other things may be concerned in the discussion, that there may be other ideas equally important, but nevertheless that this is one of the *main issues*.

What is the process that we go through in coming to this conclusion? First, we accumulate a large amount of material; then we arrange this material into two groups, that which tends to prove our proposition and that which tends to disprove it. When it is thus arranged, we find that upon careful examination some of it disappears because, while it seems to have something to do with the case, it really does not bear upon the points at issue. Some of it drops out because it is of little importance although probably true. Some of it probably true and perhaps of some importance we arbitrarily decide to exclude because, after all, it is impracticable to discuss it. After we have done this, our main issues become more prominent, but perhaps not yet entirely distinct. We find possibly that they fall into groups, that they are stated too broadly, that two which we thought distinct have come so closely together that they are merely variations of the same thought. Eventually by careful scrutiny we reduce these ideas to their lowest form until we

have a few fundamental thoughts which must run through the entire discussion upon which its decision depends, and these we make our *main issues*. To state this process categorically we find it is based upon these three steps:

1. A contrast of the *conflicting opinions*.
2. A reduction of this conflict to its *lowest terms*, by
 - a. The exclusion of extraneous matter;
 - b. The exclusion of trivial matter;
 - c. The exclusion of waived matter.
3. A statement of these lowest terms as the *Main Issues*.

First, we form a contrast of conflicting opinions. The word "opinion" is used intentionally. Much that we find at first is not knowledge but merely what some writer or thinker upon the subject has thought was knowledge. The first thing to do is to get these opinions categorically stated. It is evident that the *conflict of opinion* thus formed will contain some that is good and much that is bad, but we should be careful to include in it all that has been said about the subject for and against, whether to our minds it is good or bad. The conflict of opinion then may be defined as a *detailed statement of the arguments in favor of a proposition as opposed to the arguments against it*. This conflict of opinion may be and probably will be without order or coherence. As ideas have come to you, they have come to you the good and the bad, the weak and the strong, treading upon each other's heels. You arrange them as they come, making no other division than to see upon which side of the line they fall. Every speaker, every writer, does this mentally at any rate, and many would

Conflict of
opinion

be better speakers or writers if they would put these ideas into physical form. Let the student then who is about to write on any subject arrange in one column all the arguments that he knows in favor of the proposition, and let him with equal frankness and equal diligence arrange in the other column all the arguments that he knows against it. He will then have accomplished his first step and formed a *conflict in opinion*.

The conflict of opinion thus constructed resembles in some respects the problems in factoring in mathematics.

Reduction of the conflict of opinion Everything is there, either above or below the line, but by inspection we find that much of it can be removed, and that the more

that is removed, the clearer the remainder becomes. There are many things which we must consider in picking out the important arguments from the mass that is before us, but nearly all that we wish to do can be accomplished if we exclude from the argument all matter that is *extraneous*, or *trivial*, or *waived*. It may be that this classification is not inclusive, but it is sufficiently comprehensive for practical purposes.

We at once see that some of the arguments are extraneous; they do not relate to the subject at all although they

Extraneous matter may have been advanced in good faith by those who have spoken or written upon the subject, and may indeed have appealed to

our minds when we first thought of the question. These arguments do not prove the question under discussion. They often have a cogency if applied to some topic more or less related to it, but upon inspection it is evident that whether these particular arguments are true or not, they do not tend to decide the question. Such argu-

ments are outside of the question and we say that they are extraneous. It is obvious that if they do not prove anything, they have no place in our argument, and merely confuse our hearers. They may be extraneous for many reasons, but they most often creep into an argument when we are biased. The greater the interest that we feel in the subject under discussion, and the more closely it touches our sympathies, the less we are inclined to question any argument that sounds well. It behooves us, therefore, if we are especially interested, to be the more careful in this process of elimination, and to scrutinize most carefully every argument that is presented to see if it really bears upon the question. We find the most frequent illustrations of this error of including arguments which do not really bear upon the question in those propositions which have a moral or religious aspect. It is common fallacy, for instance, for those who are arguing in favor of the national prohibition of the sale of liquor to argue vehemently upon the evils of intemperance, or the bad effect of alcohol upon the human system. It is true that we may spend some time with profit upon this subject in order that our hearers may have a due conception of the magnitude of the proposition, but after all, it is a matter for explanation and not for proof. The question presupposes that an evil exists. Even our opponents agree with us. The evils of intemperance are not an issue at all; it is a question of controlling those evils. In any analysis of this question, therefore, we decide that all arguments in the conflict of opinion which tend to show the evils arising from the use of intoxicating liquors are really extraneous to a question concerning the control of the liquor traffic.

After we have excluded all extraneous thoughts from our conflict of opinion, there still remains much that would confuse the mind. As we look at the various arguments some seem greater than others, and some of the smaller sink into insignificance. An argument may be true and may tend to prove the proposition, and yet be of so little importance that its proof one way or the other exerts little influence on our minds. Clearly such an argument cannot be fundamental. As all people who argue are or should be desirous of convincing with as few words as possible, we can frequently produce better results by dismissing immediately such arguments from the discussion. In the prohibition question, again, for instance, the opponents might well point out that under a strict law alcoholic liquor could not be bought for use as a medicine. This may be true but it is not fundamental. When we are discussing the best method of controlling the evils of intemperance we see at once that the use of liquor as a medicine is trivial in comparison with the greater issues involved.

When we have dismissed the trivial as well as the extraneous thoughts, the argument is much simpler.

Trivial matter If we have done our work well, everything that is left will be cogent and will be of some importance. We are aware nevertheless that it is not yet brought to its lowest terms. There are still arguments which, it is evident, cannot be made main issues for our discussion. We cannot dismiss them as not bearing upon the question, because they frequently do bear upon the question. We cannot dismiss them as trivial, because they are of considerable importance. We

Waived matter

do dismiss them, however, because for one reason or another it is undesirable to discuss them. Some are of such a character that it is practically impossible for them to be decided. Others it is impracticable to discuss because of our own limitations. Still others it is inexpedient to discuss because of the occasion or the nature of the audience. All such matters we decide to waive.

In some discussions this waiver can be agreed upon beforehand. In the law courts attorneys frequently agree that for the purposes of a particular hearing points of comparative importance may be waived. A good example of this is seen in an argument before a lower court where the constitutionality of an act passed by the legislature is one of the questions at stake. This may be of the utmost importance to both the parties, yet, realizing that a court of inferior jurisdiction will never take it upon itself to overrule an act of the legislature until a supreme court has done so, the attorneys ordinarily waive any original constitutional questions when they are before inferior tribunals. In debates in colleges and schools the same thing is frequently done, and the practice has much to commend it. While high school students, for instance, may be perfectly able to discuss with advantage to themselves broad questions of national policy, it is not to their discredit that they are not able to understand intricate problems of constitutional law. When the Supreme Court of the United States decides upon the constitutionality of the Income Tax by a vote of five to four, it would be rather remarkable if any layman of any age could intelligently discuss the constitutional point. Frequently, therefore, the parties to these disputes agree that the constitutionality of such a question is not to be discussed. In

these cases the matter is waived by agreement, but a speaker may himself decide that he can safely waive an argument which is of some importance. Just prior to the Civil War a speaker pleading for the cause of the North in any of the border states might feel very strongly upon the subject of slavery. Indeed he might feel that it was the most important element of the question, and yet with perfect propriety waive it from the discussion. In waiving arguments, however, we must be careful that we have a valid reason for our action. If a question is fundamental, we cannot prevent its being so by declining to discuss it, and he who seeks to waive any argument must be ready to convince his audience that he has the right to waive it. It is evident that we cannot well waive any of our opponent's arguments. A waiver is something that may be made by one side, but if not agreed upon it cannot be forced upon the other.

We will also find in the conflict of opinion certain arguments upon the one side or the other which it is at once evident are true. These arguments may be of greater or less importance, but it is obvious that of whatever their importance, if they are true, they cannot be the subject of dispute. Fair play and good policy alike compel the side against whom these arguments tend to admit their validity. Such arguments may be called *admitted matter*. The next question is as to the disposition that shall be made of it.

It has been said by some writers that admitted matter must be treated in the same way that trivial or extraneous matter is treated, appearing only in the introduction, and cannot become a main issue. This is too broad a statement. Naturally the truth of admitted matter is not

at issue, but the importance of it may well become a main issue. Our very admission strengthens its effect, and we may be forced to meet it as one of the principal points which the other side will insist upon discussing. A good example of this was found prior to the adoption of the sixteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States in any discussion with regard to the passage of an income tax. The advocates of such a tax were forced to admit that it was unconstitutional, and this admission constituted in the minds of many people a powerful argument against such a tax. Upon such an admission, however, the question did not pass from the discussion, and did not become merely introductory matter. The advocates of an income tax were forced to recognize the increased burden that was cast upon them by such an admission, and the opponents rightly made it one of the principal points of discussion. The disposition of admitted matter, therefore, in the conflict of opinion depends upon the magnitude and cogency of the matter admitted, rather than upon the mere fact that both sides agree as to its truth.

**Position
and use of
admitted
matter**

If we have done our work of elimination properly, there is nothing extraneous or trivial left, and we have disposed of any arguments which we do not believe it would be profitable for one reason or another to discuss. What remains is of prime importance, and in what remains are found the main issues. It does not follow, however, that this residue is yet in the form of main issues. In constructing the conflict of opinion we were more interested in getting together a quantity of arguments than in deciding how

**Combining
and reducing
the residue**

those arguments should be expressed. Consequently, while the ideas that remain are of prime importance, they may be and generally are poorly expressed. We may find that the same argument appears in two forms, and that what we at first thought were two arguments are really two different ways of expressing one idea. It is evident then that these must be consolidated and the best wording for the idea chosen. These subordinate propositions must be worded concisely but without ambiguity as was required of the main proposition.

So the student, even after he has eliminated the chaff and has left only the wheat, must arrange his wheat to improve its appearance. Eventually he finds that he has one or more subsidiary propositions which he has stated in simple terms, and these become his main issues; upon the discussion of these the success of his arguments depends. If he has done his work well, he has taken perhaps the greatest step in winning his case. It is a maxim among lawyers that if you can get a judge or jury to accept your analysis of the case, you are well on the road to winning. If your hearers are saying to themselves, "This is well stated. This is the right way to approach this subject," the task of convincing them is comparatively easy. If, on the other hand, they question the accuracy of your analysis, you will find it impossible to convince them of the correctness of your result. If you have really brought your analysis to its lowest terms, you will ordinarily be surprised to find how few are the really fundamental subdivisions. A student who thinks that there are six or eight fundamental reasons for his argument will, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, discover that he is mistaken, and that some of them were not as

fundamental as they seemed. Indeed it is perfectly possible that the decision of any question may depend upon one subsidiary proposition, that all that has been said or thought about it may, by a process of elimination, be brought down to one question, the answer to which must inevitably solve the problem. No speaker of modern times had this faculty of analysis better developed than Abraham Lincoln, and the reader of his speeches is continually impressed by the fact that he considered comparatively few subordinate principles. In his Springfield speech, for instance, which has been said to have decided that he should be defeated for the senatorship and subsequently elected to the presidency, there was to his mind but one main issue at that time before the country. This he embodied in the words, "A nation cannot long exist, half slave and half free." In striking contrast we find students frequently jumping at their issues too speedily. Imagine Mr. Lincoln dividing his discussion into the political, social, and economic effect of slavery, or the necessity, practicability, and justice of its abolition. Such a division is worthless. It is mechanical, inflexible, and artificial. It does not express the gist of the matter but merely various points of view from which the question could be considered. If it will be remembered that analysis is an investigation for a central idea or group of ideas, it will be clear that such a system of ready-made topics falls far short of satisfying our needs. It is like a ready-made dress suit which, because it is made to fit everyone, really fits no one. Indeed, the mystic number three seems to be the bane of student discussions. If there are to be three speakers in a debate, it is certainly convenient to find three issues so that each one may have a separate

issue, but unfortunately political, social, economic or ethical questions were not primarily constructed for high school or college debaters, and it is more a matter of chance than anything else that they should have three main issues. Any attempt to get at the issues of a question except by a process of careful analysis is a pure matter of chance with the odds very much against the speaker. You may have three main issues. You may possibly have four, but you do not come upon them by chance, but through careful thinking.

It is obvious that when you have settled upon the main issues, your introduction is complete. You have then
Summary stated your question in what you believe to be its best possible form. You have explained its meaning by showing how it came under discussion, and what its history has been, and what any particular or specific term means. You have arranged all the arguments for it and against it, and by a process of elimination have excluded those which do not bear upon the question, which are of no importance, or which, for some other reason, you do not think it profitable to discuss. Finally you have stated the result in definite main issues which you intend to prove and upon the decision of which you are willing to rest your case.

CHAPTER V

THE BRIEF

“Look before you ere you leap:
For as you sow, ye are like to reap.”

WHATEVER may be said of the figures of speech in this couplet of Butler, the sense must appeal to the student of argument. If we mix our thoughts as badly as Butler mixed his metaphors, we must not be surprised if the harvest is confusion.

**The need
of a plan**

No sane man enters upon any important undertaking without first considering with more or less exactness his probable course of action. A student, even if he has carefully analyzed his subject and arrived at correct main issues, is not yet ready to write his argument. If he begins immediately to write upon his first issue, he will probably find when he has completed the argument that it does not turn out as he expected. He may wish that he had not spent so much time upon his first issue because he feels that he has made it too important in comparison with the rest of the argument, or he may wish that he had saved until a later time where it would have been more effective, a certain piece of evidence which he used early in his argument, or he may find that something which would have been of advantage if used earlier in the development of the case he has been unable to use in treating the last issue. If he had had a carefully prepared plan of his argument, all of these questions could have been settled

before he began to write. The plan of an argument is called the brief.

This plan must serve two purposes. In the first place it is a direct help to the man who makes it. When Robin-

Value of plan to writer son Crusoe had finally saved all that he could bring from the wreck to his desert

island and was facing his future existence under desperate circumstances, he first drew up a statement of his situation in which he balanced the good against the bad. Now Robinson Crusoe was alone, shut off from all communication with the rest of mankind. The statement that he drew up was obviously never to be used either as a record of events or as a communication to other people. Its sole purpose was to enable him to comprehend his situation more accurately, and Defoe, when he made his hero perform this task, realized that it would not seem unnatural or useless to his readers. Everyone knows that the moment any proposition which the mind has to consider becomes even in the slightest degree confused much is gained by putting it in written words, so that it is presented to the eye in definite form. We frequently wish to see how a thing looks "in black and white" before we finally pass judgment upon it. This is the first purpose of the brief. It visualizes our thought for our own benefit.

Visualizing our thought only for our own benefit is not enough; the brief must not only appeal to our own minds,

Value of plan to reader but must be constructed so that it may appeal to the minds of other people. We can

perhaps best appreciate the second purpose of the brief by considering the origin of the word itself. The word is borrowed from the legal fraternity. The

English barrister seldom sees his client, and almost never sees the witnesses until the trial begins. He gets his information from the solicitor who practically prepares the case. The solicitor's work is finally handed to the barrister in written form, and this form contains the principles of law involved, the facts which are to be proved, and a substantial statement of the evidence which can be offered to prove them. This is called a brief, and it is still in England a brief statement of the case in all its branches submitted to another person for his benefit. In this country the legal brief is more a memorandum of evidence and authorities and is submitted to the court. But the purpose is much the same. It is a plan of the case submitted to a third person for his benefit. It is prepared in order that the person to whom it is submitted may be able to understand and criticise the arguments.

We cannot, of course, expect criticism of our style from this preliminary plan, but it is possible to present the arrangement of our arguments and the evidence by which they are to be proved at this time, and a brief, if correctly drawn, will enable a critic to pass judgment upon the structure and the substance of our argument. A brief then may be defined as *a detailed plan of the argument which aids the composer in visualizing his thoughts, and enables the reader to criticise its structure and substance.*

**Definition
of a brief in
argument**

The student may think and probably does think that if every speaker had to take the time to prepare a brief as carefully and as elaborately as the ones required in courses in argument, public men would by the very limitation of time be unable to speak as much as their business or profession requires. The

The outline

reply to this objection is twofold. In the first place a great deal that is said and written for the public would never be said or written if much preliminary thought were required. It is perhaps true that if briefs had been required of all ministers, lawyers, politicians and statesmen, the quantity of argument would have been diminished but its quality improved. Still the exigencies of every profession do require men to speak and argue when they have not time to prepare themselves as elaborately as they might wish. On such occasions they are obliged to content themselves with preparing an outline which it would be possible to develop into a brief, but which is not a brief in form. An outline is also a plan of an argument, but in less detail. For practical purposes, however, the outline has one advantage over the brief. While the outline does not give as much information as the brief of what the argument is going to be, yet the information that it does give is more readily discernible. The very fullness of the brief tends to conceal its structure even though it be carefully composed. The outline may be compared to the skeleton of the human body which shows only the position of the bones, while the brief may be likened to an anatomical chart which endeavors to portray the various systems of the body. The student would get a quicker idea of the structure of the body from the inspection of the skeleton, but he would know more about the body after a careful study of the anatomical chart. If, therefore, it is not practicable to prepare a brief, there will generally be an opportunity to prepare a more or less extended outline, and this may be constructed so as to satisfy the first purpose of the brief, which is to visualize the thinking, even if it does not en-

tirely satisfy the second, which is to afford a basis for criticism of the substance of the argument.

Both brief and outline should not be confused with the notes from which a speech is delivered. The purposes are different and the time of construction is different. A speaker's notes are ordinarily prepared after the argument is completed, and are intended merely as a reminder so that he may develop his subject in the order that he had planned and use the material that he had prepared. The form of these notes is of little importance as long as it is suited to the needs of the speaker. They may consist of a practical synopsis of everything that is to be said, or they may be merely a few catch words written upon a card that the speaker can conceal in the palm of his hand. They are not primarily a plan of the argument. They may be meaningless to anyone except the speaker. They are merely aids to memory and have fulfilled their purpose if they enable the speaker to remember his prearranged composition. Glance at the following which is said to be the notes from which Abraham Lincoln delivered a plea in one of his early cases.

Brief and outline distinguished from speaker's notes

"No contract.—Not professional services.—Unreasonable charge.—Money retained by Def't not given to Pl'tt.—Revolutionary War.—Describe Valley Forge privations.—Pl'tt's husband.—Soldier leaving home for army.—Skin Def't.—Close."

While this was undoubtedly sufficient for the speaker, it is evident at once that it did not help Mr. Lincoln either to analyze his case, or to present a clear idea of the argument to anyone else. Both of those purposes had undoubtedly been accomplished long before the notes were jotted down.

The value of a brief in visualizing the arguments and in presenting them to a third person depends largely, if not entirely, upon its clearness, and a brief **Needs of uniform rules for briefing** cannot be clear unless it is constructed according to certain fixed principles. Accordingly, it has been found convenient in teaching the subject to require that briefs be constructed according to a uniform set of rules. A system of brief making is much like a system of book-keeping. The main thing to be accomplished is to provide a system which is efficient and convenient for the purposes of the person using it. It does not follow, therefore, that the rules which are here given are necessarily the best rules for every particular writer. Many things which are not here required might tend to make a brief clearer, and it is possible that some writers might find some of the things required by this set of rules unnecessary. They are fully as simple, however, as those generally offered by other writers on the subject, and they have worked well in practice when used by classes of college and high school students. It is obvious that for teaching purposes uniformity in brief making is necessary for all the class. The work of criticism would be rendered doubly difficult if the critic did not have some standard to which the work done by the students must conform. It is highly desirable that these rules should be memorized. In this way the student will not only be more likely to observe them, but in correcting the briefs the teacher can readily refer to the rules by numbers which will effect a large saving of work.

The purpose of these rules is, as we have seen, to produce a plan which will clarify the ideas of the writer, and present a clear view of the argument to the reader.

We will now see the way in which each rule tends to this result. Of these rules the first five evidently apply to the entire brief, and are therefore termed **A system of general rules.** The next three apply only to that portion of the brief which we have **rules for briefing** called the introduction. The three that follow apply to that portion of the brief which we have called the proof, and the last rule applies only to the conclusion.

Rule I. A brief should be divided into three parts marked Introduction, Proof, and Conclusion. In other words, the brief should conform to the argument itself. As every argument must have an introduction in which the speaker states what he is going to do, an argument proper in which he does the work that he has previously set for himself, and a conclusion in which he shows that he has accomplished his task, to omit any one of these three portions of an argument is to hamper seriously its effectiveness. It is obvious that the argument proper or proof could not be omitted because then there would be no argument at all. But if there is no introduction, if the speaker begins immediately to marshal his evidence without a word as to what he esteems his task to be, his hearers cannot appreciate the value and purpose of the work he is doing. If, on the other hand, when his argument is completed, he leaves it abruptly, it will lose much of its effectiveness because his hearers are not reminded of the purpose of his argument, and shown that he has accomplished that purpose. If, then, an argument must have an introduction, a proof, and a conclusion, the brief, which is a plan of the argument, must surely follow the same construction.

Rule II. The relation of ideas in the brief should be indicated by indentations into main headings and sub-headings. This rule merely recognizes a principle with which we are all familiar. We all realize how much easier it is to read either manuscript or print if it is properly subdivided into paragraphs and sentences. The eye quickly catches the change in position, and realizes that it indicates a change in thought. If in the brief we begin main propositions at the left-hand margin, and every time we make a subsidiary division, begin the statement a little further to the right upon the page, it will be evident when the brief is completed that it will be much more quickly and easily understood than if the statements were all placed directly under each other. If we adopt this system, the first main heading of our brief will begin at the extreme left. Following the page down with our eye we will find that vertically under this main heading will be the beginning of every other main heading in the brief. A little further to the right we will find in another vertical column all the subheadings, and still further what we may describe as the "sub-sub-headings," and so on. If the work is accurately done, the relative bearing of each statement to the main proposition can be determined at a glance from the position that it occupies upon the page. For instance, at the left of the page in the first vertical line in the Proof will be the main issues themselves. Everything that appears in that line will be, therefore, a main issue. In the second line will be subdivisions of the main issues, and everything that appears in that line will tend directly to prove the main issue to which it is subordinate, and indirectly, or in what we may call the second degree, to prove the main proposition. Still

further removed to the right in the third vertical line will be found propositions which prove subdivisions of the main issues, and everything in that line will be related to the proof of the main proposition in what we may term the third degree; that is to say, to continue our "House that Jack built," it will prove the truth of a subdivision that proves the truth of a main issue which in turn proves the truth of the proposition itself, and the system can be carried on to any degree of remoteness. This rule then is for the sole purpose of aiding us in the purely mechanical visualization of our thought; it enables the eye to catch readily the relation and importance of the various ideas.

Rule III. The relation of ideas should be further indicated by a uniform system of symbols, each heading being marked by one and only one symbol. This rule, like the previous one, is an endeavor to render the reading of a brief easier by aiding the eye to catch quickly the relative importance and position of the idea. In the preceding rule we made the position on the page a help to us. Here we give each idea a number or letter to distinguish it, and according to the kind of number or letter which we use, its relative position and importance is also determined. Thus, for example, the main issues not only may be placed at the left of the page, but are also designated by Roman numerals I, II, III, etc. Their subdivisions may in turn be designated by capital letters A, B, C, etc., and further subdivisions by Arabic numerals, and so on. If the scheme adopted is kept uniform, we have another aid for telling at a glance what relation the particular thought expressed bears to the main proposition. The

following has been found by much experience to be one of the simplest and most useful methods of symbolization.

I.

A.

1.

a.

(1)

(a)

Not only should each idea be marked by one symbol, but it should not be marked by more than one. There is always a temptation, if you cannot quite see the relation of your ideas, to change your method of numbering so as to force your brief to conform to your thought. This is not what we are trying to do. We are trying to make our thoughts clear by arranging them so as to conform to the rules of briefing. If the student finds that he cannot arrange his ideas logically and give a single symbol to each idea, he should realize that the fault is with his own crude thoughts, and not with the principles of briefing. If the correlation of his thought is right, every separate idea will drop into its proper place, and can be designated by one and only one symbol.

Rule IV. Each heading should be phrased as a complete statement. This rule is a recognition of the principle to which we have already alluded in considering the wording of the subject. It is the object of the brief that ideas shall be clearly presented. Now it is far easier to be confused when we are thinking in phrases than it is when we are thinking in completed sentences. As long as we use general terms and incomplete statements, we may fall into an error, but the moment we complete our

statements we become more definite and the possibility of error is diminished. The reason for this rule then is that it tends toward definite expression and thus toward clearness of thought.

Rule V. Each heading should contain but a single proposition or idea. In the previous rule we learned that each heading should contain a complete and definite idea. We now find that not only should the idea be complete and definite, but also that it should be single. This again is in the interests of clearness. When we consider each heading, we wish to find out whether it is a logical expression of our thought and tends to help our argument. If the heading contains more than one idea all that we have tried to accomplish by the previous rules with regard to symbols and indentations is lost because the relations of two separate ideas cannot be so shown.

Rule VI. In the introduction expository briefing should be used, in which each heading explains or is a division of the heading to which it is subordinated. It will be remembered that the introduction of an argument is essentially an explanation. Briefing is of two forms: in the form which we call expository, each heading explains or is a division of the one to which it is subordinate; in the form which we call argumentative, each heading proves the heading to which it is subordinate. Therefore in the introduction we use expository briefing. In giving the history of the question, for instance, there may be a number of important events or a number of important phases of the situation which we have to consider. Each of these is naturally subdivided into matters of lesser

importance, and these in turn may also be subdivided. When set down in that form, they constitute a complete explanation of the history of the question in which each event or phase of the situation has its relative position and value. The subordinate statements do not show that the statements to which they are subordinated are true. They merely are natural subdivisions or explanations of it. The relation of ideas, however, is just as important in the introduction as anywhere else. Each heading should be a true subdivision or explanation of a heading that precedes it. It should be a subdivision not merely in form; it should also be one in sense and the logical connection of ideas should be just as traceable in the introduction as it is in any other part of the brief.

Rule VII. The main headings of the introduction should be those steps in the analysis necessary for an intelligent reading of the brief. The introduction serves to analyze the entire proposition and reduce it to its main issues. The steps therefore which we take in our argument are of necessity the principal steps of the brief. In other words, if you find it necessary to state the immediate interest of the question, the first division of your brief introduction¹ should be the immediate interest of the question. That should be followed by your second subdivision, which is the history of the question, and that by the third, which is the definition of the question, provided all these steps are necessary. If for any reason it is desirable to change the order, it should be changed in the brief introduction. The general rule of the in-

¹ Abbreviated form for "brief of the introduction."

troduction should be that it contain all that is necessary in order that the body of the brief may be understood, and all that is necessary for that understanding can ordinarily be included under the various steps of the analysis which have been outlined in the previous chapters. Using these steps as the main subdivisions will produce a uniformity of treatment which tends to clearness.

Rule VIII. The introduction should always be concluded with the main issues. Probably the most important point in the whole process of your preliminary thought is the establishing of the main issues, and when the main issues are established, it does not seem possible to carry the process of analysis any further. From that time on your work is one of synthesis rather than analysis. You are engaged in constructing rather than in taking to pieces. The introduction of the argument, therefore, properly ends with the establishment of the main issues. For this reason it is logical that it should occupy the same place in the brief. Besides being the logical place for the main issues, it is also convenient for the purposes of both writer and critic that the main issues should always appear in the same position. In that way they may be readily found even at the most hasty examination. As a matter, therefore, both of logic and of convenience the last thing in the brief introduction should always be a statement of the main issues.

Rule IX. In the proof argumentative briefing should be used, in which each heading offers proof of the heading to which it is subordinated. This is the most impor-

tant of all the rules of briefing because upon its observance depends the logic of the brief. The entire purpose of the proof of an argument is by an array of facts, figures, authorities, illustration, and methods of reasoning to convince the mind of the hearer that the proposition is true. Anything that does this is good, and if it is important enough, deserves a place in the brief. It is obvious, however, that the relation of every fact to the proof of the main proposition is not immediately apparent. The very fact that we divide a subject into main issues which are themselves proofs of the main proposition is indicative of this principle, but every piece of evidence tends to prove some fact, and that fact, when it is established, tends to prove something else, and so on through a chain of reasoning until we come to the main proposition itself. It follows then that the most minute subdivision in that part of the brief which we call the Proof must be traceable by successive steps to the main proposition. It is the purpose of the brief to enable us to trace this logical chain of connection because it is by tracing it that we ascertain whether our evidence is really probative or not. The student can test his proof and be absolutely sure that he is not offering any false arguments if he will see that every statement in his brief can be traced back to the original subject by a series of steps in which every subordinate heading proves the truth of the statement to which it is subordinated. If the brief stands this test, even though it violates some of the other rules, it will be of some logical benefit; but if it violates this rule, even though it adheres to all the others, it will of necessity be illogical and confused. This rule is so important that we may call it "the golden rule of briefing."

Rule X. The main headings of the proof should be the main issues. This is almost a corollary of the ninth rule. The main issues are the first subdivisions of the subject. If the analysis by which they are found is correct, they are subordinate statements which prove the subject. It is upon the proof of the main issues that the success of the argument depends. It is evident, therefore, that when we come to that part of the brief which we call the Proof, our largest subdivisions will be the main issues.

Rule XI. Refutation should be designated by quoting with a negative clause the argument to be refuted. That portion of the proof in which we do not necessarily advance our own side, but rather are engaged in answering the arguments advanced by our opponents, is called refutation. It is destructive as opposed to constructive argument. The idea to be refuted may be of great or little importance. We may attack the main issues of our opponent, or we may attack a minute idea of his evidence. Wherever that style of argument occurs, however, it is refutation. While clearness is greatly to be desired in all parts of the argument, it is vitally essential in the refutation. The way to obtain clearness is to be careful that the argument which you are refuting is exactly stated. There must be some form of words which will always call attention to the fact that it is destructive and not constructive argument that is being offered. This may be done in several ways. For example:

- I. Although it is contended that woman suffrage has not been successful in Colorado, yet *this is not true*, because
 - A. Under woman suffrage Colorado has passed many laws for the benefit of working women.

or

- I. *It is not true that* woman suffrage has not been successful in Colorado, because
 - A. Under woman suffrage Colorado has passed many laws for the benefit of working women, etc.

This at once calls attention by a negative clause, *it is not true that*, to the introduction of something which has been stated. If refutation in the brief is introduced in this manner, the negative statement which is unusual and which can occur only in a case of refutation calls attention to it at once, and prevents any misunderstanding or confusion.

Rule XII. The conclusion should consist of a statement of the main issues followed by an affirmation or denial of the proposition without qualification. After you have proved your case all that remains to be done for the sake of producing an effective close is to remind your hearers of what you have done, and call to their attention that it was the task which you set out to do. In the brief this can generally be expressed by a mere statement of the main issues followed by the exact statement of the proposition without qualification. If you have proved your question, you have proved it as you stated it. If you find at the end of your brief that your argument has not convinced you, and that you wish to modify the original statement or qualify it, you can rest assured that your argument will not convince anyone else. Unless, therefore, you are prepared to close your entire brief as well as the discussion itself by the assertion of the proposition exactly as you stated it at the beginning, you will not have a good brief. If you find that you are unable to obey this rule, not only will its violation tell you that your brief is not

good, but it will also be a sure indication that the argument itself has not fulfilled its purpose.

RULES FOR BRIEFING

GENERAL

I. A brief should be divided into three parts marked Introduction, Proof, and Conclusion.

II. The relation of ideas in the brief should be indicated by indentations into main headings and sub-headings.

III. The relation of ideas should be further indicated by a uniform system of symbols, each heading being marked by one and only one symbol.

IV. Each heading should be phrased as a complete statement.

V. Each heading should contain but a single proposition or idea.

INTRODUCTION

VI. In the introduction expository briefing should be used, in which each heading explains or is a division of the heading to which it is subordinated.

VII. The main headings of the introduction should be those steps in the analysis necessary for an intelligent reading of the brief.

VIII. The introduction should always be concluded with the main issues.

PROOF

IX. In the proof argumentative briefing should be used, in which each heading offers proof of the heading to which it is subordinated.

X. The main headings of the proof should be the main issues.

XI. Refutation should be designated by quoting with a negative clause the argument to be refuted.

CONCLUSION

XII. The conclusion should consist of a statement of the main issues followed by an affirmation or denial of the proposition without qualification.

CHAPTER VI

EVIDENCE

WE are more accustomed to consider the Declaration of Independence as an historical document than as a model of argumentative composition, yet if the student of argument examines it from the second standpoint, he will find that it is not only admirable on account of the directness and force of its style, but also that it is a model of clearness on account of its construction. We find in the first two paragraphs an introduction which finally gives a clear statement of the main issue involved, that the present king of Great Britain has by repeated injuries and usurpations attempted to establish an absolute tyranny over the colonies. Then we find this significant sentence.—“To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.”

**Declaration
of Independ-
ence as an
argument**

If Thomas Jefferson in this appeal to mankind, the importance of which he and his co-workers could not have under-estimated, and which they drew with a care that is not often given to such compositions, felt that it was necessary to prove his assertion by facts, how can the student of argument fail to recognize the necessity? The larger part of the Declaration of Independence is a categorical statement of facts which are offered in proof of this main contention. Yet instructors in English are continually called

**Nature
of proof**

upon to criticise so-called arguments which are nothing but a series of general statements having as their only authority the opinion of the writer himself, whose lack of knowledge of the subject is only too apparent. While it is most important that the student should carefully analyze the proposition until he sees clearly and can make others see clearly the fundamental points upon which it rests, his task is then only partly completed. He must next address himself to the problem of proving the truth of these main issues. If his analysis is good, his hearers will accept it and are ready to be convinced, but they are not yet convinced, and they will not agree with him if he merely asserts his contentions. He must back up his issues by proof in order to bring the minds of his hearers into full conformity with his own. Proof therefore may be defined as *that which convinces the mind*, or if we wish for a longer definition, "Anything which serves immediately or mediately to convince the mind of the truth or the falsehood of a fact or proposition."¹ This proof is generally made up of numerous component parts. Facts, figures, illustrations, opinions, logical inferences are all marshalled to show that the proposition contended for is true. Each by itself is a piece of evidence the tendency of which is to show that the proposition is true; in combination with other factors of a similar nature it makes up the proof. In other words, evidence is that which makes the proof, or better, it is the "material of proof."² We may say then that *proof is that which convinces the mind, and evidence is the material of proof*.

¹ Best on Evidence, page 5.

² Baker & Huntington, page 69.

An argument that is without evidence is assertive. *Assertion may be said to be the statement of an unsupported opinion.* Now there are few people whose assertion is sufficient to convince our minds upon any subject, and it is safe to say that there is no one whose unsupported opinion upon any great variety of subjects is conclusive. For the ordinary man, therefore, to rest his case merely upon his own opinion is fatal. Our minds demand not only that he shall state that a thing is so, but that he shall also show us why it is so. Yet it is always those whose opinions are of little value who seem to be most insistent in offering them to the world without support. Socrates became so distrustful of himself that he asserted that he knew nothing, but it is safe to assume that at the same time the groves of Athens resounded with the clamor of lesser men who were not afraid to assert their opinions upon almost any subject. The student who is a beginner in argument should realize, therefore, that even if he has read extensively upon the subject and has thought carefully upon it, it is not enough for him to state the result of his reading and his thought in his own terms and expect it to be received by his hearers. They will demand that he show them not merely his opinion upon the subject, but to a greater or lesser extent those facts upon which he based his opinion and upon which they will be justified in following him. Mere assertion unsupported by evidence, even if it be shouted from the housetops, may stifle opposition and even reduce the critic and judge to silence, but it does not convince the mind and this is the purpose of argument.

The consideration of evidence presents two points of

Assertion
not proof

view. We must consider both the nature of evidence itself and the way in which it accomplishes its result, or

Evidence to put it more directly, in the first place, what is evidence, and in the second place, how does it work? In this chapter we shall consider the first of these propositions.

Before we proceed to a more extended consideration of the nature of evidence we must free our minds from an

Nature of legal evidence ambiguity in the use of the word itself. It is perhaps true that in a large majority of cases in which the word evidence comes to our attention it is used in connection with legal affairs. In the newspapers, in books and even in the drama we find the law retaining its grip upon the word, and we are continually told that such a fact or such a statement is or is not "evidence." Such statements really mean that it is or is not evidence which can be presented in a court of law to establish the truth or falsehood of a fact in the mind of a court or jury. This gives a very restricted meaning to the word. There are numberless reasons why courts of law have limited the application of evidence. The orderly conduct of trials, the unreliability of human recollection, the demands of public policy, the physical limitations of time and space, and other things, have influenced the courts in limiting the kinds of evidence which can be used. The mind of man knows no such limitations, and will consider anything which tends to produce a conviction as to the truth or falsity of a proposition. For instance, if I desire to know the contents of a certain document, I may well satisfy my mind by calling up a friend on the telephone whom I know to have seen the document and asking him to give me his recollection of

its contents. Relying upon his statement I may enter upon business undertakings which are far reaching in their results. My knowledge of my friend's character, accuracy, and opportunities of observation may be sufficient to convince me that his statement is for practical purposes as satisfactory as a perusal of the document itself. Yet no one would for a moment think that a judge or a jury should be allowed to proceed in such an indirect and informal way. The rules of law would demand that the document itself be produced, and would not permit secondary evidence of its contents until the court was satisfied that it was not possible to produce it. While, therefore, the rules of legal evidence are doubtless right and proper and tend in the long run to the establishment of truth and justice, and while the fact that any particular piece of evidence could not be produced in a court of law may warn us to examine it closely to see why it is that the law rejects it, nevertheless outside the courts anything that will affect my mind can be rightly offered to me to produce its logical result. In argument we are not concerned with the admissibility of evidence. All evidence is admissible, and we have only to consider the effect it will produce.

The natural tendency of students in schools and colleges when they are called upon to prove a proposition seems to be to substitute the opinion of some other person, in whom they have confidence, for their own. If you ask a college student why a thing is so, he is very apt to reply, "Professor X said so in his lecture last Monday," or "Professor X says so in his book." In other words, when you question his assertion, he falls back upon the assertion

**Argument
from au-
thority**

of some other person in whom he thinks you will have more confidence. Now while a too close adherence to this method of proof is not conducive of the best results, nevertheless the mere assertions of certain people are entitled to consideration, and can be offered in evidence. If I am seeking to ascertain the truth or falsity of a proposition, the words of some one who I know has given attention to it, and who is probably better acquainted with the subject that I am does produce an effect upon my mind and is consequently evidence. It is therefore a sort of exception to the general rule that assertion is not proof.

When we seek in this way to convince the mind by imposing upon it the opinion of some third person rather

Nature of the argu- ment from authority	than by a process of logic, we are said to use the <i>argument from authority</i> . The strength of the argument from authority is found in the fact that it presents to our
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hearers the opinion of some one whom they recognize as having a greater intellectual attainment upon the specific subject than the hearers themselves possess. The weakness of the argument from authority is that it does not in reality change the mind of our hearers. No logical process is involved. The hearers merely substitute another man's opinion for their own, and while they are in that position are particularly susceptible to argument. If we work out for ourselves from experiment or otherwise a theory or belief, it becomes ours. It is the child of our own brain and we are naturally jealous of any attack upon it. We can be convinced that it is false only by the most convincing testimony and reason. A belief that we receive from the mind of another is at the best only an adopted child, and we are ready to change it whenever a greater au-

thority appears, or whenever it is attacked by logical argument. While, therefore, the argument from authority is a proper and valid argument to use, the student of argument is warned that its continued use to the exclusion of all other kinds of evidence will give to any argument an academic tinge, and will in the minds of practical men detract from its force.

The value of the argument from authority naturally depends upon the source from which the statement comes. To test it, therefore, we should test the source itself, and should test it in three different ways. First, what is the prominence of the authority in the minds of our hearers? Second, has the authority knowledge of the subject under discussion? Third, is the authority biased on the question?

**Test of the
argument
from au-
thority**

With regard to the first of these questions it is evident that the value of our authority depends largely upon the recognition which he obtains from our hearers. Mr. Smith and the President of the United States may have the same opinion upon certain questions, and Mr. Smith may be as well able to express his opinion as the President, but none of us will pay any attention to his opinion while we will carefully consider that of the President of the United States. The trouble with Mr. Smith is that we can see no reason why we should believe him more than any other man, but we do realize that the President of the United States must be a man of such character and attainment that his opinion upon almost any subject, if he is willing to express it, deserves consideration. The first thing therefore with regard to the position of our authority must be his promi-

**Reputa-
tion of the
authority**

nence, and if the authority is not prominent, it is the duty of the writer to see that he is properly introduced. The authority is better if no introduction is necessary, that is, if our hearers at once recognize his claim to consideration. Still there are many men whose opinions are entitled to weight in particular subjects, but whose prominence in those subjects is known only to a limited circle. To the general public, for example, the name of Horace Howard Furness conveys but little, yet students of Shakespeare would at once recognize the foremost Shakespearean scholar and critic of the last half century. A speaker addressing an audience of ordinarily educated people might fail to make his point if, in quoting Doctor Furness, he mentioned him merely by name. If, however, he should tell the same audience in a sentence or two, or even in a phrase, the claim to consideration that Doctor Furness possessed when writing on this particular subject, the evidence would have great weight. It follows, therefore, that our authority must be prominent, and if his prominence is not at once apparent to the audience, they should be informed of it by a proper introduction. Not only must the authority be prominent but his prominence must be of the right kind. There is a difference between fame and notoriety, and because a man is widely known he is not necessarily widely esteemed. No matter how prominent a man is, if he is known as a charlatan, or as being superficial or untruthful, his testimony will naturally carry but little weight. It is related that Benjamin F. Butler was once arguing against Judge Hoar in Massachusetts. Desiring to emphasize in the course of his argument the value which every one places upon human life, he quoted, as he said, from the Scriptures,

"All that a man hath will he give for his life." In reply Judge Hoar facetiously questioned the character of the authority, and reminded his hearers that while it was true that the sentence in question was found in the Scriptures, they should remember that it was there set down as having proceeded from the mouth of Satan. In other words, while Mr. Butler's authority was prominent, it was prominence of the wrong kind.

We now pass to the second consideration with regard to the value of an authority, that is, the knowledge of the subject which he possesses. It requires no demonstration to show that no matter how illustrious and how upright in character a man may be, his opinion cannot be of value upon many subjects. After all, a big name or a high character will not convince us unless we feel that the man knows more than the general run of people upon the particular matter under discussion. Yet we see continually in the advertising columns of the newspapers, and sometimes in the news columns as well, interviews and opinions which are offered to the public for the purpose of convincing them that something is true because some illustrious person says so. We are told that a celebrated author smokes so and so's cigars, or that a prominent ball player wears somebody's hose supporters, or that a celebrated divine has bought such and such a graphophone. Apparently this sort of advertising pays or it would not be continued, but as a matter of argument the evidence is useless. A man may know much about poetry and little about tobacco, or he may be worth ten thousand dollars a year as a professional ball player and not worth ten cents as a judge of hose supporters, or his opinion with regard to

**Knowledge
of the au-
thority**

theology may be of great value and his knowledge of music worthless. No error is more commonly committed even by people who should know better than this offering a man as an authority because he happens to be great, without inquiring whether he has special knowledge upon the subject. It is far better to use as an authority a man whose position requires explanation than it is to use one whose prominence is at once recognized, but whose lack of knowledge of the subject is as apparent as his prominence. If we wish to put it in mathematical terms, the value of an authority varies directly not only with his prominence but also with his knowledge of the subject under discussion.

In addition to the prominence of our authority and his knowledge of the subject we must also take into consideration his bias. This brings us to a dilemma which frequently arises in the use of an authority. We have seen that familiarity with the subject is necessary, but this very familiarity generally creates strong beliefs one way or the other. We may therefore find that while our authority is highly esteemed, and is universally admitted to know what he is talking about, he has become so identified with one side of the question that his opinion loses weight because of his bias. It does not follow that he cannot be right, or that his opinion should not be offered, but it is true that in so far as he is biased he is less likely to have formed accurate ideas because his preferences naturally lead him to exaggerate. Therefore, when his opinion is offered, it will frequently be less convincing than the opinion of a man of lesser prominence and possibly of lesser knowledge who can approach the subject with an open mind. For

**Prejudice of
the authority**

example, probably the opinion of no man in the United States upon educational matters is worthy of more consideration than that of Doctor Eliot, the president emeritus of Harvard University, and if we were discussing the so-called elective system in education, the advocates of that system would rightfully consider his opinions evidence of great weight. He fulfils the other tests which we have prescribed. He is prominent in the public eye, and is recognized as being thoroughly familiar with the subject by every one, and yet the opponents of the elective system would rightly point out that as the leading exponent of the system he may be prejudiced in its favor. An authority need not be dismissed from consideration because he is biased; absolutely unbiased persons are hard to find. It would be a peculiar mind indeed that could study deeply into a question and form no opinions upon it. Nevertheless, human nature is such that a person having an opinion is insensibly prejudiced in its favor. The question to be decided in using such an authority is to what extent the bias impairs the value of the testimony.

In summing up we find that the perfect authority should be acceptable to our hearers both because of his prominence in the public eye and because of his good character; that he should be familiar to the last degree with the subject upon which he is giving his opinion; and that he should be without bias upon the matter discussed. A person who fulfilled all those requirements would be an ideal authority. Unfortunately such persons are hard to find, but in so far as our authorities depart from these specifications their evidence is weakened, and it is for the student

**Summary
of the argu-
ment from
authority**

of argument to decide at what point the value of the opinion is lost.

The evidence offered by the argument from authority does not affect the logical process of the mind; we merely

Kinds of evidence accept the opinions of other people upon faith in their accuracy. We now come to consider

the main body of evidence to which the foregoing is an exception, and we are at once confronted with a natural division which it is important to understand. If we are trying to prove any proposition, we can offer proof in two ways, either to the fact itself that we are trying to establish, or to some other fact from which we argue that an inference should be drawn. If a man is accused of murder, the government might offer a witness who would testify that he saw the murderer and his victim struggling together and actually saw the blow struck which caused the death, and they might also offer a witness who would testify that he saw the murderer running away from the spot with blood upon his hands. The first evidence we would call direct; that is, it is evidence which convinces us without our using any process of reasoning in our own minds. The second we would call circumstantial because it is indirect evidence of the crime itself, but direct evidence of a fact from which we, by a process of reasoning, infer that the crime was committed by the person accused.¹ Direct evidence, then, is evidence which is offered to establish the fact itself. Circumstantial evidence is evidence which is offered to

¹ We use the terms "direct" and "circumstantial" in their ordinary meaning. For a more accurate distinction of direct and indirect evidence from testimonial and circumstantial, see Baker and Huntington, *Principles of Argumentation*, page 84.

establish some other fact from which by logical reasoning the fact itself may be inferred.

There has been much controversy as to the value of the two kinds of evidence, and unthinking people frequently refer to circumstantial as being less trustworthy than direct. It is often said that men ought not to be convicted of capital offences upon circumstantial evidence be-

Relative
value of
these kinds
of evidence

cause if no one has seen the crime committed, there always must be some doubt with regard to it. This prejudice is entirely unwarranted. The test of evidence is not whether it is direct or circumstantial, but whether it is convincing. Neither kind is better than the other because both have their good and their bad points. It is true that direct evidence leaves no opportunity for error in drawing inferences. If a witness testifies that he saw a man stabbed, fall down, and that afterwards he discovered that the man was dead, there can be no mistake in a conviction provided the witness is testifying to the truth. It is that proviso, however, which reveals the weakness of direct evidence. If it is unaccompanied by anything circumstantial, the conclusion must rest entirely upon the accuracy of the witness. If he is lying or is mistaken, the testimony is valueless. The strength of direct evidence, then, lies in the fact that no mistake can be made in drawing the inference; its weakness lies in the fallibility of humanity. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is strong because it eliminates human fallibility to a marked degree, and weak because it depends upon the ability of the human mind to reason correctly. In the example which we have used, it would be no less convincing if instead of producing a direct witness of the murder,

the government had produced a number of witnesses who established these facts: that the accused person had reason to hate his victim; that a knife which he bought a few days previous was found beside the body; that he had been discovered wiping blood from his hands a few minutes after the tragedy occurred; that footprints were found in the earth which showed that a struggle had taken place, and that the boots worn by the accused exactly fitted these footprints; and that the murdered man's watch was found in his possession. Few of us would not be convinced by such an array of evidence from a half dozen different witnesses because we would reason and reason rightly that while one of these people might be mistaken and while one of these facts might be possible of explanation, together the facts form a chain of circumstances which is thoroughly convincing. It seems, therefore, that the value of evidence is not to be measured by whether it is direct or circumstantial. Either is good; neither is better. In the one case you have to fear the unreliability of human testimony, and in the other the unreliability of human reasoning.

We have now to consider what are the tests of evidence. In considering this matter the first thing to keep in mind is the fact that in argument the ultimate
Testing the evidence test is the effect that the evidence produces upon the mind of the person to whom it is addressed. The evidence that produces conviction is the evidence that is of value, and it is of no avail for us to comfort ourselves after defeat with the reflection that we ought to have been successful. If we have an unprejudiced critic or an unprejudiced tribunal, the fact that we were not successful is a sure indication, as far as

it depends upon the evidence, that we have been unsuccessful in our proof. The adage that the "proof of the pudding is in the eating" is an accurate statement of this general test. The student of argument should endeavor to keep clear in his mind the effect that was produced upon him when he first came across the evidence that he is going to use. If it seemed to him strong, it is more likely to seem strong to his hearers. If it seemed weak to him, its weakness will be apparent to them.

Perhaps the first question that your hearers will ask is "Do we believe this?" and they will not believe it if it seems to them inconsistent. It can be inconsistent in three ways. In the first place, it can be inconsistent with itself. In the second place, it can be inconsistent with other evidence which you have offered. In the third place, it can be inconsistent with human judgment.

**Tests of
consistency**

It would seem unlikely that anyone would make the mistake of offering evidence that is upon the face of it wrong, and yet we frequently find just this error being committed. Not long ago a newspaper announced the discovery of graft in certain public works amounting to "millions of dollars," and yet in the very same article and within a few lines of where the statement was made gave the entire amount paid for the work in question as less than a million dollars. It would seem that the most superficial mind could not be convinced by evidence of this sort, and yet we know that such statements, unless carefully analyzed, do have a certain effect. Unfortunately this lack of consistency is not always as apparent as in the case given, but it does not require much thought to expose the incon-

**Is it con-
sistent with
itself?**

sistency of such an argument as this which was advanced by reasonably intelligent students who were in favor of organized cheering at athletic games. They claimed that organized cheering should be allowed because it tended to encourage the players to do their utmost, and that it really had no evil effect upon the other side because experience had shown that in the excitement of a college game the players did not notice the cheering. A more naïve form of it is found in the statement of the student who breathlessly ran up to his instructor upon the street and said, "Oh, Professor X, I have done nothing but look for you for the last two days. I wanted to see if you would not give me a twenty-four hour extension upon the thesis which is due this afternoon." A somewhat more subtle example is this: "Among the ruins of Pompeii was found a coin bearing the date 200 B. C." This error is more often committed, however, where the testimony is complex in its character. A statement may be offered in which many facts and inferences are combined, and the final decision of the person offering it may seem at first to be worthy of belief. A careful analysis of the statement, nevertheless, may show that the conclusions drawn are inconsistent with the statement itself. We find therefore that if in any evidence, whether simple or complex, there is a manifest inconsistency, the evidence is not trustworthy and must be disregarded in so far as the inconsistency affects its validity.

Not only must evidence be consistent with itself, but it must be consistent with the other known facts in the case. In criminal investigations the inexperienced frequently err through not observing this rule. Having in mind that a crime has been committed and that the

person who has committed it is obviously of evil intent, they grasp eagerly at any evil fact as proof that their preconceived theory of the crime is correct, and not infrequently end up by proving to their own satisfaction that their supposed criminal has committed two different acts

Is it consistent with the other facts?

which are inconsistent with each other. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in his Sherlock Holmes stories calls attention to this error when he warns his colleague Watson against attributing to the same man acts which could only be accomplished by men of different mental capabilities. He points out that it is inconsistent to suppose that a man will commit a crime which calls for a high order of mentality and at the same time act with infantile simplicity in other respects. Students, however, are not ordinarily engaged in criminal research and more often fall into this error by a desire to adopt too many good arguments. Any question of large importance which is much disputed is likely to offer many opportunities for committing this error. Probably no question before the people of this country has excited so much argument as the question of the advisability of maintaining our protective tariff. Many able minds have been in favor of the policy of protection and many able arguments have been written and spoken in its favor, yet they were made by different people who had different points of view. If we collect our evidence indiscriminately, we may find that the statements of one speaker who believes in a certain high tariff for protection are inconsistent with the statements of another who believes in the same tariff for revenue only. Each of these views may be advanced with sincerity, and each undoubtedly can be supported by able

arguments, but as the two positions are inconsistent with each other, so the evidence which is offered to support them may, unless carefully scrutinized, prove equally inconsistent. We must be careful, therefore, not to allow ourselves to be put in a position where we are compelled to use evidence that is inconsistent with the facts which we have already established.

The third inconsistency in evidence is inconsistency with human experience. People will not believe evidence

Is it inconsistent with human experience?

which does not seem probably or possibly true. Nothing was more characteristic of the nineteenth century than the rapidity with which people discarded views which depended solely upon assertion when those assertions were contrary to human experience. For centuries people without much question had accepted as facts all sorts of supernatural and miraculous events and superstitions, but as human thought grew clearer they began to apply this test which we may perhaps call the test of probability. It became difficult for men to believe, for instance, that Joshua could command the sun to stand still and have it obey him when they realized that such a phenomenon was entirely contrary to everything else that they had ever known. At the present time this protest against the improbable has reached a point where it sometimes seems that the entire community is oversceptical. Nothing that is at all strange seems to be accepted as true even upon the testimony of the most faultless authority. It seems therefore that if the evidence that we wish to offer is upon the face of it improbable, we must either be prepared to prove its truth as an independent proposition, or else realize that it will have but

little effect. Yet where our argument deals with the abolition of an accepted error much of the evidence will at first glance seem improbable. All that can be said with regard to the use of evidence that is inconsistent with human experience is this,—it is far better to use evidence that your hearers will accept as true than to use evidence which they do not at first believe, and the truth of which you have to prove. It is unwise to burden yourself with the double task of proving not only your proposition but also the evidence by which you prove the proposition. But evidence is something that exists and not something that we invent. We have to take things as we find them, and it may be that the only way to prove a new truth is by evidence which is apparently, though not really, inconsistent with human experience.

If our evidence, then, is consistent with itself, and does not contradict any other fact upon which we are depending, and does not seem to be at odds with the general views of mankind, we can consider that it is acceptable from the standpoint of consistency, and that it will itself appeal to our hearers.

**Summary of
the tests of
consistency**

Consistency, however, is not the only test of evidence. The mind may not see anything wrong in the evidence itself, but may see considerable to criticise in the source from which it comes. While good evidence may come from a poor source, it is true that if we have not confidence in its source, we doubt its value. Much we have said with regard to the argument from authority applies in testing the source of evidence, but the problem is to some degree different. The argument from authority consists of the *opinion* of the person testifying, whereas evidence, with the exception

**Tests of the
source of
evidence**

of the argument from authority, consists of *facts* stated by the person testifying. We therefore ask four questions, all designed to test the reliability of the source in order that we may know whether we can depend upon the accuracy of the fact. The four questions to be asked concerning the source of evidence are:—

1. Is the source truthful?
2. Has the source opportunity of knowing the fact?
3. Has the source capability of understanding?
4. Does the bias of the source affect the statement of the fact?

With regard to the first question the objection to an untruthful witness is at once apparent. While the maxim,

Is the source truthful? “False in one thing, false in all,” is not literally true, it is a fact that if the human mind

finds that it has been deceived once, it is very slow to accept any further statements from the same source. There is perhaps no more effective way to destroy arguments than to show that in other instances the opponents have been wrong. Fortunately deliberate lying in argument is comparatively rare, and is generally easily detected, but careless misstatements unfortunately are not unusual. For instance, a student arguing in favor of the recall of public officials, a principle in which he strongly believes, announces that “office holders in the United States are nearly all corrupt,” and is much surprised to find that he has made a statement which is the exact opposite of the truth. Another arguing against prohibition alluded to Portland, Maine, and one or two smaller cities. It developed later in the argument that one of the smaller cities was Cambridge, Massachusetts, the population of which is about double

that of Portland. Still another, deeply impressed with the necessity of legal reform, stated that the average case in court occupied from three to five years, whereas the facts demonstrated that a case that extends through two years is far above the average. Each of these three mistakes was made because the writer was careless with the truth, and not necessarily untruthful, and each being detected raised a doubt as to the accuracy of the rest of the writer's work. In each case "the wish was father to the thought," and the evidence depended upon was manufactured carelessly to meet a preconceived idea. When applied to the facts of everyday life, the amount of inaccuracy that is offered at every hand is remarkable. The fish that is lost is always the biggest fish of the day not only in the pictures of the professional humorist, but really in the accounts of our own friends. We complain that we had to wait half an hour for a car when we really did not have to wait ten minutes, or that we got only a few minutes' sleep when, as a matter of fact, we slept through the greater part of the night. This does not mean that the world is bad, but it does mean that humanity is woefully inaccurate, and when we make such careless statements the basis of sober argument, we will sooner or later suffer the consequences. The person who gets in the habit of reckless assertion soon is marked among his fellows, and all his statements lose weight because they are suspected of being inaccurate. In testing our own or our opponents' evidence the first question to ask is, therefore, whether the source of testimony is habitually accurate? If it is not, we cannot say that the statement is untrue, but we can say that it may be untrue, which detracts much from its usefulness.

The second question does not relate to the character of the source, but to the opportunity for obtaining correct information. A man may be ever so honest and ever so accurate, and yet his evidence may be of little value because it is at once evident that he had little or no opportunity of observing at first hand the facts to which he is testifying. This is especially noticeable in debates in public assemblies. Students who habitually take statements made by senators and representatives as published in the *Congressional Record* as evidence of the highest type will do well to apply this test to the facts which they find. A little thought will show them that the bald statement of the senator from Missouri, for instance, who perhaps never saw salt water until he came to Washington, may not be of the highest value with regard to facts concerning the light-house stations along the Atlantic coast, and that the senator from Massachusetts may be in error when he makes sweeping statements with regard to a government irrigation project in southern Texas. In each of these instances it is probable that the eminent gentlemen are stating evidence which they themselves have had no opportunity of acquiring. If it is true that personally they do not know anything about the facts which they are citing, it is at once obvious that until their source of information is disclosed the evidence must stand as the statement of a man who, however capable he may be in other respects, has had no opportunity of personally knowing the facts concerning which he speaks. It is well to investigate every statement of fact on which an argument depends, and find out what is the final authority on which it rests, and when that authority is

Has the
source op-
portunity
of knowing
the fact?

found, to ask ourselves whether he really had an opportunity of knowing the fact which he asserts. While we err frequently in this respect, we at once recognize the value of the converse of this proposition. If a man has a special reason for knowing that a thing is true, we at once seize upon it as proof of the validity of the fact. Prior to the Spanish-American War in 1898 much was said and written with regard to the condition of Cuba, but it was generally conceded that the utterances that had the most effect upon the minds of the people were those of Senator Thurston made directly after an extended visit to Cuba for the purpose of observing conditions there. At the time this is written the American public is deluged with news with regard to the European War. Much of it is contradictory, but occasionally we find an article or a statement from some one who has been on the spot, and such evidence deservedly has a great effect on our minds. The student should, therefore, in the second place scan his evidence in order to see if it comes from a source which can be supposed to know at first hand the facts which are set forth.

The source of evidence must not only have the opportunity of knowing, but it must satisfy the third test and have the capability of understanding. Not every man who is in a position to know also has the capability. The capitalist and his paid expert engineer may both go through a mine which the former intends to purchase. Both may spend the same time and see the same things. Both have the same opportunity of knowing, and yet the capitalist may well rely more upon his engineer than upon himself. Many books are published every year

**Has the
source capa-
bility of un-
derstanding?**

by foreigners who travel through this country. All possibly have the same opportunity of seeing and forming a judgment of the United States and its people, yet all are not equally valuable. Occasionally, however, a man like Mr. Bryce writes a book like *The American Commonwealth* which from its publication became an authority upon the American people and American institutions. The merit of this book is not only that Mr. Bryce had opportunity of knowing, because other men had had that, but also that we cannot read far in its pages without coming to the conclusion that the author is a critic who not only has had opportunity, but who has studied us and understands us, and his criticisms whether favorable or unfavorable at once become of value. It would seem therefore that evidence from a source which not only is truthful and had an opportunity of observing, but has added to those qualifications the capability of understanding what he observed, would be evidence deserving consideration.

There is, however, one other test that must be applied to the source of testimony. No matter how prepossessing in appearance and manner a witness may be, one of the strongest methods of attacking his testimony is to show that he has some interest upon one side or the other. A man may be honest and accurate, and he may desire to tell the truth, and yet our experience with humanity is such that if we find that he is closely related to one of the parties to a controversy, or that he is financially interested in the result, we immediately depreciate the value of his testimony. The common law carried this to such an extent that when a person was accused of crime, it would not allow him to be a witness in his own behalf. It was argued

**Is the source
biased?**

and was the law for centuries that the testimony of a man accused of crime, whether he was innocent or guilty, could not be depended upon. We all recognize that a man's opinion of himself, and his judgment upon the acts of members of his family, are singularly unreliable. The consideration of such examples convinces us not that humanity is naturally dishonest, but that human understanding and judgment are powerfully affected by human interests. It is always fair, therefore, to subject our opponents' evidence to this test, and it is wise to subject our own evidence to the same test before we offer it; and in so far as we find that the source of the testimony is interested in the effect of the testimony, just so far the efficiency of the evidence is impaired. This error is present everywhere. Even statistics, which seem to be the bed-rock upon which an argument can be founded, are not free from the criticism. It is true, perhaps, that "figures won't lie," but we are inclined to think that the Yankee who corrected the statement by saying that while "figgers won't lie, still liars will figger," hit very near to the truth. Certain statistics are undoubtedly reliable, but the moment that the authority that has compiled the figures has an interest in what they are to prove, they are open to doubt. It is not difficult to see that if a board is maintained, the existence of which, perhaps, depends upon the efficiency of the work, where the salaries and very livelihood of every employee are dependent upon the results obtained, such a board is not likely to compile statistics which will prove its own inefficiency and deprive its members of their positions. Every man is affected by the most powerful of influences, his own financial well-being, and the result frequently is that statistics which

should be above attack are biased in the extreme. Local boards, state commissions, and even national bureaus and departments are not free from this fault, and it is always safe to examine any figures offered with a view to find out whether the persons who made the compilations had any interest in the observations which they were making. It is even recorded that a local employee of the weather bureau omitted to record precipitation caused by a shower upon the last day of the month because he did not wish to spoil the record which showed that month to be the driest known in the history of the department.

While interest in the result affects the value of testimony, we should note and remember that the converse is equally true; lack of interest increases the weight of the testimony. This leads us to the consideration of three kinds of good evidence, all of which are good because we recognize that the possibility of human bias affecting the accuracy of the testimony is in these to a great extent removed. These three kinds of good evidence are furnished by, first, what we may call *undesigned testimony*, second, *negative testimony*, and third, *admissions against interest*.¹

Undesigned testimony is that which is given when the effect of it is not under consideration. If a man does not know that anything depends upon his testimony, any personal interest that he may have is not likely to affect him. If a man on the witness stand should testify that his brother who is accused of crime was with him at a certain time upon

¹ See Baker and Huntington, *Principles of Argumentation*, pp. 130-134.

the day in question, we might well view his testimony with suspicion; but if anyone in talking with us casually should tell of a certain incident which occurred when he and his brother were playing golf together, we should not doubt that they were together at the time mentioned. In the one case we recognize a powerful interest which goes far to invalidate the story. In the other the fact of the brother's presence seems merely incidental, and as we do not detect any design or artifice in it, we accept it as true. Certain statistics furnish an excellent example of the value of undesigned testimony. It is now the custom or the law in nearly all civilized communities that a record of births, marriages and deaths be kept. The officials who have charge of these matters have no interest whatever. They get their reports from physicians, or clergymen, or other parties, and are really employed not to exercise any judgment or to bring about any results, but merely to count and classify the returns that they receive. The individual sources of their information are so varied that it is not possible to imagine any set plan or purpose of deceit. These statistics, therefore, when published are absolutely free from design; they are used for countless purposes of which the compilers have no knowledge. They are generally recognized as being for that reason dependable.

Negative testimony, or as it is sometimes termed, the testimony of silence, is another kind, good because it is free from bias. Under some circumstances we assume that a man will almost of necessity speak regarding a thing which he knows; and if he does not speak, we assume that he could not have known of the fact. If in an account by an early

**Negative
testimony**

explorer of the St. Lawrence River from its mouth through the Great Lakes, the author made no mention whatsoever of Niagara Falls, we would at once conclude that he did not follow the stream through its entire length. If we did not say that he was an imposter, we would at least say that he departed from the river considerably in passing from Lake Ontario to Lake Erie. The value of negative testimony is everywhere recognized. Silence is said to give consent, and the common law declares that if a man does not speak when the circumstances would seem to call upon him to say something, it may be assumed that he has no reason for speaking. Many ingenious arguments, for instance, have been advanced to show that Lord Bacon was the author of some of the plays usually attributed to Shakespeare; yet it is fair to say that they have not been generally believed, largely because there was no record either at the time or for centuries after that anyone had attacked the authorship that was usually attributed to these plays. When, therefore, we find that the interests of any person or persons call upon them to make an assertion that a thing is true, and nothing is said, we conclude that the thing is not true. In this testimony of silence the circumstances show us that there is no bias present.

Admissions against interest are the third kind of testimony, good because it is unbiased. In the case of unsigned testimony we saw that there is an absence of interest because the source has no knowledge of what the result is to be.

In the second case, negative testimony, we found an interest which would affect it, and from the fact that nothing is said conclude that there is nothing to say. We now go

a step further, and find a condition where we would expect the interests of the person giving the testimony to influence him to say one thing, and yet as a matter of fact, he states the opposite. The value of this testimony is at once apparent. Everyone expects a criminal to plead not guilty. If he pleads guilty, we do not take the trouble to try him because we assume conclusively that he would not make an admission so prejudicial to his interests if it were not true. In a murder trial not long ago in Massachusetts when the mother of the accused under respectful but persistent cross-examination finally admitted a point of vital importance to the prosecution, the tension in the court room was almost unbearable. Everyone realized the vital significance of this admission coming from the one person who would be least likely to testify to it if it were not true. Another example of this was the admission of Senator Aldrich shortly before his retirement that the government of Washington could, by installing ordinary business methods, save over \$300,000 a year. The idea was not new; in fact, there were few people even of the dominant political party who would have taken the trouble to deny that the government was extravagant, yet the admission, coming as it did from the senator who for years had pre-eminently been identified with the policy of the party then in power and who inferentially might be said to have been responsible for the extravagance, attracted attention through the country and was the subject of editorial comment in practically every newspaper in the United States.

Briefly stated this fourth test of the source of evidence is as follows: We ask whether the witness has anything

at stake in the matter for we all recognize that the opinions, judgments, and even the statements of humanity

**Summary of
the fourth
test of the
source of
evidence** are powerfully affected by personal interests. In undesigned testimony, negative testimony, or admissions against interest we see that these interests are removed from consideration and the evidence becomes doubly valuable.

CHAPTER VII

REASONING

THE questions small children ask about every conceivable subject are often amusing and sometimes embarrassing. What makes the fire hot? Why does the sun shine? Why does the moon rise? What is "time"? These are but a few which make life a burden for some unimaginative, matter-of-fact people.

This period in a child's life is that in which occurs the budding of the reasoning process. It is a mark of superiority of the human animal that at an early age the human young is ever seeking the *why*, and is unconsciously trying to develop its reasoning power. The child's inferences are often faulty for they are in general made from a too limited experience. A case has been given ¹ in which a baby went into convulsions every time he saw a boy. It was found later that a neighbor's small son had amused himself one afternoon by placing the baby in a bath-tub full of water to see if he would float. Although the infant's reasoning that all boys would behave alike was faulty, nevertheless it was reasoning. The older we grow the broader our experience becomes, and the more correct our inferences are. "The terrible sanity of the average man" is in the long run a very efficient test of the soundness of our reasoning. Nevertheless the fallibility of the human

Importance
of the study
of reasoning

¹ Lombroso.

mind has been an axiom since Puck said, "What fools these mortals be!" To be really educated, therefore, we must develop and sharpen our reasoning faculties by analysis, thought, and practice, in order to excel the average man. We must study first, in this chapter, the general principles and laws of reasoning, and then, in the next chapter, the common errors or fallacies into which we fall in our conscious or unconscious application of these laws.

Reasoning is the process by which conclusions are inferred from known facts. Our evidence furnishes facts; from these we must reach the desired results. There are two methods by which we reach this conclusion: by deduction and by induction. In other words, there are two methods of reasoning, *deductive* and *inductive*. *Inductive reasoning is the process of inferring general judgments from particular instances. Deductive reasoning is the opposite process by which we infer particular judgments from general propositions.* An example of induction is:

Socrates, Plato, and Alcibiades were mortal;
Socrates, Plato, and Alcibiades represent mankind;
Therefore, all men are mortal.

An example of deduction is:

All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man;
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

It will be noted that the conclusion of the induction becomes the general proposition of the deduction. For this, reason inductive and deductive reasoning are in-

separably connected. Indeed, it is only when the general proposition of the deduction is universally accepted that deductive reasoning can stand alone.

The word *sylogism* means an argument according to regular form; it is generally applied to deductive reasoning. The process by which we proved that Socrates is mortal is the classic example of **Deductive reasoning:** a deductive syllogism. The first step, or **the syllogism** general proposition, is called the major premise: "all men are mortal." The next step is called the minor premise: "Socrates is a man." The last step is called the conclusion; it is the inference which we desired to make: "Socrates is mortal." There are eight rules of the syllogism, old as Logic itself—some 2,000 years—, which govern the use of the process. They may be found in any book on logic, but for the purposes of this book lack of time forces a reliance on the common sense of the average man to decide if the reasoning is valid.

The principle on which deductive reasoning rests is fundamentally that "whatever is affirmed of a class may be affirmed of all members of that class. **Tests of deductive reasoning** Whatever is denied of a class may be denied of all the members of that class." A deductive argument is satisfactory, therefore, if the general statement, or major premise, is true; if the particular case falls within the class about which the general statement is made—if the minor premise, in short, is true; and finally if the conclusion follows inevitably from the two premises. The Socrates syllogism apparently satisfies all these tests; it is undoubtedly true that all men are mortal; it is undoubtedly true that Socrates is a man; it inevitably follows that Socrates is mortal. If we use our common

sense in applying these three tests of deduction, we shall have no difficulty in determining the validity of the reasoning.

Sometimes a difficulty does arise from the fact that often one of the terms of the syllogism is not expressed but implied. The general principle, or
The enthymeme major premise, is as a rule omitted: this man is a Democrat, because he is a free-trader. The general principle is that all free-traders are Democrats. This condensed syllogism is called an enthymeme; part of it is carried *in the mind*. The way to test an enthymeme is to supply the missing part, in order to make it a complete syllogism, and then apply the test of deductive reasoning.

Kinds of inductive reasoning

When we turn from deductive to inductive reasoning we find three types: generalization, analogy, and causal relationship.

Generalization is the most typical form: it is *the process by which, from the observation of a sufficient number of typical cases of a class, a general principle or law is established concerning the whole of the class*.
Generalization

For instance, all the magnets which we have observed attract iron; we believe these magnets are typical; we conclude that all magnets attract iron. Again, certain falling bodies are observed to fall a certain distance the first second, and a certain increasing ratio in subsequent seconds; we establish laws for these observed instances; we conclude that these laws hold good for all falling bodies.

We turn from generalization, where the whole class resembles the observed cases, to the second form of inductive argument, analogy, where a certain case resembles another particular case or cases in one or more respects

so that a certain proposition true of the known case or cases is true of the unknown. The formations and appearances of the ore in this mine are similar to those in Leadville; therefore this mine is probably valuable. At first sight this does not fall under the definition of deductive or inductive reasoning; it seems to proceed neither from the general to the particular nor from the particular to the general, but from the particular to the particular. It may, however, be called inductive because it involves a tacit generalization to the effect that all mines resembling those at Leadville are likely to be productive. This general conclusion has been reached by the observation of countless cases, and thus the whole process is inductive. The particular conclusion that *this* mine is probably valuable is only a special application of the tacit general conclusion. It is plain, therefore, that in reasoning by analogy we have a double process: first from the known particular to the general law; then from this general law to the particular unknown case. The first part of the process determines the classification of the reasoning as inductive.

Examples of reasoning by analogy are met everywhere. The ripples upon the sands of the sea-shore are caused by the waves; probably the ripples in the ancient and inland sandstones were caused by waves. Mars resembles the earth in having bodies of water, clouds, snow-covered polar regions, etc.; it very possibly resembles it in being inhabited. Lightning resembles electricity in its zigzag course, its flash, etc.; probably it resembles it in everything and is electricity. Strictly speaking, analogy means merely a resemblance, not an identity, of relations. In reasoning by analogy, therefore, we can affirm only to

some degree of probability, and the degree will depend upon the closeness of similarity and the other circumstances of the case.

The third form of inductive reasoning is that of causal relation. All three methods show a certain reliance upon causal connection as based upon experience.

Causal relation; its connection with generalization and analogy

Generalization has merely an indirect reference to the causal connection of its facts; we have as an implied premise a belief in the uniformity of nature. This is but another way of saying that as we consider there are certain causes which had certain results in observed cases, we believe that these causes will have the same results in all cases of the same kind. We know, for instance, that there is a certain tendency which causes observed bodies to fall a certain distance the first second, and a certain increasing ratio in subsequent seconds. We conclude that this same mysterious cause will work for all falling bodies, and we therefore formulate a general law. Nevertheless, this method "breaks down as an exception is noted; and it is weakened by the possibility at least of the appearance of an exception." Aristotle said that the proposition that all swans are white was undoubtedly true; yet in recent times black swans have been discovered in Australia. Generalization, in short, places little reliance upon the causal connection of its facts, and is therefore the least trustworthy of the three kinds of inductive reasoning. In analogy there is likewise an implied premise that an underlying cause working upon the known case will work uniformly upon the unknown case; we believe, in other words, that similar phenomena have similar causes.

Benjamin Franklin observed that the flash of lightning and the spark of electricity were very similar; this suggested to him that these two phenomena might have a similar and identical cause; he concluded that they were one and the same thing. By actual experiment he confirmed his reasoning. Analogy, however, unless confirmed by experiment, cannot be considered as a final method of reasoning. Many apparent resemblances may lead us to make false analogies. A child, for instance, might think that gasoline would put out fire because it resembles water so closely. Analogy is somewhat better than generalization at that: in the one, causation is entirely subordinated; in the other, the assumption of an underlying cause which will work in a similar case is much more definite. In the third method of reasoning, the causal relation is most prominent. Indeed the search for it characterizes the procedure used and gives it a name. Cause is no longer an underlying assumption; it is the method itself. That which in the other two methods existed merely as a vague impression is here made the direct and sole object of research.

Why is the argument from causal relation classed as inductive? It does not reason from particulars to the general, but from particular to particular, just as analogy does. It is, however, classified as inductive because causal relations, like analogy, can be established only by induction: to say that arsenic is a cause of death means that in all cases where arsenic has been taken, death has ensued or will ensue. This is a general statement reached through the observation of particular cases. The particular conclusion that *this* death was caused by arsenic is

**Causal
relation
inductive**

only a special application of the tacit general conclusion.

Reasoning from causal relation is of three kinds; from
Kinds of effect to cause, from cause to effect, and
causal from effect to effect. Of these there are
reasoning likewise three degrees of probability: where
 the causal connection is possible; where it is probable;
 and where it is certain.

When we argue from effect to cause, we infer from an
 observed effect that a certain cause, though unobserved,
Effect to has acted. When in the morning we see
cause puddles of water on the ground we infer
 that it rained during the night. When
 Democratic Judy is in power and there happens to be a
 period of financial stringency, Republican Punch blames
 the Democratic Tariff. He says that we have hard times,
 and the cause is that duties have been lowered and cheap
 foreign goods can come into this country; our mills have
 been shut down, the people are all out of work, and nobody
 makes any money. Every great panic in the history of
 the country, he continues, was a direct result of the policies
 of the Democrats. If it did not occur in the Democratic
 administration it was the after effects of those policies.
 All our great floods came in times of Democratic control.
 "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous al-
 together." We must, therefore, remove from office the
 thing that always causes these ills—and the cause of
 all is the Democratic Tariff. The Republican puppet
 argues from observed effects to what he believes or wishes
 us to believe to have been the cause.

The second form of argument from causal relation is
 from an observed cause to what is believed will be the

effect. This proceeds from a given force to that state of affairs which will succeed it. To illustrate, we put on our raincoats on a cloudy day, because we reason from an observed force or cause, **Cause to effect** the threatening weather, to the probable result, rain. When Washington argued in his "Farewell Address" against foreign entanglements, he reasoned from cause to effect, that such relations would cause foreign conflicts. Again, to go back to our Punch and Judy political campaign, let us, to be fair, give Democratic Judy a show. The Democrats, it will be remembered, are in power; it is election time; Judy must show why Republican Punch should not be elected. Waiving the question of woman suffrage as a matter on which she is prejudiced, Judy reasons from a supposed cause, the policies of the hated Republicans to what she considers would be the results if they should be elected. After a great declamation upon the sovereignty of the people, she dramatically "prestidigitates" from her capacious underskirt pocket a baby's shoe, cap, dress and bottle of milk. Then it is easy to show that "under the Republican Tariff this shoe would cost \$1.69, while it costs only \$1.43 under the splendid, scientific tariff of the party of the people; this cap would cost 53 cents, not 47; this dress would cost \$2.00, not \$1.50; finally, this bottle of milk, this unassuming little bottle, containing the welfare or the downfall of this, the world's greatest nation, according to its purity and plenty, this little bottle, I say, would cost 7 cents, whereas under the great Democratic Tariff it costs but the small sum of six pennies." She sees certain things under Republican power: a high tariff. The effect would be beyond a doubt the high cost of living. Thus it is that she reverses the

process of Republican Punch and argues from cause to effect.

Besides the argument from cause to effect and from effect to cause there is according to the books still a third form of arguing from causal relation—from **Effect to effect** to effect to effect. The simple weather illustration very popular with the writers goes something like this: "If a boy says that there is skating to-day because the thermometer registers below the freezing point, he really reasons from the low thermometer to its cause, the low temperature, and from that back to another effect of the same cause, namely, the frozen river."¹ When we argue, for instance, that the party in power will be defeated at the next presidential election because it was defeated in the last congressional election, we have in our minds a certain analogy between the two elections; we see certain definite causes of the first defeat, the Mexican situation, perhaps, and we reason that another defeat will result in the next election because of the same cause. In other words, we reason from effect to effect.

When we test the existence of the supposed causal relation we must recognize that while "nothing can exist without a cause," there is seldom one and only one cause followed by one and only one effect. Every cause is composed of a chain of actions, conditions, and motives; it may sometimes even remind us of the old nursery rhyme:

"The cat began to kill the rat;
The rat began to gnaw the rope;
The rope began to hang the butcher;
The butcher began to kill the ox."

¹ Foster, *Argumentation and Debating*, page 135.

Effects likewise are often composed of a number of elements, or are accompanied by a number of other effects.

In science, with which formal logic seems to concern itself more than it does with argument, the search is for the efficient element of the cause, which is always followed by a given effect.

“Mr. Darwin, in his experiments upon cross and self fertilization in the vegetable kingdom, placed a net about one hundred flower heads, thus protecting them from the bees and from any chance of fertilization by means of the pollen conveyed to them by the bees. He at the same time placed one hundred other flower heads of the same variety of plant where they could be exposed to the bees, and, as he observed, were repeatedly visited by them. Here we have two sets of instances, in one the flowers accessible to the bees, and in the other, not accessible. He obtained the following result: The protected flowers failed to yield a single seed. The others produced 68 grains weight of seed, which he estimated as numbering 2,720. Cross-fertilization as the cause in this case is thus proved.”¹

In law the test of a man's responsibility for causing a given effect is whether this effect was intended or could have been foreseen from his action, even if his action is not the immediate or proximate cause. A railroad company, for instance, is responsible for its act in delaying goods if on account of the delay they should freeze, because it is foreseeable in winter that they might freeze. On the other hand, it is not liable for its act in delaying goods if on account of the delay they should be spoiled by a flood which could not be foreseen. Yet in each case the railroad caused the damage by its delay.

¹ Hibben, *Logic, Deductive and Inductive*, page 253.

In argument, unlike science but like law, we are concerned with other than immediate or final causes. We have given a cause or an effect; we wish to know whether we can infer from the cause the existence of a given effect, or from the effect the existence of a given cause. It makes no difference whether the cause and effect are connected proximately or remotely. Our tests, moreover, are not like those of logic—experimental certainty; they are those of probability. If a certain effect will possibly follow a given cause, that is sometimes an argument of weight; if it will probably follow, that is often an argument of some weight; if it will certainly follow, that of course is the most weighty argument of all. If we are arguing that the United States will intervene in Mexico, we might give as one reason the chaos and anarchy there; this state of affairs will possibly result in intervention. If it were true that all Americans had been driven out of Mexico and their property confiscated, this would be a stronger argument because intervention would probably result. If, finally, the Mexican “generals” should combine and send an expeditionary raiding force against Los Angeles, this would be the strongest argument because intervention would certainly result. Our problem, it is clear, then, is not to test the absolute certainty of the causal relation, but to determine the value of the argument by the degree of probability that the causal relation exists. We have, therefore, as our tests merely these three questions: Is the causal connection possible? Is it probable? Is it certain?

The question of whether the existence of the causal relation is possible depends upon the potentiality of the cause to bring about the effect. By this we do not mean

that the cause must be absolutely adequate in itself. It may be that it is a motive that might or might not cause a certain thing to happen. The hatred of Mexico for the United States might result in positive acts of violence, and these in turn might cause intervention by the United States. It is an argument of some weight, therefore, that the causal relation possibly exists, because that shows a tendency for it to exist. The weight of this tendency depends upon the other facts that stimulate or minimize it. Too often the police are inclined to consider a man guilty of a crime simply because he has a motive for committing it. Without a motive existence of crime seems almost an impossibility, yet the existence of the motive proves merely the possibility of the crime. While we must admit that any argument which satisfies merely the first test, possibility, has some weight, yet it cannot be accepted as final.

First test: is the causal connection possible?

It is of much more value, however, to show not only that the causal relation possibly exists, but that it also probably exists. The cause is sufficient to produce the effect, and there is a marked tendency for it to do so. It may be that the cause is prevented from working by a third force, or it may be that another cause could have brought about the effect, but to satisfy the second test the supposed causal relation must reasonably be supposed to exist. Very strong motives satisfy this test. Indeed nearly all convincing circumstantial evidence falls within its category; the existence of a motive is nothing but circumstantial evidence. President Hibben cites ¹ the

Second test: is it probable?

¹ *Logic, Inductive and Deductive*, page 347ff.

case of *Nicholas v. Commonwealth* (21 South Eastern Reporter, 264), illustrating how probative such evidence may be, although it cannot establish the causal relation beyond the possibility of error. The accused had taken great pains to get the two victims to go on a trip with him across a river to take a bee tree. It was common knowledge that the two men did not know how to swim.

“It further appears that the boat was a small one, about ten feet long and about two and one-half feet wide, and both in going over and returning the prisoner sat in the extreme rear of the boat with his face to the front, and that Wilkerson and Mills sat in front and their backs to the accused. . . . When returning, and about fifty yards from Henrico shore, the boat suddenly filled with water, and Mills and Wilkerson were drowned, and the prisoner swam to shore. The next day the Magistrate of the district was notified of the occurrence, and an investigation was set on foot. The boat was gotten out of the water, and it was found that immediately under the seat where Nicholas sat there were three holes, freshly bored with an inch and a half auger. The evidence of the owner of the boat shows that on Tuesday evening, the 6th of December, he used his boat, and it was sound. It was taken by Nicholas for this fatal trip Thursday morning, the 8th of December. Further investigation discovered fresh pine shavings corresponding to size of the holes and to the wood the boat was made of, which had been thrown into the water, but had drifted upon the shore near the point where the boat had stood fastened to the Henrico side. There were also found corn-cobs which had been cut exactly to fit the holes in the boat, which had also drifted

to the same point. It was shown that the prisoner had in his possession an auger just the size of the holes."

This collection of probabilities is very convincing and was sufficient to secure conviction. But after all they were only probabilities and no matter how strong are not the equivalent of what we call certainty.

The human mind is so constituted, however, that such a thing as absolute certainty is non-existent. "To err is human," we are told, yet we all want to be as nearly perfect as possible. We wish to establish our causal relation with as great an approach to certainty as is possible.

**Third test:
is it cer-
tain?**

A large manufacturer probably advertises in many ways; all of these will bring in some results. He wishes to cut selling expenses without materially decreasing sales. He withdraws for one month his "ads" from the newspapers. The next month he replaces them, but withdraws the street car cards. The following month he replaces these, but he takes the advertisements out of the magazines. After some time it would be a simple matter to see in which month the sales had fallen off the most, and that would show with reasonable certainty the most valuable form of advertising.

An experiment of Professor Jevons, quoted by President Hibben,¹ shows how much pains are taken to secure certainty in particular cases:

"Suppose, for instance, a chemist places a certain suspected substance in Marsh's test apparatus and finds that it gives a small deposit of metallic arsenic, he cannot be sure that the arsenic really proceeds from the suspected substance; the impurity of the zinc or sul-

¹ *Logic, Inductive and Deductive*, page 247.

phuric acid may have been the cause of its appearance. It is therefore the practice of chemists to make what they call blind experiments, that is, to try whether arsenic appears in the absence of the suspected substance."

In other words, the test is first made with all the apparatus, but without the presence of the substance. Then the test is made with it present, and the arsenic, if found, must come as a matter of certainty from the suspected source. This is one way of determining causal relation as a matter of certainty. The logics give several other methods; they all are based on the principle that to determine the existence of the causal relation with certainty it must be shown that the supposed cause was sufficient and no other causes could have acted.

To sum up this whole chapter, there are two kinds of reasoning, inductive and deductive. In a deduction we

Summary proceed from general statements to particular cases. We determine its validity by testing whether the two premises are true and whether the conclusion follows inevitably from them. In an induction we proceed from particular cases to a general statement. Of it there are three forms, generalization, analogy, and causal relation. We test the last by determining whether the causal relation is possible, probable, or certain.

CHAPTER VIII

FALLACIES

SOMETIMES an older uncle will learnedly remark: "My boy, you have committed a grave error of reasoning there; that is a case of the *undistributed middle*. What? You do not know what that means? Well! Well! What are our colleges coming to? I studied Logic two years when I was in college."

This superior knowledge is irritating, to say the least. It is no answer to say that we believe the technical rules of logic to be of little value in after-life, that education of to-day is eminently practical. A grave shake of the head shows our disgrace. It behooves us, therefore, to be able to understand, if not to use, some of the terms of the logicians, even if, in the superiority of youth, we do think their exercises are a waste of time.

The books on logic call errors of reasoning "fallacies." They classify these according to whether they concern inductive or deductive reasoning. They also divide fallacies of deduction into the heads of formal or logical, and material.

Need of
knowledge
of logic

Classifica-
tion of
fallacies

Formal fallacies consist in errors in reasoning due to violations of the rules of the syllogism. Material fallacies are errors in reasoning which lie in the matter itself, and it requires some knowledge of the subject-matter to detect them. The above classifications have been used by logi-

cians since the time of Aristotle. We, however, are not studying logic as an end in itself but merely for the sharpening of our faculties in arguing. For that reason we shall consider fallacies not in classes according to whether they occur in inductive or in deductive reasoning, but according to the places in the reasoning in which they occur—the premise, the inference, and the conclusion.

Fallacies which occur in the premise are of two kinds. In one of these an incorrect observation is made the basis of argument—a fallacy of observation. In the other, observation is discarded and an unjustified assumption is introduced in its stead—a fallacy of begging the question. In fallacies of observation our premises are incorrect because we have observed wrongly. In fallacies of the begging the question our premises may be correct but as we were not justified in assuming them our whole reasoning process lacks conviction.

In the first kind of fallacy that occurs in the premise we have some authority for our facts, our own observation, but it is incorrect. By observation we mean the appeal to any of the senses, by seeing, by hearing, by feeling, by tasting or by smelling. Premises based on sight are the most common. It is a fallacy of observation if we argue that the supernatural exists because last night we saw a ghost moving in the room. The error lies in our faulty eyesight; we mistook a garment hanging on a hook and gently swaying in the wind for a moving ghost. It was a fallacy of observation also for people in the dark ages to deny the theory that the earth turned upon its axis. They contended that the sun revolved around the earth, for they

said anyone could see the sun rise and set; moreover the world was not round, because it was plain that the sea was flat. Or it may be that our error in observation is due to the treachery of one of our other senses. One should take care of complaining of the rough gentlemen in the restaurant who seem to use swear words in every sentence they speak. It may be that they are talking of the Gatun Dam. These are examples of fallacies of observation—of mal-observation, if you prefer. The keynote of it all is that things are not always what they seem. When you argue from your own experiences, be careful that you saw, heard, felt, smelt, and tasted correctly; otherwise you will argue from an incorrect premise; you will commit a fallacy of observation.

In other cases, without a vision of your own, of your friends, or of anyone else, you assume that ghosts exist; you infer from this that, since ghosts are supernatural, the supernatural exists. It may be that you were brought up by a black mammy of the South and this accounts for your easy assumption of the existence of ghosts. Be that as it may, such an assumption is not justified. The error lies in a failure to observe. This is generally due to prejudices, which means preconceived opinions. Some one has said that man is a reasoning animal, but that he never reasons except to defend his prejudices. At any rate, this error due to the failure to observe is the second fallacy which we find in the premise—an unjustified assumption of the facts. This plain assumption as a premise of material facts which need support is called *begging the question*, or in logic, *petitio principii*. It is ordinarily defined as assuming the conclusion without any attempt whatever to prove it. Assertive-

**Fallacy of
begging the
question**

ness in argument is therefore a tendency to beg the question. Very often we argue from an assumption which does

Definition of not seem unjustified; it is perhaps accepted
begging the by many people or it seems probable. We
question are soothed into thinking that no wit-

ness, no authority, is needed to support our premise. We are so sure that our conclusion is right that we do not question the premise from which we reach it. This error most often occurs in deductive reasoning. We argue from a generalization without first going through the inductive process to establish the general principle. In ancient times, particularly, men guessed at their premises; because these were false, they often reached false conclusions. Aristotle stated that large bodies would fall more rapidly than small ones, because that seemed reasonable. From this premise we might reason, as the newspaper writer did, somewhat as follows: a mother jumped from the roof of a high building and pushed her baby off at the same time; she changed her mind on the way down, and fortunately landed unhurt in the well padded seat of an automobile; she then, we are told, leaned over and caught in her arms the baby who, being lighter, naturally fell at a slower rate of speed. Unfortunately for the story, when stones of unequal size were dropped from the Tower of Pisa, it was found that they fell at the same rate of speed. The newspaper writer fell into the fallacy of begging the question. He reasoned from a premise which he was not justified in assuming. In writing our arguments we are prone to commit this error in objecting to a measure on the ground of constitutionality. The constitutional argument is a dangerous one for the very reason that the difficulty in proving the con-

tention often leads us to assume its unconstitutionality, directly or indirectly. One boy argued against the Minimum Wage because it was unconstitutional. Any confiscatory measure, he said, is unconstitutional. He assumed that the measure was confiscatory; he thereby begged the whole question. His assumption was not justified; his task, of course, was to prove it confiscatory.

If the premise assumed without support amounts to the same thing as the conclusion to be reached, it is of course *begging the question*, but it is given a name of its own: *reasoning in a circle*. Properly speaking, it is a form of begging the question, but the other term is in such common use and the error is one which occurs so frequently that it has this special name. It has been defined as "an attempt to prove a conclusion to follow from a premise, when in truth the premise itself depends upon the truth of the conclusion as its ground." Most of the so-called "Irish bulls" are typical examples. Pat, it may be remembered, did not like lettuce, "and begorra I'm glad that I don't like it, for if I did, I'd ate it, and I hate the dirty stuff."

**Reasoning
in a circle**

To sum up, there are two kinds of fallacies which occur in the premise. The first kind is due to erroneous observing; it is the fallacy of *observation*, or more accurately, *mal-observation*. The second kind is *begging the question*; the fault is due to an unjustified assumption of facts in the premise. A special form of it is *reasoning in a circle*; the truth of the premise itself depends upon the truth of the conclusion.

Summary

The next group of fallacies are those which occur in the reasoning process. In deduction the fallacy consists in the failure of the conclusion to follow inevitably from

the major and minor premises of the syllogism. It is called a *non sequitur*. The term, *it does not follow*, seems to apply to all fallacies of the reasoning process, both of induction and of deduction. But as those which have to do with induction are given special names, we are able to limit the use of the general term, *non sequitur*, to deduction.

The logicians divide *non sequitur* into various formal fallacies according to the rule of the syllogism violated.

Non sequitur For our purposes, however, the error is apparent enough without any detailed analysis.

A few examples of *non sequitur* are as follows:

All naturalized foreigners may vote.

No native-born citizens are naturalized foreigners.

Therefore, no native-born citizens may vote.

None but members of the union will be employed.

A certain man is a member of the union.

Therefore, he must be employed.

No persons lacking in imagination are good public speakers.

Some persons lacking in imagination are good logicians.

Therefore, some good public speakers are not good logicians.

The above cases of deductive reasoning may give us some difficulty in analyzing, but certainly the fallacy is apparent enough. In every case both major and minor premises seem unassailable; but in no case does the conclusion follow from the premises; the error is that of *non sequitur*, the term, to repeat, which covers all errors in the reasoning process of deduction. Generally, all that is necessary to detect the error is to reduce the deduction to the form of a syllogism.

In induction each form of reasoning has a fallacy peculiar to itself. In the case of generalization, it is called *hasty generalization*; in analogy, *false analogy*; in causation, *mistaken causal relation*.

Fallacies in the reasoning process: induction

The error in *hasty generalization* consists in generalizing from insufficient or improperly selected samples. We all have preconceived opinions about most things, some handed down to us and some which we ourselves have formed. To defend them we note a case here and there, and, in our eagerness, immediately generalize. To meet the fallacy it is necessary to point out merely that not enough cases are observed to warrant a conclusion about all other cases, or that the cases observed are not typical. Sir William Ramsay is commenting on this error calls our attention to the fact that even accurate statistics may lie. In an endeavor to justify the use of alcoholic liquors as a beverage in tropical countries, it was stated that fifty per cent of the total abstainers in a certain regiment in India had died within a year. It turned out that the whole number of total abstainers was two, and that one while taking a walk had been eaten by a tiger. Besides this error of generalizing hastily from insufficient or improperly selected samples, there is another for which we must watch. It will be remembered that a generalization "breaks down as an exception is noted; and it is weakened by the possibility at least of the appearance of an exception." Where we encounter an exceptional case it is invalid to argue from a generalization, but we cannot call the error a fallacy of hasty generalization: the generalization may be true enough; there would be no valid rules if all rules

Hasty generalization

which had exceptions were called invalid. The error here is as a matter of fact begging the question, because we unjustifiedly assume as a premise that the case in question is typical, while it really is an exception. There are cases, on the other hand, in which the neglect of negative instances does make a hasty generalization. If a great number of negative instances exist, we cannot generalize. For instance, it would be a hasty generalization to say that most varieties of pheasants are brilliantly colored, because in all varieties the hen pheasant is comparatively dull colored. Again, to say that there are no white pheasants is a hasty generalization, although the number of negative instances unobserved is very small. To commit the fallacy of hasty generalization consists not in failing to note an exception when we find it, but in failing to find the negative instances or in generalizing from insufficient or improperly selected samples.

The second fallacy to be found in the reasoning process is that of false analogy; the error consists in comparing things which are not similar in relevant respects. The great example of the error is the comparison of two things utterly unlike in themselves but superficially similar in some respect. What is good merely as an illustration we are prone to consider good as proof. Similes and metaphors, where the comparison is figurative rather than literal, are good to secure force and clearness, but they are worthless as actual proof. It is well enough to compare the large navy advocates to a fisherman:

“For angling-rod he took a sturdy oak;
For line, a cable that in storm ne’er broke;
His hook he baited with a dragon’s tail,—
He sat upon a rock, and bobb’d for whale.”

This undoubtedly expresses in an amusing and forcible fashion the ideas of the speaker that a navy is like a whale, which is supposed to be no good after it is secured. Nevertheless it certainly does not *prove* that a navy is no good. The metaphor is an illustration and not proof. The resemblance is not in things angled for, but simply in the act of angling. If it be remembered that the basis of the analogy lies in the implied premise that an underlying cause working upon one case will work similarly upon another similar case, we will realize how similar the cases must be. It is, of course, absurd to say that a certain cause which makes a whale of no value will also make a large navy useless. Figurative language is not the only place where we find false analogies. The tendency to misuse the argument from example is much more prevalent. There is always a tendency for those who are advocating the adoption of a new political measure to commit this fallacy. We are urged, for instance, to adopt government ownership of railroads because it has been successful in Germany. While Germany and the United States have many resemblances, does not the analogy prove false when we consider the very great differences that exist in governmental administration? A highly centralized monarchy might successfully operate railroads when a federal republic could not. It is only basically similar phenomena which have similar causes. Where the resemblance is merely superficial or limited to the one thing for which we are comparing them, the analogy is valuable for illustrative purpose but not for proof; to offer it as proof is to commit the fallacy of false analogy.

The third fallacy which occurs in the reasoning process is called *mistaken causal relation* or *false cause*; the error

consists in assuming without justification that a given cause will produce a certain effect, or that a given effect

Mistaken is the result of a certain cause. The logi-
causal cians' name for this fallacy is *non causa pro*
relation *causa*, the regarding as a cause something

that is not a cause. "It is due to the lack of discrimination between a mere coincidence and a veritable cause." As a rule attention is drawn to the fact that in certain cases one thing was followed by another. It is immediately assumed that the one caused the other. This special form of a mistaken causal relation is called *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, after this and therefore on account of it. Many of our popular superstitions illustrate a combination of this fallacy with that of hasty generalization. The saying that when thirteen sit down to dinner one will die within a year, is an example. First there is the fallacy of taking a mere coincidence for a causal relation. Some one has noticed that in a certain case after thirteen had eaten together one of the party died. He assumed that the death resulted from the dinner. Several such cases led to the generalization that whenever thirteen ate together one would die within a year. This was a hasty generalization, because insufficient cases were observed. The cases where the result happened are remembered and used as a basis for the inference; those where no death followed are forgotten. Nearly every superstition contains these two fallacies of mistaken causal relation and hasty generalization.

In the reasoning process, to sum up, there are three
Summary fallacies, one for each form of inductive
reasoning. They are hasty generalization, false analogy, and mistaken causal relation. A special form of the latter is called *post hoc ergo propter hoc*; it

consists in the confusion of a mere sequence with a causal connection.

The final group of fallacies are those which concern the conclusion. In each case we arrive at a different conclusion from that which we started out to prove. The names of the fallacies are *ignoring the question*, *shifting ground*, and *definition or equivocation*. **Fallacies occurring in the conclusion**

The whole group is really a case of ignoring the question in so far as we do not meet squarely the point at issue. We use the general term, however, to apply to the most flagrant instance where purposely and often deliberately we divert attention from the point at issue by appealing to some lower emotion or motive. The two common forms of deliberately ignoring the question are the *argumentum ad hominem*, and the *argumentum ad populum*. The first takes the form of a personal attack upon some one connected with the controversy. The much-quoted example is the case of the attorney for the defendant; he handed to the barrister who was to plead the case the brief bearing these words: "No case; abuse the plaintiff." It is an example of ignoring the question to say that a man's preaching is "no good" because he does not practice what he preaches. Henry Ward Beecher brings out the fallacy when he says that because he is only able to "practice skim milk is no reason why he should not preach cream." Another illustration is that of a man noted as a lecturer who has been made to say that he would not speak on temperance from the same platform with another man equally eminent as a pugilist, because the prize-fighter had once drunk to excess and was not fit to talk about prohibition. It is

conceivable that he was on account of this all the better fitted to talk on the evils of intemperance. Ignoring the question by arguing *ad hominem* consists, in short, by drawing attention from the point at issue to the personal characteristics of one who speaks about it. We may ignore the question, however, not only by attacking a person but also by appealing to the lower emotions of the audience, the *argumentum ad populum*. This may take the form of ridicule of the whole subject without reference to the merits of the question at issue. The treatment of the woman suffrage question by the so-called comic papers is an illustration. Again it may take the form of an appeal to prejudice. Lynchings in the South generally result not from proof of the negro's guilt, but from hatred of the race and of the crime. Sometimes the appeal is to a higher emotion, but it is still beside the point. It is the practice of demagogues and of political orators to wave the flag and consider the point proved.

The second kind of fallacy in proving a different conclusion is not so bad as the first where the question is utterly ignored; an attempt is usually made to prove a point, but the particular point at issue is evaded. It is called *shifting ground*. Many times when some one is cornered in an argument the reply is, "Yes, that is true, but. . ." The human mind so dislikes to admit it is wrong that it will attempt to evade defeat by maintaining a qualified contention. A gunboat was steaming up Boston Harbor. Approaching it at right angles was a ferryboat. It was apparent that the ferryboat would cross the channel immediately in front of the destroyer. One or both vessels would have to turn out. The gunboat glided along

as if unaware of the existence of its lowly sister. Those of us on the ferryboat started a discussion whether or not government vessels are subject to the local harbor regulations. One contentious old gentleman, a very devil's own advocate, claimed that they are subject. When driven from that position he claimed that anyway you couldn't build a pier without the city's permission. He next argued that a state could build a bridge over a navigable stream situated entirely within its own boundaries. When reminded that the constitution gives the federal government control of all navigable streams, he triumphantly asserted that the state could build a bridge over a brook.

The third fallacy of proving a different conclusion consists in using a word or term with another meaning than that intended; it is called a fallacy of definition or equivocation. Sometimes the mistake is made in the beginning; sometimes in the course of the argument. In the latter case it generally is also a case of shifting ground. The error generally arises in the use of words or phrases which have more than one meaning, in more than one sense, or in a way that was not intended. The evident illustration is the one turning on the two meanings of "democratic" and "republican." "It is a generally accepted principle in this country that he is the best citizen who is the most democratic. . . . Therefore, all men should vote the Democratic ticket." In the same way it has been argued that a republican form of government is the best; therefore, we should vote the Republican ticket. Another illustration is offered by the cheap cross-examiner in our law courts. The witness is asked if he knows how far the

**Definition or
equivocation**

plaintiff was from the machine when the driver sounded the horn.

"Ten feet."

"Do you know he was?"

"Yes."

"You say that you *know* this man was just ten feet away. What makes you say that you *know* this? Can you swear to it? Could he not have been nine or eleven feet away?"

There is an evident fallacy here. The lawyer uses the word "know" at first in the ordinary sense of having an impression; later, in order to confuse and discredit the witness, he uses it in the sense of being absolutely certain. He shifts ground from one meaning of "know" to another.

This last group of fallacies, to summarize, all consist in proving a different conclusion from that which is intended.

Summary The first error is the very reprehensible one of ignoring the question altogether; no attempt is made to convince the mind, but an appeal is made to the prejudices or passions of the audience to get support. The second error is that of shifting ground from the original proposition to a qualification of it or to an entirely different one. The third error is that of equivocation; words or phrases are used in more than one sense, or in a different sense from that generally understood.

CHAPTER IX

PERSUASION

AFTER taking a course in argument, a student of Hibernian ancestry exclaimed to his instructor, "I see how you get conviction all right, but it looks to me as if persuasion was just being born Irish." **The nature of persuasion**

There is perhaps a germ of truth in this remark and it may be that the persuasive element in public speaking is more generally inborn than acquired. Nevertheless there are certain principles which it will be well for us to consider.

We have seen that the object of argument is to bring the mind of some other person into conformity with our own. In so far as we do this by direct appeal to the reasoning faculties only, we call the process conviction, and if man were merely a thinking machine, the process of conviction would be all that there would be to argument. Everyone knows, however, that men are far from being reasoning machines. Every day we see apparently intelligent men acting in the most important affairs of life almost without thought and as a result of impulse. If we could be sure that the results of reasoning were always right, there would be but little harm in leaving the subject of argument after a study of pure reasoning. But the human mind is imperfect and its operation inaccurate, and we all recognize that many times things that we feel,

are more to be depended upon than those that we think we know. For thousands of men and women to spend their time out of doors on a cold autumn afternoon watching twenty-two young men endeavor to carry a leather ball a few yards one way or the other appears, when stated in the language of logic, the height of absurdity. The veriest tyro can construct a logical argument to show that such action should be condemned, and yet as long as young men have red blood in their veins and physical prowess is one of the delights of life, some men will delight in playing football and others will delight in watching them. The trouble with those misguided individuals who think that life is merely a succession of days, and man a mechanical device which should operate with mechanical exactness is that they ignore the great human element in the world, which after all is the element that makes life worth living. It is because man is man that there is another side to argument than mere conviction. The same evidence should perhaps produce the same result whether presented in print, in the halting language of a schoolboy, the periods of a statesman, or the verses of a poet, but the fact is that such is not the case. The process of appealing by speech to human emotions is called persuasion, and both conviction and persuasion are necessary in practically every speech. It is perhaps true that of the two conviction seems the more necessary. It is better to have a thought poorly expressed than to have merely meaningless words and empty phrases. In fact, it is difficult to imagine persuasion existing without conviction, but it is about as difficult to imagine conviction accomplishing much without persuasion.

Persuasion manifests itself in many ways. The personal appearance of the speaker, his dress, his manner, the environment in which he speaks, all have their effect, and a trained and careful speaker pays attention to them all. For the present we are to consider persuasion with reference to the composition of the argument and not with regard to its delivery.

Arguments depend a great deal for their success upon the speaker's understanding of the relation that exists between him and his audience. It is the appreciation of this relation that makes one man succeed where another fails. Now this relation is not a fixed one by any means, but varies so much that even an experienced

**Relation of
speaker and
audience—
Character of
audience**

public speaker will rarely find the problem that confronts him when he rises to speak like anything that he has met before. Suppose, for example, that a public official is an authority upon naval affairs, and desires to convince people of the necessity of a material increase of the navy. His knowledge is ample and it may be assumed that he has at his command all the facts which are essential. If he should carefully prepare an argument in favor of his proposition, it would seem at first sight as if he might eventually evolve a composition which was practically perfect and which he could deliver upon any occasion with the feeling that it completely covered the ground and could not be improved upon. The facts, the reasoning, and the result to be achieved are all the same. Why should there ever be any necessity for variation? Yet this same authority may be called upon in four successive days to speak at a hearing before a congressional committee, to a class of students in a university, to an audience in a popular lec-

ture course drawn from all kinds and conditions of men, and at a dinner of naval officers. Can we imagine any speech that could by any possibility fit all four of those occasions? The facts upon which he relies cannot be varied and his reasoning must be the same in each case, and yet if he is to be successful, he must vary the language of his speech to suit his audience. The first requisite, therefore, of a persuasive speech lies in adaptation to the audience to which it is addressed.

Not only is it important to consider the character of the audience, but we must also pay attention to its attitude. The problem that confronts a speaker changes according to the friendliness or hostility of the audience. If the hearers are very friendly to the speaker, they are obviously ready to be convinced. They already either believe or half believe in his proposition. With such an audience one can take much for granted. The facts upon which the speaker relies are either known or are readily admitted when set forth. The purpose of the speech, indeed, is not to form a new conviction in the minds of the audience, but rather to strengthen the belief that is there already. This is the problem that confronts the political speaker who is generally talking to members of his own party, or the minister whose parishioners ordinarily believe in the truths which he is expounding. At times, however, a speaker is unfortunate enough to be obliged to speak to an audience that is absolutely hostile to him. It is not probable that he will be able to accomplish much, and yet the little that he accomplishes may do his cause more good than he could achieve in any other way. If you cannot convince a hostile audience, you may at least

set them thinking, and the fruit of your labor may manifest itself long after the speech is delivered. Probably all that can be accomplished is to neutralize the hostility of the audience to some extent, but that result may be well worth the endeavor. In striving to be persuasive in such a case, however, we should not forget that the argument should be exact, nothing should be taken for granted, and the endeavor of the speaker should be to compel agreement by the sheer weight of his evidence. More frequently we are called upon to address audiences that are neutral. If their neutrality is not accompanied by lack of interest, it gives the speaker what is perhaps his best opportunity. A friendly audience may tempt him to be careless, while a hostile one may make him over-cautious, but if the audience is neutral, he has that which is a blessing to any speaker, an impartial tribunal before which to argue.

The audience is only one factor, however, in the relation that exists between a speaker and those whom he is addressing. The other factor is the speaker himself. There are certain attributes of a public speaker which seem to be necessary to his success and which should be manifest in his argument. Three of the most important are good nature, tact, and good taste.

**Attributes of
the speaker**

It is very difficult to convince people by an argument which shows ill temper. It is not necessary that a speaker should flatter, or amuse, or entertain his audience, but he certainly must not irritate them. If, in speaking in the face of direct opposition, he loses his temper, he is more than likely to lose his case. An audience may like to hear a forceful, vivid, and aggres-

Good nature

sive argument, but it will object decidedly if it is accompanied by any personal animosity either in feeling or in manner. There are certain speakers who seem instinctively to take an attitude that is hostile to humanity. The world is wrong and they soon become ill-natured scolds, railing at existing conditions. An argument delivered in that vein is more likely to arouse opposition than to secure belief. Without being servile in submitting himself to the supposed views of his audience, a speaker should endeavor to be pleasant and agreeable. He should treat an opponent courteously and pleasantly before the audience even though he feels that pleasant and courteous treatment is not deserved.

Tact is nearly akin to good nature. There are certain people in the community who seem to delight in saying
Tact and doing things which make their neighbors
 and friends uncomfortable. They too often preface their assertions by the remark, "I am a plain, blunt man, and accustomed to say what I mean," or by something similar thereto, as if plainness and bluntness were necessarily virtues. While these people may be an essential part of the general scheme of humanity, it seems that the other extreme is more to be recommended. We all have a certain sympathy for the witness in one of the rural counties who asked the judge to excuse him from taking the oath. He explained in a confidential aside that he was a candidate for coroner, and that while he was willing to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, nearly all the people in the court room were his constituents, and he would like to be excused from telling the whole truth. But tact does not necessarily imply any element whatever of deceit. In an argument it means merely the

avoidance of those things which are likely to distract the attention of your hearers from your thought. Not long ago a minister was invited to deliver an address at one of the local penal institutions in Massachusetts. He doubtless felt that he had a great opportunity of doing good, but it does not seem essential to the delivery of his message that he should have told his audience that fact and then driven the point home by explaining to them that it was rarely a clergyman had an opportunity of addressing an audience composed entirely of bad men. A little care in the composition and delivery of an argument will enable a speaker to avoid thoughts and expressions which have a tendency to antagonize his audience. A speaker should not allow himself to express his opinions except in so far as is necessary upon the subject in question. If you are arguing for prohibition, there is certainly no advantage in reminding your hearers that you are also a believer in the abolition of capital punishment, and the disadvantage is obvious. Tact consists in the recognition by the speaker of the position in which he is placed and the avoidance of extraneous matter which is likely to produce conflict in the minds of his hearers.

The third attribute of good argument which we have to consider is good taste. As has been pointed out, the audience is inclined to put the speaker upon a pedestal. If he is wise, he will stay there **Good taste** and not endeavor to lower himself in his hearers' estimation. Good taste differs from tact and good nature in that it is far more difficult to acquire. Good nature may be simulated even if not felt, while tact is really the result of forethought, but a lack of good taste will betray itself upon the public platform just as readily as it does in

private life. It is essential to avoid vulgarity in any form. Students should realize that there is no audience before which they will ever have to speak where their argument will be strengthened by a vulgar story or a jest with a questionable meaning. All exaggerations in manner and speech should be avoided just as they should be avoided in ordinary society. A prominent instructor in elocution some twenty years ago was accustomed to tell his classes that a speaker should always address his audience with exactly the same care which he would use in addressing a lady. If this is true with regard to the delivery of the speech, it certainly must be true with regard to its composition. The student can rest assured that if his argument contains anything that offends the sensibilities of his audience, his influence over them is practically destroyed.

The possession of good nature, tact, and good taste is, however, somewhat superficial. They are attributes of a good argument rather than parts of it.

Qualities of good argument— There are at least two qualities, however, which seem to be essential if an argument is to have any persuasive effect. These are **Sincerity** and simplicity. Sincerity in the speaker is necessary to produce belief in the audience. We are so constituted by nature that we cannot be affected by the argument of a man who does not himself believe what he is saying. The argument may be true and from other lips might be convincing, but if we feel that the speaker himself does not believe what he is saying, the ever present thought in our minds is, why should we believe it if he does not, and everything that he says is clouded at once by doubt and suspicion. Now the only successful

way to produce an impression of sincerity is to be sincere. For many men this is not a difficult task. Many a man has convinced himself by his own eloquence, and perhaps a majority of us find it only too easy to believe the side in defence of which we have composed our argument. The legal profession would suffer were it not for the fact that man is by nature partisan. It is safe to assert that in a very large majority of the cases that are tried, the attorneys firmly believe personally in the proposition which they are defending. If, however, a student after a careful study of his argument finds that he does not believe what he is saying, he may be assured that that argument should never be delivered. Sincerity does not necessarily mean that we should agree with all that other people have said or written upon our side of the question. Different men may support the same measure for entirely different reasons. Some time ago, after a particularly acrimonious debate in the state legislature as to the division of a certain town, the adoption of the division was submitted, as is the custom, to the voters of the town, and much to the surprise of everyone, it appeared that among the people of the town themselves there was practically but one opinion. As the local stage driver expressed it, "The fellows at the south end of the town thought that they ought to get out and the rest of us agreed with them." Yet it is probable that the reasons for belief in the two sections of the town were somewhat different. One of the ways in which sincerity manifests itself is in the fairness with which you discuss the question. A sincere man does not misquote the other side nor misstate its position. If he believes in his case, he has nothing to conceal at any point in the argument. There can be

nothing more fallacious than the belief which we sometimes hear expressed, particularly in intercollegiate debating, that it is good policy to conceal your real argument as long as you can, in order that the other side may not have an opportunity to reply to it. The speaker should always realize that you can never conceal anything from your opponents without concealing it from your audience and from the judges, and they are going to resent fully as much as your opponents your deception. A sincere man will believe in his case, and because of that belief will be willing to meet his opponent's case without deception or subterfuge, and just as far as his audience is impressed with his fairness and honesty, it will be impressed by his belief. It is a powerful argument in our minds when we find an honest and conscientious man believing certain things. Insensibly we ask ourselves why we should not also believe the things which seem so evident to him.

Sincerity is one innate quality of every good argument; the other essential is simplicity. While sincerity must be

Qualities of good argument— felt, simplicity may be acquired. It is a characteristic of the expression of an argument rather than of the argument itself.

Simplicity Unfortunately the tendency among students of argument is to obscure their thought through what seems to be an endeavor to fill space or time. The arguments offered to any college instructor are no different from the other compositions submitted to him. Nineteen out of twenty could be rewritten to advantage in half the space. This reduction in space can be achieved in two ways: first, by cutting out numberless unnecessary words, and second, by using shorter words in the place of longer ones; this can be accomplished without hurting the style

of the writer. In the first place, let the student dismiss from his mind the thought that there is any "oratorical style." Thomas Wentworth Higginson said of the oratory of Wendell Phillips that it was conversation raised to the highest power. Colonel Higginson undoubtedly recognized that it was not merely conversation, because we all know that you cannot talk to an audience as you would talk to your friends by your fireside, but he did mean that it had the directness which is the distinguishing quality of our ordinary conversation. An argument should from beginning to end, in thought, paragraph, sentence and word, proceed directly to the goal to be achieved. In fact, we may test our work by carefully examining it and seeing if we find anything that is unnecessary. We should be able to take it to pieces in its minutest parts, and if every part does not tend to prove the main proposition, we will not make a mistake in striking it out. This directness can be achieved both by sticking closely to the subject, and by avoiding long and involved sentences. Mark Twain described a German sentence as one in which a writer dives in upon one side of the ocean and finally emerges upon the other side of his verbal Atlantic with his verb in his mouth. Whether our German friends will admit that this good-natured criticism is true or not, it is a fact that the desire for exactness frequently leads to qualifying phrases and expressions which confuse the thought. The English that lawyers use in drafting instruments in which they are endeavoring to anticipate every possible contingency and provide for it is the subject of much well-deserved ridicule. As a general rule, the student will find it safe to avoid qualifying phrases and words. While every sentence cannot be a short one,

many sentences, even those of the best writers, might be shorter than they are to advantage. Another method of obtaining simplicity is to be natural. There is no reason why an argument should be couched in language that the student does not ordinarily use. When President Lincoln used the expression "a sugar-coated pill" and President Roosevelt spoke of a "square deal," no one misunderstood them because they were using the ordinary language in which men talk to each other. The same cannot be said, however, when President Cleveland coined the phrase "innocuous desuetude." Many an intelligent man had to use his dictionary before he found out exactly what the President meant.

Again, it should be realized that the shorter words are the simpler. One of the greatest orations, if not the greatest, ever delivered by an American is undoubtedly President Lincoln's speech at Gettysburg, and as a work of art it is noteworthy for its simplicity. While it is almost desecration to dissect it in order to hold it up as an example, we find that of the 265 words employed, 194 are of one syllable, 52 of two syllables, 12 of three syllables and 7 of four syllables, and all are included in an ordinary vocabulary. It is so simple that we are tempted to say that a schoolboy might have written it, and would say so were it not for the fact that we realize that no schoolboy could possibly so limit himself. We may note that the use of words of Saxon derivation instead of those from the Latin will ordinarily help us. Simplicity is brought about perhaps more by what we leave out than by what we put in our speech. We should certainly avoid slang. It is a fact that much of the slang of the present day is direct and humorous and frequently suggests ideas

with a vividness which is tempting. Nevertheless, it is a cardinal rule of writing that the use of slang tends to detract from rather than add to the expression of thought. In the same way we should avoid colloquial expressions, especially if we are speaking to a general audience which may not understand them. It is also wise to avoid the use of foreign phrases. A speech which bristles with French and Latin terms may show the extent of the author's erudition, but it never will express his thought as well as the ordinary English of everyday life.

Persuasion after all consists in pleasing your audience. It is, or should be, a frank attempt to get on good terms with them in order that their minds may be open to receive your ideas. In so far as it does not seek to deceive or betray their judgment it is not only permissible but also advisable. The art of persuasive composition should cause the writer, therefore, to clothe his thought in words pleasingly arranged, in order that it may reach the minds of his hearers with undiminished force.

Is the use of
persuasion
justifiable?

CHAPTER X

CLEARNESS

THE construction of an argument has often been compared to the building of a house. The brief is the framework, and the evidence is the floor, walls, roof, and so on. But no house is finished without windows, painting, and the other things which go to complete the building and to make it pleasing to the eye. We may in the same way have an argument on a good framework, and have good evidence, but if the whole is not clear, forcible and beautiful, we cannot call it artistic or even effective. Our writing, then, must have, besides structure and evidence, certain qualities, and these are called clearness, force, and beauty.

The quality of clearness is to be attained in part by an accurate, pure and precise choice of words, and in part by a strict observance of the three principles of composition,—unity, coherence, and emphasis or mass. In this chapter no attempt is made to cover the matter of diction, but the purpose is to summarize for review the best thought on the principles of composition, and to apply these as specifically as possible to argument. The first, the principle of unity, requires that every sentence, paragraph, and whole composition group itself about one central idea. The second, the principle of coherence, requires that

Qualities of style

Quality of clearness secured by the principles of unity, coherence, and mass

every part of a sentence, paragraph, and whole composition should be closely linked (should cohere) to its neighbor. The third, the principle of mass, or emphasis, requires that the various parts should be given space and position important in proportion to their own importance. The term "mass" seems better than "emphasis." "Emphasis" connotes the idea of actual forcibleness. As here used, however, it does not necessarily mean that: it means that the particular part is made to stand out in relation to other parts, not positively to force itself upon our attention. It is a state of being emphatic in relation to the other ideas in the composition, and may not be actually or absolutely a forceful statement. Force is a quality of style which strikes our attention; mass is a principle of style which gives us a clear impression of the relative importance of the various ideas. Mass refers to the distribution of emphasis among the various constituents; force is the quality of being emphatic as a whole. Mass, in short, refers to relative, and force to absolute, emphasis. Of the three principles which go to constitute the quality of clearness, mass governs the space and position to be assigned to the ideas; unity, the selection of them; coherence, the arrangement and connection of them.

These principles can best be considered by studying how they may be secured in each of the elements of composition, the whole composition, the paragraph, and the sentence.

In the whole composition, the principle of unity provides that nothing should be admitted which does not bear directly upon the theme or general idea of the argument. There must be no false beginnings, and no digressions.

Every detail must directly and immediately forward the general idea of the whole. No better way of attaining **Unity of the whole composition** this can be found than the carefully worked out brief or outline. The skeleton form, the visualization process, shows up the ideas in their true relation to the whole theme, and permits of no disguises or stowaways. If your idea fits logically into your briefing, then you may be sure the principle of unity is not violated.

Not only must we be careful in selecting our materials, but we must so arrange them that each part shall have **Mass of the whole composition** an amount of space and a position proportionate to its importance. The principle of mass, or emphasis, therefore, requires that more important ideas should be given a greater amount of space and a more striking position according to their importance. Here, too, our old friend, the brief or outline, is indispensable. By visualizing the thoughts it enables us to compare them, to judge of their relative importance, and to give each idea a due amount of space. In general the order of climax should be observed; we should work from the less important idea to the more important. Here, in particular, the visualization of the ideas, such as is effected by the outline and brief, is the best way of securing our purpose.

After the arrangement of the ideas in the composition comes the connection of them so that they shall cohere **Coherence of the whole composition** or cling together, and so that the relations of one part to another shall be unmistakable. The principle of coherence in the whole composition requires a presentation of the ideas in logical order, linked with logical transitions. The logical connec-

tion of the thoughts can be shown by preliminary statements of the plan the composition is to follow, by summarizing paragraphs, and by transitional connecting paragraphs. Here, also, the brief is an excellent servant. The whole theory of the component parts of the brief is based on the fundamental principle of coherence, an orderly and logical arrangement of thoughts. We start with the known fact, the occasion for the discussion, and proceed through the history and conflict of opinions to the statement of the main issues—the main points or plan which the body of the argument is to follow. Then we take up each of these points in order.

The analysis made necessary by the brief insures coherence of substance. It remains merely to secure coherence of form by transitional paragraphs, short summaries of what has preceded, and preliminary statements of what is to follow. A careful observance of *Suggestion H*, page 202, is the best way to take care of these matters. Write a short separate argument on each issue. Let each sub-argument have an introduction, a body, and a conclusion. Let the introduction be a statement of the issue, and the conclusion, a recapitulation of the steps in the proof of that issue.

From the unity, mass, and coherence of the whole composition we turn to the ways of securing these principles in the paragraph. In the matter of unity, a paragraph is nothing more than a whole composition on a small scale. The paragraphs are to a whole composition what the rooms are to a house. If this obvious fact is kept in mind much of the choppy paragraphing and of the tiresome lack of paragraphing will be avoided. No one wants a house that is

**Unity of the
paragraph**

all closets; nor would we like to live in a house that had no rooms, but was merely one great hall. Observe the lack of clearness that is manifested in the following paragraph:

“The foregoing definition of the word ‘argumentation’ is transcribed from Webster’s International Dictionary, and perhaps it is my duty as a teacher of justice here to record my faith that of all the means of education in the English language that James Otis spoke, as opposed to the corrupt jargon that the British government scribbled, Webster’s dictionaries are of the very greatest importance; and in all seriousness and sincerity I declare it to be my firm belief that there is always the greatest need for police court justices who are gentlemen as well as officers, and who think in the words of the English people, in order that they may do their part towards correcting the awful mistakes of the incumbents of the upper benches who are officers without being gentlemen and who follow in their mental processes the jargon of the British cabinet.”

Here in a single paragraph, and indeed, in a single sentence, are at least four separate ideas absolutely dissimilar. The result is that it conveys no clear impression to the mind. The paragraph, in short, like the whole composition, should contain but one single central idea. A group of very closely related ideas, however, may be included in one paragraph centering about a general thought. Digressions in a paragraph from the central idea should be just as carefully avoided as in the whole composition.

While the principle of unity is essentially the same in the sentence as it is in the paragraph, it is secured differently. The brief or outline is of little use here because often, even generally, it gives merely the central idea and not the

steps in the development of the idea. If, however, this central idea is placed at the beginning of the paragraph as a topic sentence, and if care is taken that the remainder of the paragraph is composed of sentences each of which develops the topic sentence, and nothing but the topic sentence, then of necessity the whole paragraph will be unified; it will contain but one general thought, that expressed at the beginning. If, moreover, the final sentence is in the nature of a summary of the development of the topic, one can be doubly sure that the paragraph is unified.

The principle of mass, or emphasis, demands that in the paragraph ideas should be given space and position in proportion to importance. The topic sentence is here too the best method of securing this. The beginning and end are the parts of the paragraph which stand out. Those are the parts one notices just as one notices the opening and closing of a book, the one part to see what the book is about and the other to see how it comes out. The first and last sentences may contain the one dominating idea of the paragraph. The first sentence should be clear and brief; it is well to have it give a preliminary statement of the central thought. The body of the paragraph should contain the details by means of which the idea is worked out. The last sentence should sum it up concisely. Note the mass in the following short paragraph from a sermon, "Resurrection," by Rev. Frederick W. Robertson.

Mass of the
paragraph

"Six thousand years of human existence have passed away—countless armies of the dead have set sail from the shores of time. No traveller has returned from the still land beyond. More than one hundred and fifty genera-

tions have done their work, and sunk into the dust again, and still there is not a voice, there is not a whisper, from the grave, to tell us whether, indeed, those myriads are in existence still."

The initial thought, the lapse of time, is here put in a prominent place, that is, at the beginning, in a single sentence. The vital part of the paragraph is at the end, which is another prominent place. What comes between admirably develops the thought but is not of as much relative importance. The principle of mass requires in short that in paragraphs, also, the chief thoughts should be in the most conspicuous places.

The principle of coherence demands that the separate parts of the paragraph shall cling together. Connectives
Coherence of the para- graph and relative pronouns or adjectives like "such," "some," "another," "these," should be used. This will secure coherence in form. Coherence in substance is attained by having the thoughts follow each other logically. The change from sentence to sentence should not be marked by any abrupt change of thought. If the student has the habit of using the topic sentence, his task is greatly simplified. Starting from a topic sentence one naturally secures coherence in developing the paragraph from it. In narration, as oftentimes in the introduction, the natural order is chronological—time sequence, as it is called. In description, the order is place sequence; with a uniform point of view one naturally describes one part of a thing or place and then another part as each naturally occurs to him after the general statement or starting point laid down in the topic sentence. In argument, the development from the topic sentence may be from a general statement to particulars, or to examples

or illustrations; from cause to effect, or effect to cause, and so on. If any logical order of ideas is followed, the sentences will cohere in sense. The principle of coherence in paragraphs demands merely that the sentences be firmly cemented together and that the ideas naturally cling together.

In considering the application of unity, mass, and coherence to the sentence the matter is not so simple. We are confronted by the conflict of good usage, of the rules of grammar, with the requirements of the principles of composition. We are not allowed the privilege of juggling the parts of our sentences in any way that may please us. We are limited by the requirements of good use—that is, the practice of reputable writers and speakers of national reputation at the present time. Subject, however, to the restrictions of good use we may apply the principles of unity, mass, and coherence to sentences just as to the other elements.

Conflict of good use and the principles of style when applied to the sentence

The principle of unity requires that each sentence should contain a single idea. The sentence which does not fulfil this requirement may contain more than one idea, or less than one complete idea.

Unity of the sentence

The commonest example of the former is the *bad loose sentence*. A loose sentence is one which is grammatically complete before its end. It usually has one or more clauses after the verb. A *bad loose sentence* is one in which the loose clauses add separate ideas to the one contained in the subject and the verb. An example is this: "The boys cheered heartily the speaker who came from Colon, a town at the end of the Panama Canal, which is the greatest achievement of modern

engineering." It is very plain that the descriptive idea with which the sentence is ended has nothing to do with the main idea in the sentence. It should be omitted entirely. While it is important, however, that no sentence should contain two or more ideas, it is just as important that each should be complete. The common type of incomplete sentence is the co-ordinate or subordinate clause used as a complete statement. Nearly every short sentence beginning with *and* and *but* is really a co-ordinate clause of the sentence immediately preceding. Consider the following: "The princess proceeded to the ball. But the king hurried back to his palace to confer with the prime minister." It is plain that there is only one general idea, the action of royalty when war was declared: the period after "ball" should therefore be changed to a comma. Subordinate as well as co-ordinate clauses are frequently detached and made complete sentences in the same way. Examples of this are: "He said that he had not seen my book. Which was a plain violation of the truth." "It was not hard for me to finish the examination. While many I know hardly began it." The second sentence in each of the above examples is not complete. Each of these sentences is really a part of the one which precedes it, because both are needed to complete a single idea. If the sentence is composed of an incomplete statement, or of two incomplete statements crowded together, the unit of expression does not give a unit of thought. To avoid this confusion, the principle of unity as applied to sentences requires that each group of words representing a sentence should contain one idea, neither more nor less.

The principle of coherence in the sentence makes clear

what is the relation of the various parts. A newspaper contained this item: "The infuriated lover shot three times at the young lady, one taking effect in the neck and another in the arm and a third in the piano." The absurd result obtained here is due to lack of coherence. A very common mistake of coherence is to be found in the use of the adverb "only." "Please write only on one side of the page." The adverb here modifies "write," not "one." To remedy this fault of position, the relation should be made clear by placing the dependent word or phrase so that it can refer to nothing else. A second difficulty of coherence in the sentence lies in the use of dissimilar forms of construction for similarly related ideas. Consider the sentence "When the umpire had taken his position, the pitcher having received the brand new ball, and the catcher being behind the plate, the game began." Here there are three clauses all similar in their relation, yet each is in a different construction. The sentence might read: "When the umpire and catcher had taken their positions, and the pitcher had received the brand new ball, the game began." Another very common mistake in coherence is the combination of active and passive verbs in parallel clauses of the same sentence. "The Filipinos decided to complain to the Governor General, and they were met with the greatest courtesy." The purpose of writing and speaking is to express our thoughts. If the thoughts are similar, the expression of them to be most efficient should be similar. Parallel ideas should be stated in parallel constructions. To make our style coherent, we must make the relation of the various parts of the sentence so clear that no mistake can be made.

Coherence of
the sentence

The principle of mass makes clear what is the relative importance of each part of the sentence. The writer must

Mass of the sentence first select the most important words and then he must assign to them positions which will make their importance felt. The be-

ginning and the end of sentences are always the emphatic parts. It follows, therefore, that important words should occupy these places. For this reason the loose sentence should in general be avoided, for it places at the end of the sentence an unemphatic clause. On the contrary, periodic sentences will often secure the proper emphasis; in the periodic sentence the sense and the attention are sustained to the end. Consider this sentence: "It is an evident fact that life is worth living for the scavenger who sweeps our streets, and for the doctor who cures our ills, and for the maid who serves our coffee." This sentence lacks mass; the weakest parts are given the strongest places. It starts with a weak clause. It closes with an anti-climax. The sentence would have proper mass,—the various parts would be given a position in proportion to the importance of them,—if it were arranged as follows: "The maid who serves our coffee, the scavenger who sweeps our streets, the doctor who cures our ills,—all lead a life clearly worth living." This order of climax does place important words in the important positions. For this reason the periodic sentence is theoretically desirable. Theoretically, we say, because if all of our sentences were periodic we would violate the principles of good usage in the English language. There is no writer whose sentences are entirely periodic or entirely loose. If, however, we make our sentences periodic wherever it is possible without their becoming artificial, they will fulfil that require-

ment of clearness called mass,—the ideas will be placed with reference to their importance.

To recapitulate, sentences, paragraphs, and whole compositions should be constructed according to the principles of unity, coherence, and mass.

Summary

Each element of composition should contain one thought; the relation of one part to another should be unmistakable; each part should be assigned a position according to its importance. In the whole composition the brief is the most useful servant in securing these principles; in the paragraph and in the sentence we have to rely upon our own judgment in applying a few general rules. Our problem is simply to make others see an idea as clearly as we do: the principle of unity teaches us how to select our materials; the principle of coherence tells us how to arrange or cement them together; the principle of mass or emphasis shows us how to assign to them space and position according to their importance. The result is clearness.

CHAPTER XI

FORCE

A CUBIST painting has been compared to the scratching of a chicken on a palette of brilliant water colors. The result is vivid, but it gives no definite impression; it lacks clearness. Our writing is likely to have the opposite fault; if we constructed a brief, and if we followed the principles of unity, coherence, and mass in writing the argument, the result is clear enough, but in many cases it is colorless, or the colors are dull and lifeless. The cubist picture attracts the attention, but it gives us no definite impression; our arguments often give a clear enough impression, but they do not attract the attention. How can we then make our style not only clear but also forcible?

Force is that quality of style which attracts or holds the attention. Attention itself is an elusive thing; it is
Force as a quality of style the positive element of the great psychological mystery, consciousness. It is, in short, active consciousness; it is that part of consciousness which is mentally active enough to receive definite impression. Locke, in his *Essay on Human Understanding* says:

“There are ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of waking man; though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with such intention . . . that it shuts out all other thoughts

and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made on the senses; . . . at other times it barely observes the train of ideas . . . without directing and pursuing any of them, and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded as faint shadows that make no impression."

Our problem in writing an argument is to make the mind fix itself "with such intention . . . that it shuts out all other thoughts." We want the attention of our hearers that they may receive the impressions we wish to give them. We

**Nature of
attention**

must arouse their consciousness to a state of mental activity. It is purely a psychological problem, and psychology gives us the answer. Professor James Ward says: "In sensations we can distinguish three variations, viz., variations of quality, of intensity, and of . . . extensity."

While Professor Ward has no reference to style, his words suggest to us methods by which we may secure force: extensity is to be attained by repetition; intensity by conciseness; and the quality of vividness by concreteness.

**Ways of se-
curing force**

It is related that in the days of Captain Kidd it was a favorite method of torture to chain the victim securely and to let fall from a porous vessel drops of cold water each striking in the same spot

Repetition

on the head. At first the gentle dripping is not noticed; soon the drops are felt but the sensation is not disagreeable; finally the monotonous blows seem to fall harder, harder, harder, until the victim faints or raves. It is by such a mechanical device as this, constant repetition, whether it be of drops of water or of words, that an impression is made. Sometimes we repeat one word only. In a well-worn emotional declamation,

"The Deathbed of Benedict Arnold,"¹ the forcible word is the *throb* of the death watch. "Throb!" the youthful orator declaims. "Throb! Throb!" he intensifies. "Throb! Throb! Throb!" he finally sobs, and the hero dies. Artificial and mechanical, beyond a doubt, this piece is, yet the very popularity of it proves its forcibleness.

Burke gives us many an admirable example of force by repetition. At one time he says:

"The proposition is peace. Not peace through the medium of war; not peace to be hunted through the labyrinth of intricate and endless negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal discord, fomented, from principle, in all parts of the empire; not peace to depend on the juridical determination of perplexing shadowy boundaries of a complex government. It is simple peace, sought in its natural course and in its ordinary haunts. It is peace sought in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific. I propose, by removing the ground of difference, . . . to give permanent satisfaction to your people; . . ."

A less mechanical method of repetition is not in repeating words but in repeating whole ideas by a neat turn of phrasing, by a summary, by an illustration, a metaphor, or a simile. Notice how forcibly Patrick Henry expresses the idea that the colonies must act now or never:

"They tell us, sir, that we are weak—unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be next week, or the next year? Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a British guard shall be stationed in every house? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance by lying supinely on our backs and hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot?"

¹ By George Lippard.

Daniel Webster was the very master of force through repetition:

"True it is, generally speaking, that murder will out! . . . Meantime, the guilty soul cannot keep its own secret. It is false to itself; rather it feels an irresistible impulse to conscience to be true to itself. It labors under its guilty possession and knows not what to do with it. The human heart was not made for the residence of such an inhabitant. It finds itself preyed on by a torment which it dares not acknowledge to God nor man. A vulture is devouring it, it can ask no sympathy or assistance either from heaven or earth. The secret which the murderer possesses soon comes to possess him; and like the evil spirits of which we read, it overcomes him and leads him whithersoever it will. He feels it beating at his heart, rising to his throat, and demanding disclosure. He thinks the whole world sees it in his face, reads it in his eyes, and almost hears it working in the very silence of his thoughts. It has become his master. It betrays his discretion, it breaks down his courage, and it conquers his prudence. When suspicions, from without, begin to embarrass him, and the net of circumstance to entangle him, the fatal secret struggles with still greater violence to burst forth. It must be confessed; it will be confessed; there is no refuge from confession but suicide, and suicide is confession."

The effectiveness of repetition is apparent enough; it is the constant drive, drive, drive, that finally penetrates to the inner consciousness. We tell our classes that the fundamental thing about argument is the analysis into the *main issues*; we italicize the words "*the main issues*" in the rules for briefing; we criticize in the forensics the fact that the *main issues* do or do not stand out; and at the end of the year we tell the class that if ten years hence they remember the need of *main issues* in everything they write and

**Nature of
forcefulness
of repetition**

apply this principle, the study of argument will have been the most valuable part of their college course. The result, it is easily appreciated, is that *main issues* are so firmly impressed upon the minds of the students that to state the *main issues* in anything they write becomes nearly an instinct.

There is of course some danger in this constant repetition of words and ideas. We are told in the rhetorics that **A rhetorical objection to repetition** it is a fault to repeat oneself. There are, indeed, certain purists and worshippers of authority who prefer a kind of "school-marm" or emasculated style in which the same word never occurs twice in the same paragraph. It is undoubtedly true that repetition which is the result of carelessness or of an insufficient vocabulary shows the unpolished and inartistic writer. Repetition to secure force, however, is a desirable and virile characteristic well worth careful cultivation.

There is another danger of repetition which is more fundamental and more dangerous. It lies in the fact that **Repetition must be used with moderation** too constant or too mechanical repetition will be monotonous and not forcible. We must know when to stop. The man who always uses the same swear word, the man who always tells the same story, the man who always talks prohibition, the man who constantly pounds the air in speaking—these men do not secure force, but they do become pests. In repetition, as elsewhere, the law is moderation.

The monotony of repetition can be avoided by securing a second great principle of force—conciseness. The terms conciseness and repetition seem at first thought para-

doxical; but concise repetition is not a self-contradictory phrase. Repetition may be diffuse or it may be concise. George Eliot speaks of the terse repeating of an idea which we wish to make forcible as the "curt hammering way with which we usually try to nail down a vague mind to imperative facts."

Conciseness as a principle of force

Conciseness may be defined as brevity plus comprehensiveness; it is saying much in little, as opposed to verbosity, saying little at great length. Conciseness is brevity, but it is brevity secured by compactness, not by omission; to be concise one must condense and not merely cut down.

Definition of conciseness

The need of conciseness in securing force is apparent enough. The verbose style is not forcible: we tire of the man who wanders on and on, who never seems to know when to stop. A story is told of a noted speaker's first public address. His subject was good, and he hoped his treatment had been adequate. He was not sure. His wife had listened to him from the gallery of the town hall, and he had half-expected her to meet him at the door afterward, and to say, as soon as they were out of hearing of others, "Oh, it was simply great." But they were half-way home, and she had said nothing of the kind.

Need of conciseness to avoid monotony

"Well," he began, awkwardly, when he could bear it no longer, "what did you think of my speech?"

"What you said was all right," she answered, with guarded enthusiasm, "but it seemed to me that you didn't make the most of your opportunities."

"Opportunities?" repeated Mr. S—, "What do you mean?"

"Why," Mrs. S— replied, "you had ever so many chances to sit down before you did."

It is a platitude of public speaking instructors that the proper way to make a speech is to say your say and sit down. We have many times, especially during long commencement orations by men who ought to know better, sympathized with the small tot in the Sunday School class. A visitor was asked to address the children.

"I hardly know what to say," he began.

"Thay amen, and thit down," was the helpful suggestion from the front row.

Conciseness is valuable not only to avoid alienating the attention but also to arouse it to increased activity. The intensive reaction of the terse, pointed saying acts as a shock to the mind. To enumerate and describe the courses given in a large university in the large and small college argument would be deadly monotonous; but it is another matter to say: "For one man to take all the courses offered by Harvard University would require 110 years." The proverb and the epigram are such pointed forms of statement that prick the attention by conciseness.

The appeal of the concise to the attention is in the intensity of the stimulus. In a foundry we can bear without great discomfort the refracted heat from a white hot mass; but if a small part of this heat were concentrated on any part of our body by an oxy-hydrogen blow-pipe, we should be cremated, at least in part. It is the concentration, the condensation, that makes the stimulus intense enough to leave its impression. A sermon of half an hour on the evils of intoxication may be forgotten during its delivery; a sharp, pointed epigram, "No man can serve

two masters, especially if one be John Barleycorn," may stick in the memory for years. What brevity is to wit, conciseness is to argument.

"In laboring to be concise," Horace tells us, "I become obscure." Just as we found that in trying to secure force by repetition we tended to over-leap ourselves and attain monotony, now we find that in striving for conciseness we fall into abstract terms lacking in vividness, and therefore in interest. What force we gain in form, we more than lose in substance. "Discretion is the better part of valor," is concise enough, but its abstractness tends to diminish its forcefulness. "Adam's meat may be Eve's poison" is concise, but it is also concrete, and it is certainly more striking than the other epigram. Our problem, therefore, is not only to be forceful in form by means of repetition and conciseness, but also to be forceful in substance by means of concreteness.

Concreteness consists in dealing with the specific rather than the general; it is the opposite of abstractness. The use of the concrete may take the form of an example or of an illustration. When we give an example we select one case and hold it up to show the character or quality of all. An illustration as used here to differentiate from an example consists in presenting not a sample of the whole but another thing with which a comparison is made. To say that Mill spent years of his life in the construction of a system of logic is an example of the general statement that philosophers deal with the immaterial. To say that a philosopher is like a child reaching for the stars is an illustration, a verbal picture, taken from external

Concreteness
as a principle
of force

Concreteness
defined

affairs to "light up" the meaning of the general statement.

"The mind of man is peopled," it has been said, "like some silent city, with a sleeping company of reminiscences, associations, impressions, attitudes, emotions, to be awakened into fierce activity at the touch of words." The concrete is more forcible because it is more effective than the abstract in awakening this silent city. Our perceptions consist in the assimilation of the new thing to the old, in the meeting of each novel idea, "as it comes in, see through it unwontedness, and ticket it off as an old friend in disguise."¹ James mentions the child who called whole eggs, "potatoes," and a folding pocket-corkscrew, "bad-scissors." Another child called a vase of ferns, a pot of green feathers. The Polynesians are said to have called Captain Cook's horses, pigs.

The Fuegians whom Darwin encountered expressed great wonder at the small boats, but, strange to say, they took no notice of the big ship. Here we have an explanation of the fact that the concrete appeals to the mind more forcibly than the abstract. The interest or wonder is not aroused concerning things which are so large, or so indefinite, that we have no experience to which they can be referred or standards by which they can be measured. The definite verbal picture, in short, has much greater power to awaken the sleeping city of associations than have abstractions. Cartoons and drawings in the comic papers attract our attention more forcibly than do the printed jokes; they call to mind more vividly actual sensations. We associate

¹ James, *Briefer Course in Psychology*, p. 328.

the visualized experiences of the characters with our own experiences and our own feelings much more vividly than we do a verbal description of the same events. The story of a clerk who gave up a bank position with a salary of \$1,500, accepted a job with wages of \$50 a month as locker-boy in a golf club, and there earned \$3,000 a year by handling the pressing and laundry of the members,—this story makes a much more forcible impression than a sermon of generalities and platitudes concerning the folly of false pride.

The value of using concrete examples and illustrations, or awakening the silent city of associations, is strikingly seen from an analysis of the nature of genius. Geniuses are incorrectly supposed to excel other men in their power of sustained attention. The superiority of genius is of an entirely different nature. “The minds of geniuses are full of copious and original associations. The subject of thought, once started, develops all sorts of fascinating consequences. The attention is led along one or the other of these in the most interesting manner, and the attention never once tends to stray away.” The superiority of genius lies, therefore, not in its power of sustained attention on uninteresting subjects, but in the richness of its associations which tend to make all subjects interesting. In writing an argument we cannot make geniuses of our readers by adding to the silent city of associations in their minds and thus make it possible to keep the attention even to uninteresting abstractions; we must, therefore, try to awaken the silent city that exists by using the most vivid and connotative examples and illustrations.

**Genius and
attention**

Force, to sum up, is that quality of style which gets

and holds the attention. We demand attention by emphasizing our points through constant repetition. We

Summary furnish fertile soil, a favorable environment for the flourishing of attention, by making our style concise, so that the interest may not wither away from drear monotony. Spontaneous attention we get by taking advantage of the twofold tendency of the human mind to associate concrete events and things with all our past experiences, and to be interested in the discovery of the kinship of new acquaintances in the shape of ideas, things, and events with the inhabitants of the silent city of our minds. Repetition, conciseness, and concreteness, in short, are the essentials of force.

CHAPTER XII

BEAUTY

EMERSON says that the presence of a higher, namely, of the spiritual, element is essential to perfection. If for the purposes of argument we consider the word "spiritual" to mean æsthetic, or that which is pleasing to the taste, this statement certainly applies. Of the three qualities of style, clearness, or that which appeals to the mental side of man, is perhaps the most prominent and it may be the most necessary. Force, which holds the attention and appeals to the emotional nature, is undoubtedly next, but after all, while an argument that is clear and forceful can be effective, it is not perfect unless it pleases its hearers and appeals to their æsthetic instincts. Beauty is the term which we apply to that quality of style which makes the argument please those who hear it. The term "beauty" is not exactly satisfactory, and yet it is perhaps the best word we can use. Sometimes this quality has been called elegance, ease, finish, smoothness, or harmony, but none of these words seems to describe the quality any more accurately than the term we have chosen.

Nature of
this quality

Although we readily appreciate how much more effective an argument can be if it is written in a pleasing style, we find that when we come to analyze and try to set forth the methods of obtaining that quality of style, we are at once beset with difficulties. The ways of attaining clear-

ness approach the mathematical in their precision, and force has certain elements which are easily discerned, but beauty is an indefinite quality, the existence of which we appreciate, but which we find it difficult to define. Why is it that one speaker satisfies our ears more than another? No one at this time would claim that Henry Grady was a greater orator than Daniel Webster, and yet, admirable as the oratory of Webster is, it is doubtful if any of his speeches will compare in this one quality with such an address as the "New South." If, then, some men seem to have the ability of phrasing their thought in beautiful words, words that make a pleasurable impression upon their hearers, how can we attain it?

The suggestion comes at once that this quality is something that cannot be taught. It is the perfection of the orator's art. It is, indeed, that which makes a good argument a work of art. Orators, like poets, are born, not made. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some suggestions which will aid the beginner in acquiring this most elusive quality of style.

Beauty in any form of English composition can be acquired by what we may call unconscious imitation. If the student will read copiously and carefully and with appreciation, from the best masters of style he will soon find that unconsciously he is developing a style of his own. He soon begins to break away from the primitive English which had its first expression in the sentences of the primer, and uses words and phrases of greater scope, even though he be at times amazed at his own audacity. It surely must have been the unconscious influence of academic surroundings and possibly of aca-

demic speech which made a professional baseball umpire exclaim to the contestants who desired to have a college game called on account of rain, "Bide a while, me lads, it may cease." It must be confessed that sometimes the endeavors of young people to break away from the matter of fact language of their early days produces a grotesqueness of expression which rivals that of our friend, the umpire. If they persevere, however, sooner or later they will free themselves from the circumscribed limits of their youthful vocabularies, and speak with a freedom which will give pleasure to their hearers and to themselves.

In the first place, therefore, we may create a pleasurable style in ourselves by observing and appreciating its presence in others. The student of argument need not confine himself to reading from the works of the masters of oratory. Every artist, whether he write in prose or poetry, has something to contribute if we will only seek it out. If a student wishes a practical and psychological test of what contact with masters of style will do, let him spend a short time reading aloud from some great artist whose works particularly appeal to him. Suppose that he select, for example, such a masterpiece as Grady's "New South," or Burke's "Impeachment of Warren Hastings," or Webster's "Reply to Hayne." If immediately after he has finished reading any such selection, he begins to write, it will be strange indeed if he does not see in his composition the effect of the words which have just been upon his tongue. If he enlarge the scope of his reading and read continually the words of these people who have known how to write, the same influences will unconsciously persist in his own speech. We all know that you cannot live long among people without imitating their forms of ex-

pression and even the particular dialect in which they speak their words. So you cannot live long in the company of the great writers of the past without unconsciously drawing from them inspiration in the art which they have known so well. This, then, is really a tangible method of acquiring beauty of style.

As yet, however, while we have seen a way to acquire beauty, we have not found out anything with regard to what it really is. It is just as indefinite as **Characteris-** it was before. Without even pretending **tics of beauty** that we can analyze this indefinite quality to its component parts, and while admitting that there are many other manifestations of it, at least four of its principal characteristics can be described by the terms, purity, melody, imagination and wit. Here again the terms are not any too aptly chosen, but they are at least sufficient to suggest what we have in mind. A good style, then, should be pure; it should contain nothing which is offensive to the thought of our hearers. It should be melodious; the very sounds of the words themselves should fall pleasingly upon our ears. It should betray imagination in order that our hearers may be lifted above the commonplaces of life. Finally, it should have wit in order that the seriousness of the thought may perhaps be relieved by the brightness of the vehicle in which that thought is conveyed.

The characteristic of purity is obtained not so much by what we put into our speech as by that which we leave out. As has been said in the chapter on **Purity** persuasion, slang, although from its very vividness at times a temptation to the writer, nevertheless in the long run is sure to prove a fault rather than a merit in his work. Colloquial and vulgar expressions

undoubtedly will attract attention, but they are fatal to sustained interest in the thought itself. It goes without saying that ungrammatical constructions obtrude themselves at once upon the notice and give pleasure to no one. There seems to be nothing stranger in the whole subject of human speech than that men who are habitually ungrammatical themselves should so quickly notice the same fault in others. If you wish to portray an uneducated person upon the stage, you make him double his negatives, put aspirates where they should not be, and commit other solecisms. The audience, whether in the orchestra or in the gallery, will laugh. It is not only the refined and educated who smile at the blunders of the illiterate; illiterates themselves laugh loudly at the same blunders when they hear them committed by other people. The student should also avoid the technical terms of this subject of argument. "Affirmative," "negative," "burden of proof," "main issues," "history of the question," and the like, while proper in the brief, are artificial in the extreme when introduced into the finished argument. To attain purity, therefore, we should leave out all forms of expression which are offensive in themselves. It is not sufficient to talk as other people talk, or to talk so that other people can understand you. To attain beauty of style it is necessary that you satisfy a higher standard of purity, and talk as other people ought to talk.

Melody is that characteristic of beauty which renders the style pleasing to the ear. It is a fact which we all recognize that certain combinations of words sound better than other combinations. **Melody**

Eleanor is ever to most of us a prettier name than Hepzibah even if we have known a Hepzibah who was dearer to

us than any Eleanor could be. Now as arguments are primarily to be spoken, it follows that he who chooses words with reference to their sound will have an advantage over him who does not. Compare the melody that is found in any of the orations of Wendell Phillips with the clear and forceful but not beautiful style of Carl Schurz. Whatever may be the argumentative ability of either writer, there is no question but that Phillips charms us by the very rhythm of his sentences. When he appeals to us as "blue-eyed Saxons, proud of your race," we do not stop to think that we may not be blue-eyed at all. The melody of the sentence pleases us and carries us with the speaker. Phillips undoubtedly did not deliberately choose the adjective "blue-eyed." It probably fell into its place spontaneously, and yet, if eliminated from the sentence, the harmony is spoiled. Again, when Henry Grady describes the returning confederate soldier and alludes to him as "a hero in gray with a heart of gold," he chooses words largely for their sound. He could have expressed the idea perhaps as accurately in a dozen different ways, but he would not have pleased the ear. The very sound of the words, independent of their sense, makes a persuasive appeal to our hearts.

Not only does this melody manifest itself in the choice of words, but it also appears in their arrangement. There is a certain balance or cadence to the speech of some men which is pleasing in itself. When Webster closed his splendid peroration with the words "Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable," he deliberately balanced his phrases for rhetorical effect with a most admirable result. A more sustained example is found in an oration of Edward Everett's which is but little

remembered at the present time. He is describing the American Indian and puts these words into the mouth of King Philip:

“Thou hast taught me thy arts of destruction; for that alone I thank thee. And now take heed to thy steps: the red man is thy foe. When thou goest forth by day, my bullet shall whistle past thee; when thou liest down by night, my knife is at thy throat. The noonday sun shall not discover the enemy; and the darkness of midnight shall not protect thy rest. Thou shalt plant in terror; and I will reap in blood. Thou shalt sow the earth with corn; and I will strew it with ashes. Thou shalt go forth with the sickle; and I will follow after with the scalping-knife. Thou shalt build; and I will burn;—till the white man or the Indian perish from the land.”

We may perhaps criticize the literary merit of this passage upon other grounds, but certainly the melody produced by the admirable balance of phrases and words is pleasing to the ear. The speech has nearly the charm of verse. It may be objected that all this is apparently artificial, that it is a deliberate subordination of sense to sound. Undoubtedly that is sometimes true, for there are speakers of considerable prominence who impress us as being mere phrase makers, but the man who has a message to deliver and keeps it in mind is surely fortunate if he can at the same time phrase it in words that fall musically upon the ears of his audience. No man can do it deliberately, but by bringing ourselves in contact with the best writers we can in time acquire as a matter of habit some little portion, at any rate, of the skill that has made them great.

The beauty of style which is possessed by some speakers and writers seems to find its source in the third characteristic which we have called imagination. It, too, can-

not be deliberately acquired. It is to a great extent a natural gift, but like the other natural gifts it is capable of cultivation in some degree. It is almost **Imagination** inevitably present in persuasive oratory, and manifests itself ordinarily in what we call figures of speech. As in the other characteristics of beauty its manifestations must come spontaneously and not be dragged in by the heels to ornament our discourse. To be effective it must appear as a natural expression of the character of the speaker. We admire the imagery of Henry Ward Beecher but cannot think of it in connection with the speech of Abraham Lincoln. If Mr. Lincoln had ever tried to rival his eloquent contemporary in this respect, the result must have been failure; and yet Mr. Lincoln was not lacking in imagination, and it manifests itself in his great speeches. The truth of the matter is that each man employed that kind of discourse which was best suited to his character, and neither deliberately attempted to introduce anything that was not natural to him. The student, therefore, who deliberately tries to adopt figures of speech merely to embellish his oratory may achieve an ornamental style, but he will never obtain one that is beautiful. Yet if he cultivates his imagination by living with those writers who possess it, he will soon see in his own writing and speaking an inevitable result. The plain things of life will take on new beauty, and that beauty will manifest itself in his choice of words and phrases. One danger, however, he must avoid. Certain phrases which originally showed imagination have been so dulled by use that they now seem to betray merely a lack of it. It was undoubtedly a genius who first coined the phrase "the white light of truth," but constant repetition has

certainly dimmed its lustre. As a practical suggestion we give here a list of phrases which although possessing the imaginative quality in their inception have now become so hackneyed by constant use that they no longer show this characteristic: *Large and enthusiastic audience, endorse the sentiments of the previous speaker, the plaudits of the crowd, a monster mass meeting, from time immemorial, footprints on the sands of time, the spirit of the times, in the fulness of time, a path of roses, the primrose path, the cup that cheers, from out the distant past, the pages of time, his native element, a sea of flame, the finger of fate, chasing the rainbow, the beckoning hand of destiny, hitch your wagon to a star, embark on a new enterprise, the sea of life, sail the uncharted seas, the man of the hour, in the midst of this crisis, too full for utterance, satisfy the inner man, thrust out into a cold world, robbed of his destiny, the cruel hand of fate, the wide wide world, the starry heavens, the spacious firmament, shuffle off this mortal coil, fade into oblivion, launched into eternity, horny-handed son of toil.*

Imagination, as we have said, is most frequently manifested by the use of figurative language. Without going into the various figures of speech which may be used, it is sufficient to say that in a figure of speech, language is used outside of its literal meaning. Figurative language is not at all confined to poets or even to prose writers of acknowledged standing. It occurs in our everyday life and its presence frequently makes ordinary discourse more entertaining. Different writers have from time to time suggested rules to be observed in the use of figurative language.¹ It is difficult to consider imagination bound down

**Suggestions
for using
figures of
speech**

¹ See *Talks on Writing English*, by Arlo Bates, page 100.

by rule and yet certain suggestions as to the use of figurative language are worthy of consideration.

A figure should be used only for a definite purpose and never simply for its own sake. An argument is not some-

A figure thing that can be ornamented by figures of
should justify itself speech laid on without meaning. The in-
 elegance of such a process can be easily
understood by reading those authors of the Elizabethan
times who adopted what has been called the euphuistic
style. It was the fad at that time for the wits to conduct
conversation, especially between ladies and gentlemen,
in extravagant figure. Strephon and Clorinda trod the
stage and London was transformed to Arcady. The result
was far from being beautiful, and the reader of the present
time notices nothing in such writing except its general
dulness. In a similar way what has been called the "ante-
bellum oratory" in America is not pleasing through its
very extravagance of figure.

All figures of speech should be easily comprehensible.
Sometimes a speaker having in mind an apt comparison

A figure will forget that he is to use his figure of
should be speech for purposes of explanation, and
easily un- that if the figure is not itself easily under-
derstood stood, he has entirely failed of his purpose.

It is valueless to compare something that is obscure with
something that is still more obscure. In an after-dinner
speech not long ago a physician was commenting in a
facetious way upon the danger which he had run in com-
ing to the dinner in an automobile driven by the toast-
master. The idea which he expressed was not novel, but
was pleasant enough to interest the audience. In speaking
of the recklessness of the driver he alluded to the number

of speed laws that were broken, and adopting the language of his profession said that it was not only a fracture of the law, but a "comminuted fracture." This addition to his jest hardly elicited a smile from his hearers. The reason is obvious. No one but a physician would have a definite and immediate knowledge of what a comminuted fracture was. In other words, his figure of speech was not easily comprehensible by a large majority of his hearers, and therefore was ineffective.

Another warning is never to make a comparison without realizing fully what it is. Sometimes a writer, misled by the aptness of his comparison in one particular, will use it only to have it turned against him with telling force in another particular. The political orator who in the process of a campaign likened the triumphant career of his party leader in the campaign to Napoleon's progress from Elba probably did not think until reminded by an opponent that, after all, Napoleon's progress from Elba ended in Waterloo and St. Helena. While it is not necessary that a simile or a metaphor should be accurate in all particulars, we certainly should take care that it is not glaringly inaccurate in any obvious respect.

Great care should be taken never to push a figure too far. The inexperienced in writing frequently allow themselves to be carried away by the aptness of an illustration. Having found a likeness in one respect, another similarity suggests itself, and then a third and so on until they build up triumphantly a structure which shows no little ingenuity. A government, for instance, may be likened to a ship, and although the idea is not a new one and was

**A figure
must be rea-
sonably ac-
curate**

**A figure
must not be
carried too
far**

not new even when Longfellow spoke of the "ship of state," it is still passable. An ingenious mind can undoubtedly find many analogies between the various parts and activities of a ship and those of a government. The ropes, masts, decks, rudder and pilot, perhaps, all can be duplicated in similar figures of speech. If a writer, however, is carried away by his ingenuity, he will find that not only does he lose in beauty from his very profuseness of illustration, but he may push the figure to a point where attention is called to its weakness rather than to its strength. At any rate there is no question that as he continues to harp upon the idea it loses in strength. A single comparison may serve a purpose, but a monotonous repetition of comparisons only serves to distract attention from the writing itself.

The imaginative factor is worth cultivating. It lends variety to one's language, and variety is an element of beauty. To carry the imaginative factor to an extreme, however, is to defeat the very end for which you are striving. Imagination that has become tiresome has ceased to be imagination, and in becoming tiresome has ceased to be pleasing to our hearers. Anything that is unpleasant is by the very definition of our term opposed to beauty.

The fourth characteristic of beauty which we shall consider is wit. Wit in argument is like fire in our ordinary life, a most useful servant but a bad master. Woe to the writer who seeks only to be funny, especially if he gets that reputation fastened upon him. Men will not be convinced by one whose object seems to be to amuse them, and a speech which in the language of the newspapers brings

Summary of imagination

Wit—its danger

forth "gales of laughter" may founder and sink in those very gales. The first thing, therefore, for a writer to bear in mind is that while his audience may laugh with him, they should never laugh at him. A speaker who drags in humorous anecdotes one after the other may entertain his audience, and in some forms of speaking entertaining the audience is the thing desired. The man who argues, however, has a different purpose in view, and if he makes his audience smile, it should be only as a means to an end.

In spite of the danger, however, which attends the use of wit, it is most effective when rightly used. When Mr. Grady, for instance, in his speech upon "The New South" remarked that the people
Wit—its
value
 in his section of the country (Atlanta, Ga.)

regarded General Sherman as "an able man although somewhat careless with fire," he lightened the seriousness of his theme with his wit, and certainly did not detract from the effectiveness of his speech. An epigrammatic characterization will frequently make an audience laugh and at the same time drive home a point with telling force. When President Lincoln told certain critics of General Grant who were complaining that the General drank whisky, that he wished he could find out what kind he used so that he could send some to his other generals, the wit of the reply certainly added to the keenness of the argument. Brevity, however, is said to be the soul of wit, and in writing an argument that adage should be borne in mind. No matter how apt a story or an anecdote is, it will not be effective if it is too long. For this reason the witty phrase or the epigrammatic sentence is ordinarily better than the humorous story or the elaborated jest, for the latter take the atten-

tion of the audience for too long a time from the subject under discussion. If the witty point can be made in half a sentence, well and good. If it requires a paragraph, the writer had better look to it closely and see if it is worth while. In the consideration of all the other characteristics of beauty, we have commented upon the fact that it is difficult deliberately to acquire them, even as it is difficult deliberately to acquire a beautiful style itself, but it is doubly hard to acquire this characteristic of wit because the failure is so disastrous. The writer, therefore, who seeks to make use of this characteristic should realize that he is indeed playing with edged tools.

After all the entire question of beauty in style may be summed up by saying that it consists in the preservation of a certain balance in our writing. On **Balance be-** the one hand we have the desire to please, **tween beauty** and **and efficiency** and no matter whether beauty is secured by one or more of the four characteristics which have been suggested, or by any of the numerous others which may come to our minds, the fundamental idea is always this idea of pleasure. As opposed to this we have the primary object of argument which after all is not to please but to convince. If in our desire to interest and please those who hear us, we succeed in distracting their attention from the primary purpose of our art, then our style has detracted from our argument rather than added to it. Properly used, the quality of beauty, like the qualities of clearness and force, tends to help us in our endeavor to communicate our message. When it goes beyond that, it defeats its own purpose and ceases to be beauty.

CHAPTER XIII

WRITING THE ARGUMENT

"If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces." Doubtless, also, the arguments written in our colleges had been models of composition. While the principles laid down in the chapters on style sound good, it is another matter to apply them. It is one thing to know the theory of clearness, force, and beauty, but it is another to make our arguments clear, forcible, and beautiful. No one can furnish a perfect recipe for writing an argument, but there are a few general suggestions, most of them mentioned or explained at length in the preceding chapters, which it is particularly important to keep in mind throughout the process. Then there are other specific suggestions which apply to the various parts of the argument.

The first suggestion of general application is that we should avoid all mechanical and formal expressions. We should avoid the numbering of points. It is true that numbering does make for clear-
ness; it points out definitely certain things.

**Avoidance of
artificiality**

On the other hand, it tends to make a style uninteresting; it leaves nothing to the imagination. We all know how tiresome it is to read the 1's, 2's, 3's, 4's, or a's, b's, c's of legal or scientific treatises in which we have no unusual interest. It may be true that in a style where clearness is

the sole essential, and force is a minor matter, the device of numbering or lettering points is desirable or at least excusable. This applies to extensive treatises of all kinds and possibly to text-books. It does not apply to our arguments, for in them it is just as important to interest our audience as to make our message clear; if they do not listen, they cannot understand. Yet there is one place in our argument, as we shall see later, where it is permissible to enumerate points: it is the one place where above all clearness is essential—the statement of the main issues at the end of the introduction.

We should not only avoid all numbering or lettering of points, but also the technical or quasi-technical terms of argument itself. We like such terms in argument no better than in any other form of writing. Even if we understand what they mean, they become deadly monotonous. The following is a list of terms to be avoided: *origin of the question, history of the question, conflicting opinions, clash in opinion, extraneous matter, excluded matter, waived matter, special issues, main issues, affirmative, negative, contend, maintain, refute, opponent, discussion, argument, debate.*

The second suggestion of general application is that we should cultivate a simple direct style. This is doubly desirable in an argument which is intended to be delivered. Of course variety is an element of charm and of interest, but variety in simpler sentence forms and in shorter words is not impossible. The short sentence, the short Anglo-Saxon word, have a terseness and a strength that are foreign to the Teutonic sentences and the Latin words. The appeal of our slang, however faulty, is that by the

Value of a
simple style

use of short words and simple sentences a thought is expressed in the most direct fashion. Of course we must not desert the shrine of good use, but surely simplicity and good use are not strangers to each other. An interesting example of what one writer ¹ has done with Anglo-Saxon words of one syllable is given below. Students should not consider this as a model because it was not written as such, but it is a striking illustration of the homely strength of the Saxon part of our mother tongue.

“That part of our speech which comes down from our sires, far back in the days of yore, is made up in large part of those words which we can speak with one pulse of the breath and one stroke of the tongue. The stream of time, through a long tract of years, and from lands not our own, has brought down to us a vast drift of new and strange terms, poor as they are long, by which we lose in strength more than we gain in sound. But the good old stock of words is not lost. They shine out here and there from the heap in bright points, like stars when a fog dims the air, or the face of the sky is dark with clouds. It will pay us for our toil to mine out these gems and string them on the chain of our thoughts, which will then shine with a new light; and though the tongue may lose in sound, it will be all the more firm to speak all that the deep soul can feel. The heart beats throb by throb, and thus the tongue should keep in tune while it vents the heart’s joys and pains. The art of life and the lore of the head may call for terms cold and long; but let all that the heart thinks and feels come from the depths of the soul in thoughts ‘that breathe and words that burn.’”

It is not a bad exercise to train ourselves by writing a whole argument with no word of more than three syllables in it. There is a great temptation here to cite again Lincoln’s *Gettysburg Address* as an example of what a speech

¹ G. W. McPhail.

ought to be, in this case in the matter of simplicity of diction. In that oration of two hundred and sixty-five words only seven per cent of the words are of more than two syllables and in seventy-three per cent there is only one.

The third general suggestion is merely another reminder of the importance of being concrete. This is so large an element of force, and it was so strongly **Concreteness** emphasized in the chapter on that quality of style, that it is enough here simply to reiterate the need of it. We must avoid abstract discussions and make use of facts, examples and illustrations whenever opportunity offers.

The fourth suggestion is to be concise. This subject, too, has been treated so fully that merely a word of review is necessary. **Conciseness** means, as was said above, brevity plus comprehensiveness; it is saying much in little. An audience will listen to a terse meaty message, but it will be tired out by a long-drawn wordy one.

All of these suggestions have been treated in previous chapters at greater or less length. They are, however, so fundamental, that it seems best to emphasize them and if possible to have them constantly before the student's mind when he writes his arguments. This does not mean that the other principles are of less importance but simply that these are fundamentals of a tangible and definite sort which can be readily grasped and easily put into practice.

Keeping the preceding suggestions constantly in mind, we come to the actual writing of the forensic. The first thing that confronts us is our brief. What use shall we

make of it? The answer seems to be that it has to a great extent already fulfilled the purpose for which it was constructed. The brief was to make us think clearly and this should all have been done before we start to write. From now on the brief can be only a guide to follow, and that is comparatively a minor purpose. Then too, there is danger in following too closely. It may be that one is to be commended who makes two blades of corn grow where one grew before, but a writer who merely makes two sentences appear in his argument where one appeared in his brief is not entitled to praise. A padded brief is an artificial argument. But if we write with the brief before us it is difficult to avoid this fault. It is suggested, therefore, that the brief be closed or even put in an inconvenient place, a desk drawer perhaps, so that the writer is not tempted to refer to it too frequently. If this is done, it can be used as an outline or a reference without having its constant presence threaten to drive the author into artificiality.

Use of the
brief

We find as we progress in the writing of the argument that many of the principles of style have a special application to certain parts. As we mentally go through the construction of an argument let us note how we may apply particular principles to particular parts.

Specific
suggestions

To begin at the beginning, the forensic should open in a manner striking enough to challenge the attention. Two tests this opening must fulfill. It must first of all be interesting. It must carry out to the very fullest extent the requirements of the quality of force. It must wake up your audience, no

The opening

matter how apathetic they may be to you or to your subject. One student was arguing that the Filipinos should not be given self-government. The gist of his argument was that they were not capable of it.

"The Filipinos," he said, "are like a little barefoot brown baby, who has no clothing but a short calico shirt, and who is just learning to walk alone. Shall we, the foster parent of this babe of color, leave it to perish in ignorance, or shall we continue to guide its footsteps until it is able to take care of itself?"

Whatever else may be said of this opening it caused the audience to sit up with a smile of appreciation and of interest. Another student was arguing in favor of applying Civil Service rules to the police of a certain city. He began with the following quotation:

"The —— Police are like balls upon a pool table; they are knocked and whacked against one another, followed and drawn, pocketed, jumped, and spotted, rolled and racked and counted, first one way and then another, framed and 'busted' and broke at the will and caprice of those who are pleased to play the game for glory or gain, for place or power, for policy or for purity."

The method used in each of these cases is a striking comparison. This device is rather mechanical, but it can be used effectively. It is for us to improve upon this method and show some originality in the opening, at the same time making it as interesting as we can.

Not only must this opening fulfill the requirements of the quality of force, but it must also conform to the principle of unity. No matter how forceful the story or quotation, if it is not relevant to the entire subject, it destroys the unity of the composition. To satisfy this requirement, the be-

ginning may be either a statement of the occasion for the discussion or an expression of the key-note or basis of the whole argument. The previous illustration comparing the Philippine Islands to a little brown baby gave the key-note to the one argument—that the Filipinos should not be given self-government because they were incapable of it. The other, comparing the police to pool balls, expressed the basis of the other—that the police should be put under civil service rules because they are now the victims of political jugglery. Both of these openings fulfilled the requirements of unity. Another kind of opening is the one which, it is said, was given in a debate in which several speakers had forgotten their speeches. One speaker began like this:

“Lord God of hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget, lest we forget.”

This was certainly a timely and interesting opening, yet no one can deny that it detracted from the unity of the speech. It attracted attention to the wit of the speaker, not to the subject on which he was speaking. It would have been much better to begin with something just as striking and expressing the key-note of the argument. See, for example, how Robespierre in a speech urging the abolition of capital punishment combines both these factors, and, indeed, gives in one paragraph an entire introduction ending with a categorical statement of his main issues.

“When the news came to Athens that in the City of Argos some citizens had been condemned to death, the Athenians ran to their temples and implored the gods to turn them from contemplating such cruel and distressing

deeds. I now come to pray—not the gods—but legislators who should be the interpreters of the eternal laws dictated by God to man to efface from the code of the French people those laws of blood, repellent alike to their morals and their new constitution, which demand judicial murders. I wish to prove, first, that the punishment of death is essentially unjust, and second, that it is not the most deterrent of punishments, but increases crime rather than prevents it.”

The next step in the introduction is the history of the question. On this point there is little to be said, but that little is of the greatest importance. This **History of the question** historical part of the argument should be written not as an end in itself but merely as a means to an end—to explain the proposition so as to make clear exactly what it means. To do so does not require a long history from the beginning of the world; some features should be dwelt on at a greater length than others, and some may be omitted entirely. Many writers on the subject of woman suffrage, for instance, seem to think it their duty to write essays on the position of women among the Egyptians, the ancient Hebrews, the Greeks, the Romans, the Dark Ages, and so on, before starting to write an argument. It is safe to say that no matter how well these historical sketches are written, they will throw little or no light upon the question of to-day. The writer forgets that the historical material is included for purposes of definition, and that to make it an end in itself destroys the unity of the speech. The history of the question, therefore, should be as concise as is consistent with clearness; the sole reason for its existence is as an explanation of the meaning of the question.

The third step of the introduction, the definition of terms, must be treated with special care. It is a very easy matter to make of it a mere dictionary-like exposition. There can be nothing worse than such a method, and it is better to omit all definitions entirely than to follow that course. Indeed in many cases this step of the analysis is unnecessary; the history of the question or the common knowledge concerning the topic may be sufficient. If some definition is necessary, it should be made as concise, terse, and interesting as possible. Above all it should not be over-elaborate or smack of the dictionary. Most writers give with some detail various methods of defining a term, by etymology, exemplification, explication, authority, negation, and so on. It is hard to resist the temptation to compare these methods of definition with Doctor Johnson's definition of a net-work, quoted by Baker and Huntingdon:¹ "anything reticulated or decussated at equal distances with interstices between the intersections." In other words the various methods of definition require more defining than the term to be defined. The authors of this book are of the belief that such an analysis of the process is of only theoretical interest and that the student will do well to avoid anything so academic as an attempt to differentiate his definitions. The best introduction is probably that in which no set definition of terms is necessary. The best definition is that which is as concise, simple, and natural as possible.

**Definition
of terms**

After the definition of terms comes the conflict of opinions, and this is the great stumbling block for most stu-

¹ *Principles of Argumentation*, page 23.

dents when they put their arguments into black and white. The brief here is likely to lead them astray. The

Conflict of opinions conflict of opinions has been defined as a comparison of the contentions of the affirmative with those of the negative. The natural thing to do, therefore, seems to be to start two paragraphs this way:

"The affirmative makes these contentions: (1) . . ." and so on.

"The negative makes these contentions: (1) . . ." and so on.

The result is artificial, mechanical, monotonous, and uninteresting beyond belief, and is not read by anyone, sometimes not even by the instructors who are paid to read it. It is all very well in the brief to make the conflict of opinions a list of all the arguments of the affirmative set off against a list of all the arguments of the negative, because the purpose there is in part at least to aid the writer himself by a process of elimination and combination to find what are the fundamental points at issue. In the completed forensic, however, this purpose no longer exists: the writer has already reached his main issues and the conflict of opinions here serves merely to convince the reader of the reasonableness of the analysis. It therefore follows that a comparison of points of view will serve this purpose just as well, for all that is desired is that the reader will agree with the point of view of the writer. Moreover, a detailed and mechanical comparison of minute contentions would defeat its own purpose by tiring the reader and distracting his attention from what the writer was trying to accomplish. In the woman suffrage question, for instance, it would be much better, instead of enumerat-

ing some twelve or fifteen contentions on each side, to sum the matter up as follows:

“People’s beliefs on this subject, as on most others, are determined largely by the point of view. The conservative thinks that whatever is is right; the radical, we sometimes suspect, thinks that whatever is is wrong; the idealist thinks as a matter of justice, of natural right, that women are entitled to vote; the statesman opposes suffrage or favors it according to what he considers its political effects will be; the politician takes his stand according to what he believes will be its effects on him and his party; the professional man is apt to consider the sociological results on the race and on women themselves; the common citizen generally considers in his own experience whether women would vote honestly and efficiently or largely as sentiment dictates. When we discard the unworthy motives or points of view we find there are comparatively few fundamental questions remaining: (1) . . .”

Even the above conflict of opinions is comparatively mechanical, but it is at least readable. Furthermore, it also includes the reduction to its lowest terms, although this step of the analysis is dismissed with the phrase, “When we discard the unworthy motives or points of view.” Very often the reduction of the conflict can be handled as briefly as this but sometimes the exclusion is not so apparently justifiable, and the attempt to make the exclusion amounts to actual refutation. Some people who argue in favor of or against woman suffrage contend that the question whether women want the vote is not material, because voting is not a privilege but a duty to be exercised whether or not the voter desires to vote. This clearly is a matter of refutation and refutation being

Exclusion of matter from the conflict of opinions

nothing more than negative proof should be included in the body of the argument, not in the introduction. It follows, therefore, that if a student and his opponent disagree on the exclusion of a material point, the matter of exclusion is a main issue or part of one. This whole discussion, however, is really a matter of structure and not of form, but it is evident enough that those apparent matters which can be excluded from the discussion in the introduction should be treated very briefly and concisely.

The next step in writing the argument is the statement of the main issues. It will be remembered that according to the first general suggestion all numbering of points should be avoided, except in this one place. It is so fundamental for the issues to stand out conspicuously that here we are willing to sacrifice beauty to clearness. It is permitted, therefore, and even desirable, that a system of enumeration of one sort or another be used. The usual method is similar to that of Mr. Gunraj in his forensic on "Home Rule in Ireland:"¹

"Sifting the case thus, we begin to see that the contest has raged around three points, at once simple and fundamental, the consideration of which is necessary to a solution of our question:

"First,—Does Ireland want Home Rule?

"Second,—Does Ireland need Home Rule?

"Third,—Will Ireland when she gets Home Rule be a detriment to the interests of the British Empire?"

This statement of the issues, while not perfect, is at least clear; it also makes the issues stand out clearly by the mechanical device of indenting, and by the very fact that this is the only place in the forensic where enumeration is

¹ See Appendix.

used. Robespierre's paragraph previously quoted is as clear and much more artistic.

In the next task, the writing of the body of the argument, the proof, the simplest method is to treat each issue as a separate small argument in itself; it should have its own introduction, proof, and conclusion. In this way the issues are made to stand out with almost absolute clearness; the line between them is made as distinct as possible. Great care must be taken, however, that the *sub-argument* introductions and conclusions be not too elaborate, for then they become monotonous and destroy the interest and symmetry of the whole.

Each issue a small argument

The *sub-argument* introduction need be little more than a statement of the issue with perhaps some explanation of the method of approaching it. Notice the way Mr. Gunraj handles the beginning of his second issue:

Introduction to each issue

"Let us turn now to the question: Does Ireland need Home Rule: This, too, like the last is fundamental, for if Ireland does not need Home Rule, why all this fuss about giving it to her? But how are we to tell whether she needs it or not? What is the criterion by which a need is to be judged:

"Plainly, the object of government is, or should be, the welfare of the governed. This is a proposition too well conceded to be denied. Some may conceivably contend that the object of a despotic government is not the welfare of the governed but of the rulers, but even despots have learned that the welfare of the governed best contributes to their own. But we are not here concerned with despotic governments. We who believe in the democratic principle and who partake of its blessings cannot for a moment hesitate to grant that the welfare of the people is the true object of government. Believing thus, we are forced to concede that a government which fails to promote the happi-

ness of the people it governs has failed in its purpose and needs to be supplanted by one more adequate.

"The criterion, then, by which we are to judge Ireland's need of Home Rule is: Has the present form of government by a Parliament overwhelmingly British succeeded in promoting Irish welfare? And since the influence of government on the welfare of a people is most readily seen in industry, our question resolves itself mainly into a consideration of the effects of British rule on the economic life of the Irish people."

This introduction to the issue is simple and clear; it might be criticized on the grounds that it is too long, and certainly such a criticism would apply to most college arguments. In this case, however, the treatment itself is much more extended than the average. In all arguments the introduction of each issue should be at least a statement of that issue; how much additional information should be included depends upon the nature of the subject and the scope of the treatment.

The conclusion, likewise, to each sub-argument must not be over-elaborate. It is generally desirable to make it a short recapitulation of the steps by which the issue was proved. This is Mr. Gunraj's summary of the same issue that the Irish need Home Rule:

"It is a gloomy page which tells of the political and industrial life of Ireland under English rule. England, as the conqueror of Ireland, has ruled with an iron hand in a way little short of savage tyranny; as Ireland's legislator, she has used every means in her power in effectually blocking the avenues to industrial prosperity, with a consequent destruction of Irish industry, and a decimation of Irish population unparalleled in modern history. The motives which have guided England in her policy have been partly commercial, partly religious and race rivalry. The great

wrongs which Ireland has suffered call aloud for reparation. England has signally failed as a ruler in promoting Irish welfare, and the only thing she can do to atone in a measure for her unjustifiable treatment is to make Ireland autonomous and allow her to work out her own destiny."

The most commendable feature of this sub-argument summary is that it is not mechanical or perfunctory. So many students would sum up in this fashion: "To summarize this issue, Ireland needs Home Rule, because, as has been shown, England is incapable of understanding her, she has suffered tremendously under English rule, and she is able to govern herself better than England is able to govern her." The sub-argument conclusion, it is true, should be a recapitulation of the steps by which the issue was proved, but particular care should be taken to observe the first general suggestion by avoiding all mechanical and formal methods of expression.

While we have made suggestions as to writing the introduction and conclusion, we have said nothing concerning the writing-out of the body or proof of each issue. There are practically no specific suggestions to be made. The student can do little more than put into practice his knowledge of the qualities of style.

**Writing proof
of the issue**

Can we, however, leave this subject of writing the proof of each issue without saying anything about refutation? The questions are almost hurled at us:—
 "What shall I refute?" "When shall I re-
 fute?" "What proportion of the argument should be refutation?" "Where shall the refutation be placed?" "Can you put refutation in the introduction?" These and many other questions show that in the minds of both writers and

Refutation

teachers of argument refutation seems to be some peculiar style of composition which is indeed akin to argument but yet distinct from it in some particulars. This is not true. Refutation has been called destructive argument, and perhaps there is some reason for the use of that word. After all, however, it is not essentially different from any other kind of argument. The same principles with regard to structure, substance, and style apply to refutation as to everything else. There is, however, this point which should be noticed, and in which is found the only characteristic of refutation in itself. While throughout the argument you are contending with your opponents, in refutation you are meeting their views as they themselves have directly expressed them. Your entire argument is to show that the other side is wrong and you are right, but in refutation you point out one particular thing which they have asserted, whether it be big or little, and show that that particular thing is wrong. If this distinction is fundamental, it follows that refutation has no particular place in the argument except that it is part of the proof, not of the introduction or of the conclusion. It is proof, not introductory or summarizing matter. It becomes necessary when you feel that the views of the other side are so prominent in the minds of your hearers that they must be answered at that time. It may be in the beginning, or the middle, or the end of the proof. An entire issue may be given up to refutation at one time, while at another time, possibly in the same argument, an idea may be refuted in a sentence or even in a phrase. To attempt to tell where it belongs, or how to express it, would be of little value. This one principle should always be observed. In constructing the brief you are told to designate with a negative clause

the argument to be refuted. In other words, the structure of the brief demands that in the first place you make clear exactly that which you are going to refute. What is true of the brief is doubly true of the argument. It is essential to clearness that refutation should be phrased so that the audience may have in mind exactly what is being refuted. To introduce a piece of evidence or a line of reasoning without telling the audience beforehand the point at which it is aimed is to sacrifice both clearness and force. The one rule, therefore, for writing refutation is to make it perfectly plain just what you are going to do, and equally as plain just how you are doing it.

There is one matter of practice in writing the issues, and indeed the whole argument, which may prove of value. Many writers, old and young, experienced and inexperienced, have found that by laying their work aside for several days or a week they can go back to it with freshened mind, opinions, and point of view. As Professor Wendell says, "Words and sentences are subjects of revision; paragraphs and whole compositions are subjects of prevision."¹ This revising can be done most efficiently not while you are writing but some time afterward when you are able to view the work dispassionately. Connected with this device is another which many have tried with success. Do not try to write the whole argument in one stretch, but after you have collected all your materials and written the brief, write the introduction at one time; the first issue at another; and so on. But be sure to make the conclusion a separate task. This method will prevent the frequent criticism that the student seems to have run down near

**Argument
should not
be written
at one time**

¹ *English Composition*, page 117.

the end of his argument. It will also insure the proper amount of care on that part of the argument than which no part is more important, the conclusion.

We are almost tempted to leave this subject without making any suggestions as to how to write the conclusion of the argument. If a writer has studied the question, has analyzed it, and has clothed his thought in words down to the very end of his proof, it would seem that his conclusion ought to write itself. If after all that endeavor one cannot write the final words with "a tongue of fire," we suspect that there is but little fire in his make-up. An examination of almost any argument written by a master of his subject shows that in the conclusion he is at his very best. He then gathers together all the material which he has at hand, and forges one final thunderbolt to be thrown into the world with all the force that is in him. One might as well try to teach a runner how to make the final heart-breaking sprint which tells the difference between victory and defeat as to tell a man who has written a good argument how he should bring it to a close.

Yet there are some things which we will do well to notice. In the first place it may be doubted if under any circumstances it is advisable to introduce any new matter into the conclusion. The argument has been written; everything that is of value in analysis or proof should have been made plain long ago. The introduction of a new thought which properly belonged in the development of the case, or in its proof destroys the unity of the entire composition, detracts from its clearness, and certainly diminishes

its force. We are, therefore, justified in believing that the only things which can appear in the conclusion in an argument are those which appear in the conclusion of our brief, that is to say, a recapitulation of the proof and a final statement of the question in the form of a persuasive appeal upon its merits.

The recapitulation of the proof should never be so extended as to cause confusion. It is obvious at once that we cannot go over the ground again, following out each thought and reproducing it. The purpose of the recapitulation is to suggest, not to repeat, the arguments that have gone before. It certainly helps our hearers, after we have concluded the treatment of perhaps a fourth or a fifth issue, if, as briefly as is consistent with clearness, we remind them of the substance of the preceding issues, but we should remember that it is only a reminder; it is not a retrial of the case. How long this should be depends upon the nature and length of our argument. If we have been successful in analyzing it to one comparatively simple issue, the recapitulation is hardly necessary. If, however, the argument is long, with many subdivisions, careful recapitulation at considerable length will tend for clearness. If the writer bears in mind that his only endeavor should be to bring his argument back to the minds of his hearers so that they can appreciate the value of his final appeal, he will not go far astray. Again we must urge the avoidance of artificiality. Sometimes we find a conclusion that is merely a restatement of the issues almost word for word, followed by a statement of the question itself. Such a device is mechanical even in a geometrical proposition where it belongs. In an argu-

Recapitulation in the conclusion

ment which is intended to reach our hearts and minds, it is inartistic in the extreme.

The final appeal is the writer's last and best opportunity for persuasive writing. All that he has done has been in a sense preparatory to these final words which he is to leave with his audience.

Final persuasive appeal

It is therefore true that here there must be no qualification of his original proposition. If, after writing an argument, a student finds that he cannot assert his original contention as forcibly as he did at the beginning, but that on the contrary he wishes to qualify it to some extent, he should realize that he never can convince any other person that he has proved his case. The slightest indication of weakening is always interpreted as a partial abandonment of the original proposition, and no amount of explanation or excuses can ever make it seem anything else. The last sentences of the conclusion should be not only a reassertion of the original proposition, but they should be also a reassertion in language which has force and beauty and which is the climax of the entire argument. They should be a final persuasive appeal to drive home the message. If the very last words can tell the story of the argument so that they will linger in the minds of those who hear them long after the details of the proof have been forgotten, the writer will have achieved a triumph of analysis. Let us note here again the art of Abraham Lincoln, who is becoming more and more recognized, as the years go on, as one of the very best exponents of analytical argument. The concluding sentences of the *Gettysburg Address* have been so dinned in our ears during every political campaign that perhaps we are over-familiar with their beauty. It is said, indeed,

that they are not original with Mr. Lincoln. They still stand, however, as one of the best examples of a persuasive conclusion which has within it the essence of the entire speech, and the very fact that the words "of the people, by the people, and for the people" fall so readily from our tongues to-day is an undoubted tribute to the unconscious art of the great author. The ending of another ¹ of Lincoln's great speeches has never been surpassed for sublime beauty and majestic persuasive appeal. "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations."

In closing this chapter on writing the argument we cannot help recurring to the quotation with which it begins: "If to do were only as easy as to know what were good to do," how easy it would be to tell how to write an argument. In the very fact, however, that it is not easy probably lies the charm of the entire subject. Argument as exemplified in its highest form, oratory, is after all an art and not a science. One may lay down rules in the sciences with confidence that their observation will bring to anyone the desired results. The difficulty in a science is not so much in knowing what the rule is as in being able to follow it. In an art such as ours, however, it is also difficult even to know the rule. The blind are indeed leading the blind, and the great hope of the teacher

The delivery of your message is the end of argument

¹ Second Inaugural.

is that to his pupil will be given a clearer vision than to himself. The experience of centuries has done no more than to enable men to make here and there a suggestion. The rest lies in careful thinking, in hard work, and in inspiration. If the student who has read these pages looks to find in them a complete guide to argument, he looks in vain. The public speaker, as we have said, is the man with a message. It is not given to any teacher to be able to furnish either the message or the man. All that he can hope to do is to make suggestions which will enable the man to be more efficient in the delivery of that which is after all of the highest importance, the message itself.

SUGGESTIONS FOR WRITING AN ARGUMENT ¹

GENERAL

- A. Avoid mechanical or formal forms of expression.
1. Do not number points, except in stating the issues at the end of the introduction.
 2. Do not use any of the following technical or quasi-technical terms of the course, or derivatives of them:

<i>origin of the question,</i>	<i>affirmative,</i>
<i>history of the question,</i>	<i>negative,</i>
<i>conflicting opinions,</i>	<i>contend,</i>
<i>clash in opinion,</i>	<i>maintain,</i>
<i>extraneous matter,</i>	<i>refute,</i>
<i>excluded matter,</i>	<i>opponent,</i>
<i>waived matter,</i>	<i>discussion,</i>
<i>special issues,</i>	<i>argument,</i>
<i>main issues,</i>	<i>debate.</i>
 3. Do not, with your brief before you, follow it step by step in a rigid and mechanical way.
- B. Be simple:
1. Use short sentences.
 2. Use short words.
- C. Be concrete:
1. Use illustrations.
 2. Use examples.
 3. Use facts.
 4. Use figures.
 5. Do not generalize.
- D. Be concise:
1. Conciseness means brevity plus comprehensiveness; say "much in little."

¹ Offered merely as a working guide or reminder for students to have before them when writing.

INTRODUCTION

- E. Challenge the attention in opening your argument; e. g., with a quotation, illustration, incident, epigrammatic statement, or striking piece of evidence.
- F. In the completed forensic, make the conflict of opinions a comparison of points of view, rather than of detailed contentions.
- G. Have the main issues stand out clearly at the end of the introduction.

PROOF

- H. In the body of the forensic write a short separate argument on each issue, each of these *sub-arguments* having its own introduction, body, and conclusion.
 - 1. The *sub-argument* introduction should be a clear presentation of that issue.
 - 2. The *sub-argument* proof should be a presentation of the evidence which goes to prove that issue.
 - 3. The *sub-argument* conclusion should be a recapitulation of the steps by which that issue was proved.

CONCLUSION

- I. Make the conclusion of the forensic consist in a summary and a persuasive appeal.
 - 1. The summary should be a recapitulation of all the issues and of the steps in the proof of them.
 - 2. The persuasive appeal might take the shape of a quotation, an illustration, an incident, or a brief restatement of the whole case in eloquent words.

CHAPTER XIV

DELIVERY¹

It is, perhaps, not out of place, even in a book which deals with the composition of arguments, that some space should be devoted to the question of delivery. A fair criticism of the teaching of the past, however, is that it has paid too much attention to this question. Students were given practice in "speaking pieces" or in delivering essays and orations, as if the delivery were the only thing of importance. Even to-day we find teachers of elocution training their pupils in the delivery of selections with but little thought as to whether the selection itself is worth delivering, and when consideration is paid to a pupil's own composition, too frequently it is judged purely upon its dramatic possibilities rather than upon its value as a piece of English. It is not the purpose of this book, however, to minimize the value of the proper teaching of vocal English. Every student who intends to take up work which will require him to speak in public should obtain, if possible, training from some competent instructor in elocution. While he should pray to be delivered from the teacher that produces that abnormal product, the young lady reader of the lecture course or social entertainment, he should realize that there are competent men and women teaching elocution who are able to teach

The importance of good delivery

¹ This chapter is written by Mr. Stone, not in collaboration.

him how to make marked improvement in public speaking. The hints that follow in this chapter are not intended to take the place of such instruction. They will serve, however, as suggestions to those who for one reason or another are not able to avail themselves of such opportunities.

In the beginning it is valuable to realize the distinction between the public speaker and the actor. It is no dis-

The public speaker not an actor respect to those who practice the dramatic art to say that after all they are interpreters of the thoughts of other men rather than

thinkers and doers of the world's work themselves. The actor imitates, pretends, plays, and his endeavor should be to sink his individuality in the character that he is representing. The public speaker should also keep his own individuality in the background, but not for the same reason.

The actor wishes the audience to see another person. The public speaker does not wish the audience to see any person at all, but only to grasp the thought that is expressed.

Consequently the same arts that will justly bring the actor success will be ludicrous in the public speaker. The public speaker is the man with a message, and the message is the all important thing. The messenger is false to his trust if he strives to attract attention to himself at the expense of the truth which it is his business to deliver.

Emerson said in speaking of this subject, "What you are speaks so loud that I cannot hear what you say." For

The speaker's outward appearance this reason the public speaker should, in the first place, take care not to distract the attention of his audience by his personal dress or appearance.

No man is to blame for any physical peculiarity which he possesses, but he is to blame if he exaggerates it, or does not do his best to overcome it.

Peculiarities in dress are easily controlled, and there is no excuse for a public speaker's attracting attention by any eccentricity of his raiment. He should dress as the gentlemen in the community in which he is speaking dress on similar occasions. There is no regulation garb for the public speaker. His dress may well vary with the time, the community, and the character of the audience, but it is always the dress of a cultured person. Extremes of style which attract attention are fully as bad as eccentricities due to a disregard for conventionalities. The speaker should remember that anything in his dress or appearance that attracts the attention of the audience distracts their attention from the message which it is his duty to deliver.

It is customary to deliver some words of formal address before beginning to speak. Consequently the omission to do this would be noticeable and hence bad. Just what shall be done by a public speaker in this way rests largely with the taste of the individual speaking. Under ordinary conditions it seems that the simplest form of address is the best. If there is a presiding officer, a formal address and a formal salutation to him is certainly courteous, but there would seem to be little need of any exaggeration. At some time in his progress to the platform or when he is upon the platform, the speaker should catch the eye of the presiding officer, bow, and address him as *Mr. President*, or *Mr. Chairman*. That would seem to be the only time in which any formal address to the presiding officer is advisable. The habit which some speakers have of inserting at frequent intervals during their speech, "Mr. President," as if they were speaking only to the presiding

**The form of
address**

officer and not to the audience, is now a relic of the dark age of oratory. Upon the proper address to the audience there seems to be a difference of opinion. Some teachers of rhetoric whose ability and good taste cannot be criticized advise their students formally to address each particular portion of the audience. Accordingly, in debates, for instance, it is not unusual to hear a speaker begin somewhat in this style: "*Mr. President, Honorable Members of the Governing Boards and Faculties, Honorable Judges, Ladies and Gentlemen.*" It is, perhaps, the rule in intercollegiate and interscholastic debates for the speakers to address formally the judges who are to decide the debate. We prefer to recommend that if error is made, it should be made upon the side of simplicity. There is rarely a case in which the address, "*Ladies and gentlemen,*" or "*Gentlemen,*" will not be sufficiently inclusive, and sufficiently courteous. Anything more formal seems to increase the artificiality of the address, and this in itself is not desirable.

Too often the novice at public speaking is apparently afraid to stand upon the platform without saying anything. Accordingly, we find students, even before they have reached the position from which they intend to speak, starting off in the opening sentences of their composition with the speed of scared rabbits. The student should realize that a slight pause before he begins to speak is not unnatural. If there is a desk or reading stand and he has books or papers which he intends to use, he can safely place them or arrange them as he desires, and then, when his audience has settled down and is quiet, begin his address. To the practiced public speaker this presents no difficulty. He seems to

When to begin speaking

select with unfailing accuracy the time when he is ready to begin and the audience is ready to hear him. To the novice we can merely say that while too long a wait is awkward, it does not seem to be the fault which is likely to afflict beginners in public speaking. They are more likely to begin to address their audiences too quickly than to wait too long.

While, as has been said, a public speaker is not an actor and consequently should keep his personality in the background, nevertheless he is seen and consequently he must pay attention to his appearance and actions when he is upon the

**Posture on
the platform**

platform. The first thing for him to consider is the position which he should take. The old books on public speaking are full of absurd directions, sometimes illustrated by diagrams, as to the exact position which a speaker should assume. Such instruction is worse than useless. Any position which the speaker assumes cannot be kept throughout his speech without becoming artificial. He should, therefore, stand upon the platform as he stands upon the ground, like a human being whose position after all is important only in so far as it enables him to speak. If a friend approaches you in the house or on the street and begins to talk to you, he will probably stand naturally on both feet. There would seem to be no reason why the public speaker should not do the same. As long as he does not stand upon one foot, and hold the other in the air, or wriggle, or writhe, or twist, or sway, he will not excite particular comment. If there is a desk or reading stand, he will stand near it. A good speaker can rest his hand or his arm upon it without appearing grotesque, but it is a dangerous support

for the beginner. Too often he will make it both a physical and a mental support, and will perform gymnastics by its aid which would astound him if he could see them reproduced. It is not uncommon to see speakers gripping the desk as if they were afraid that it would get away from them, or leaning upon it to such a degree that it seems to be absolutely essential to prevent them from falling. Some speakers hide behind the desk, grasping it with both hands, and at impressive periods in their addresses, rise on their toes like so many Jacks-in-the-box to startle and astound their audiences. It is dangerous even to touch such a support unless you are thoroughly master of yourself. It is not uncommon to find a student under the impression that he is only resting his fingers lightly upon the desk when in reality he is pressing upon the desk with force enough to bend his fingers backward, leading the audience to wonder if they will not break. Until you are thoroughly master of yourself upon the platform, it is better to leave the desk alone. Use it for your books and papers, and if you need to consult them, go to it for that purpose only. As soon as you have obtained the paper or book that you desire, or have read anything that you intend to read, it is well to keep far enough away from the desk so that you cannot touch it.

The speaker's place on the platform depends much upon the physical surroundings. Ordinarily he should see that he has room enough to stand comfortably. He should not keep at the back of the platform because, as any actor will tell you, it is more difficult to reach the audience from "up stage" than from any other position. It is equally bad to speak continuously from the extreme front edge

Place on the platform

of the platform. It tires the audience to see you continually in that position, and at first they may be afraid that you will fall off, while later in the address it may be that they will be afraid that you will not. Under ordinary conditions a place upon the platform reasonably near the front of the stage seems to be desirable. The speaker, however, should not keep in one position. It is not natural for any person to stand in one position for a long time, and if a speaker does so, it is noticeable to his audience. This does not mean that the student should pace up and down like a caged tiger, but it does mean that he should rest himself and his audience by changing his position from time to time in a natural manner. If a speaker begins upon the right-hand side of a reading desk, he may well during the delivery of his address find himself upon the left-hand side, and then, before its close, back in his original position. These movements should not be made artificially or according to a definite plan, because in that case they will be noticeable. If, however, a speaker has occasion to take a book from the desk and read an extract to his audience, it would not be unnatural, when he places the book upon the desk, for him to step over to the other side and speak for a while from that position. If the audience is a large one, he may have an angle of ninety degrees from any part of which he can speak and still be facing his audience. His face and body can be turned to the right side of the room for a time, and then to the left, and as long as these positions are assumed naturally, they will be of advantage both to the speaker and to his audience.

Probably no matter troubles the instructor in oral English as much as that of gesture. Whatever he recom-

mends, there seems to be a pitfall awaiting the student who is practicing public speaking. At one extreme we find the public speaker who pays no attention to the preparation of gestures, but believes that he will naturally use appropriate gestures when he feels the necessity of them. If the public speaker would use a natural gesture, there would be no difficulty in following this advice. The trouble is that nearly everyone will use a gesture that appears unnatural and frequently grotesque. Left to themselves speakers will saw the air with their hands, pound the desk, rise on their toes, and shake their fists at the audience, all under the impression that they are making natural and appropriate gestures to emphasize or interpret their remarks. On the other hand, if a speaker attempts to prepare a gesture beforehand, the chances are that he will construct an artificially correct movement of the hands or body which from its very artificiality is unnatural and displeasing. We have all laughed at the public speaker whose platform gymnastics, of which he was hardly conscious, were amusing instead of being forceful, and we have laughed no less heartily at the product of the elocution school who moved his arms and wiggled his fingers in so-called lines of beauty. Both are wrong, and wrong because while we are laughing at the gesture, we are not thinking of what the man is saying. What then shall we do? Experience seems to teach that of the two extremes it is better to have too few gestures, or none at all, than too many or too elaborate. Of course the fundamental fact is that the movements of the hands and arms can be rightly used to aid the voice in conveying impressions to the minds of others, but while this is true, it is also a fact

Gesture, its difficulties

that in the actual practice of public speaking we find the movements of the hands and arms detracting from the expression of thought more frequently than adding to it. Consequently it seems best for the student to restrain himself and use gestures sparingly, if at all.

It is generally recognized at the present time that what is called the gesture of imitation or illustration should be avoided by public speakers. As has **The gesture of illustration to be avoided** been pointed out, the public speaker is not an actor and it is not his business to portray a scene or to depict a character. Years ago it was the practice for the teachers of the grade schools who trained their youthful charges to "speak pieces" to suggest to them gestures which were purely illustrative. For instance, if heaven was mentioned, the eyes and the hands must be turned upward, presumably for the purpose of pointing out the exact location. If a phrase like "the whole world" or "throughout this wide continent" occurred, the youthful orator spread his diminutive arms as far apart as possible in order to illustrate such a wide expanse. If anybody in the piece that was being declaimed bowed his head, the head was bowed. If the knee was bent in the piece, it was bent on the platform. All this was done artificially, and the invariable effect was that the audience, every time they saw a gesture, paid no attention to the words that accompanied it. In other words, it served to distract the attention from the message to be delivered. It may be laid down as a rule that in public speaking the illustrative or imitative gesture should almost never be employed.

It also seems to be pretty evident that a constrained gesture does not help out the speaker. The speaker who

keeps his elbows glued to his sides and gestures frequently with the forearms only, inevitably distracts our attention

**The con-
strained
gesture**

from what he is saying by the awkwardness of what he is doing. Gestures of the arms should ordinarily be made with the whole arm to avoid awkwardness. It is rarely in actual affairs of life that we find ourselves using the forearm and wrist only. There would seem, therefore, to be no reason why we should do so when we are upon the platform. The advice, however, that every gesture "should begin at the shoulder and flow gracefully down the arm to the finger tips" is apt to produce an effeminate performance that is no less awkward than the other extreme.

The beginner in public speaking will do well to avoid all gestures except gestures of emphasis, and in using gestures of emphasis he should remember

**The gesture
of emphasis**

that the more a gesture is used the less emphatic it becomes. A preacher, when deeply moved, may strike his pulpit a resounding blow with his fist. If he does that once during a sermon, it will probably give an additional force to the thought that he is expressing at the time. If he does it twenty times, he will degenerate into a mere pulpit pounder, and people will pay no attention to what he does except to be irritated at the constant physical interruption of their thoughts. As a final word on the subject of gesture it may be said that if we cannot follow Josh Billings' famous advice to those about to marry, which he formed in the single word "Don't," we can at least lay down a rule which approaches it. Don't gesture in delivering a public address unless you know why you are doing it and are sure you are doing it right.

Teachers are continually urging their pupils in this matter of delivery to be natural, and the poor pupil may well reply, "When I attempt to be natural, you tell me that I am wrong." Unfortunately this is only too true. Men form habits quickly, and when they are formed, they lead to action which in itself is unnatural and conspicuous although the person performing the act does not realize it. A certain speaker of considerable prominence frequently stands before his audience with his hands clasped in front of him while he twirls his thumbs rapidly, first in one direction and then in another. Now it is safe to say that the first time any man puts his fingers together and twirls his thumbs around each other, it is the result of conscious effort and is not a natural performance. Such an unusual motion must be in every man at first the result of a certain mental concentration upon the action itself. As time goes on the habit becomes fixed and the man does it unconsciously. When speaking to an audience, he does not realize what he is doing, and we may say it is a "natural" thing for him to do. Nevertheless, such a motion of the hands is unnatural in ordinary men, and invariably attracts the attention of the audience. In so far as the people whom this speaker addresses are thinking of his twirling thumbs, they are not thinking of the message which he is delivering, and his action has distracted attention from his thought. Consequently a speaker should watch himself to see that he does not fall into mannerisms which, although natural to him, are unnatural in themselves. It is probable that no one can be entirely free from mannerisms. Even the best speakers have habits which they unconsciously display upon the platform,

**Mannerisms
of action**

but beginners in public speaking should remember that the best speakers succeed not because of these habits, but in spite of them. The ideal public speaker is undoubtedly the man who satisfies the eyes and ears of his audience without distracting their minds from his train of thought.

Unfortunately mannerisms do not confine themselves to any part of a man's physical being, and serious as any

Mannerisms of voice mannerism is to a public speaker, most serious seem to be those which affect his voice. The voice is his main medium of communication of thought, and if the mere tones attract attention to themselves, a public speaker has much to contend with. It is true that the voices of human beings are not all alike, but it is also true that they need not vary as much as they do. While one man's voice may be pitched high and another low, no man need have a squeaky voice and no man need have a gruff one. It is utterly beyond our province to attempt to enter upon the very broad subject of voice cultivation, but the public speaker can correct defects in speaking with just as much positiveness as can the singer. Some have naturally musical voices and can produce agreeable sounds with little effort, while others are not so gifted, but no person need speak through his nose or growl like a bear if he is willing to be taught and to practice the results of his teaching.

There are defects in speech, however, which are not physical, but mental. That the public speaker should be grammatical goes without saying. He should also emphasize his words properly, enunciate them clearly, and pronounce them correctly.

The matter of emphasis is one in which the speaker

will never be perfect. Experience in public speaking means growth in power of expression, and the greater part of that growth seems to be in a proper appreciation of the matter of emphasis.

Emphasis

Some things, however, the veriest beginner must realize. Emphasis is not always produced by increase in tone although that seems to be the impression that too frequently prevails. We have all of us seen the speaker who, as he warmed up to his subject, shouted louder and louder until at the end he was producing an unmusical din from which thought had long since fled. Emphasis may be produced as well by lowering the voice as by raising it, and yet we do not like the speaker who, when he wishes to be emphatic, comes forward to the extreme edge of the platform and hisses his emphatic words at us as if they were secrets. Emphasis may be produced most effectively at times by the use of what has been called the rhetorical pause. Words as we say them are separated by short momentary pauses which in our ordinary speech are all approximately the same. If before any word we lengthen the pause, we immediately emphasize the word and the emphasis is increased with the length of the pause. In fact, the general rule seems to be that any variation from our ordinary manner of speaking, whether in tone, cadence, or time, will direct attention to the words where it occurs, and thus serve to emphasize them. If this is practiced within proper limits, the effect is good and the transmission of the thought is aided. Carried to an extreme in any particular it becomes a mannerism and defeats its own purpose.

The matter of enunciation is one in which practically every student in our schools and colleges needs careful

attention and drill. The student who enunciates clearly at the beginning of his course of public speaking does not seem to exist. It is true that there is an artificial over-enunciation in which the speaker tries to sound every letter irrespective of whether the letter should be sounded or not, and unfortunately some teachers of English seem to think that this is the acme of good form. The average student, however, need be in no fear of attaining such an over-ripe style of speaking. At first students are apt to be a little indignant at any criticism of their enunciation, especially if they come from families where higher education has been the rule for generations; and yet experience has taught us that it does not seem to make much difference whether the speaker was born in the shadows of Beacon Hill or of the Blue Ridge. Instruction in this matter must be largely personal, but every student may well ask himself whether he says "being" and "doing" or "bein'" and "doin'," "government" or "gover'ment," "gentlemen" or "gen'lemen," "regular" or "reg'lar." If he finds after impartial consideration that he offends in any of these particulars, he can with profit submit himself to competent instruction and learn to enunciate clearly. As a physical aid to this you should remember always that the flow of the voice should never be obstructed when you are speaking. If a man speaking in an ordinary tone of voice were revolved slowly upon a movable platform, there would be a portion of his audience which would hear clearly what he was saying when he was facing them, less distinctly when he was facing to one side or the other, and no intelligible words when his back was to them. The rule for the public speaker is the same

as for the actor,—always face the front when you are speaking. There may be exceptions to this rule in the case of the actor who occasionally finds himself placed in a position where it is impossible for him to suit the action to the word while facing the audience, but it is safe to say that this difficulty will not confront the public speaker. Again, never obstruct the voice by having anything in your mouth while you are speaking. The writer has a vivid mental picture of an interscholastic debater who tried to debate and chew gum at the same time. Frequently speakers of experience will be seen to rub their noses, pull their moustaches, or even place their fingers against their lips. These are mannerisms and objectionable for that reason, but they are doubly objectionable because they interfere with the proper flow of the voice.

Emphasis and enunciation are largely matters of habit. Pronunciation is partly habit and partly knowledge. Strange as it may seem, teachers of English frequently pay more attention to the pronun- **Pronuncia-
tion** ciation of unusual words than of the more common ones. It is interesting doubtless to know that “canine” is accented on the second syllable, according to the best authorities, but no one in your audience is going to pay much attention if you say “caynine,” and that sort of perfection, while perhaps desirable, is not absolutely necessary. We all of us doubtless pray to be delivered from spending time in those families where the constant topic of conversation is the pronunciation of unusual words with frequent appeals to the family dictionary as authority. The writer suffered for years from the habit of mispronouncing a certain word. Every time the offence was committed,

it was impressed upon the mind and a certain amount of chagrin ensued. Finally at a convention of men of more than ordinary education a statesman of national importance who was noted for his erudition and two professors from a prominent eastern university pronounced or mispronounced the word in the same way. The resulting mental peace has been refreshing. Least of all need we worry about the mispronunciation of unusual proper names. If a speaker is going to use the name of a person or place, he should familiarize himself with it, but even if he should make a mistake, it is of little importance when compared with the countless mispronunciations which we all know are wrong, but do not realize that we are making. A school teacher who scolded one of her youthful charges because he insisted upon saying "paytent" in the next breath told him to get her a box of chalk from the "cluzzet." Doubtless if she had had an opportunity, she would have said "wuz" and "becuz" instead of "was" and "because." But the reader says, "Surely students in our colleges do not commit such mistakes?" It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that twenty-five if not fifty per cent of the students in the colleges and universities of America pronounce the word "was" as if it were spelt "wuz." Of other common mispronunciations the percentage is undoubtedly much larger. Students will go to the theatre and smile when the local politician as portrayed on the stage speaks about his "constitooents," but nine-tenths of them in the class room talk about the "constitootion" and "institoot" and "noo" instead of giving the correct sound to "u" in these words. Here again the matter is largely one of personal instruction, but the fact for the beginner in public speaking to

consider is that he is undoubtedly mispronouncing many of the most common words that he uses. Occasionally when we talk of this matter of pronunciation somebody says, "Oh, I guess the audience will understand me all right." That is true without doubt, and if the audience was fairly intelligent, it might understand you if you had to augment your vocal endeavors by the sign language in order to convey your thoughts. The question is not whether you will be understood. The question is whether the audience will enjoy listening to you, and there are few audiences in a civilized community that do not appreciate a speaker who uses good English even if they do not know how to use good English themselves.

But one may go on almost without limitation in the advice that may be given as to the delivery of speeches. After all, as has been said, it is largely a matter that requires personal instruction.

**The use of
visual aids**

It is perhaps worth while, however, to call attention before closing this chapter to the use of outside aids to public speaking. Frequently, especially in scientific lectures, the speaker can convey the thought to the eye of his audience by a diagram or chart with comparative ease when it would be difficult and perhaps impossible to make them understand as well if he relied upon mere words. The use of charts, maps and diagrams, therefore, plays an important part in public speaking. If they are to be used, they should be large enough to be seen by all of the audience. To hold up a small photograph and inform the audience that you are sorry that only those in the front row can see it, and then talk about it for five minutes, seems to be a waste of time. A chart or diagram which is so confused that, although the audience can see

it, they cannot understand it, would seem to be open to the same objection. As a general thing a public speaker should not use too many aids of this kind. When he does, they should be self-explanatory if possible, and if he has to explain them, he should be careful, as has been said, to speak to the audience and not with his back to it. In interscholastic and intercollegiate debates it would seem to be best not to allow the use of any visual argument. Debating is, after all, practice in the art of appealing to the mind by speech. If that is to be emphasized, it is best to draw the line at the beginning and say that no visual aid shall be used. If one chart is to be used, why not use a dozen, and if the matter was carried to extremes, we might find our intercollegiate debates illustrated with the stereopticon, and rivalling even the "movies." The better rule would seem to be to eliminate once and for all anything of the sort.

Occasionally a speaker wishes to incorporate in his speech a more or less lengthy passage from the speech

Reading a of some other person or from some book or
selection magazine. A great many public speakers who speak well do not know how to read.

Only too frequently such a one takes the book from which he is to read, bends his head, and with his mouth a comparatively short distance from the book mumbles the passage upon which he is depending. If you desire to read something, it is because it expresses the thought better than you can express it yourself, or because it is by some authority of great weight. It is, in either case, an important part of your speech. If the speech is carefully prepared, the passage, although ostensibly read to the audience, should really be recited to them; that is to

say, the speaker should know it without reference to the book. When this is true, he talks directly to his audience and is not bound constantly to refer to the pages before him.

After all is said and done the student of public speaking should remember that it is the message which is important. Public speaking of every kind, whether argument or lecture, sermon or plea, is an endeavor to convey thought. It is the thought and not the means of conveyance that we seek. The final criterion by which you should judge your efforts is the effect produced upon the minds of the people who are receiving the thought. If what you are saying and doing serves to speed the message on its way, it is good. If it retards it, it is bad. There would seem to be no other basis of judgment.

Summary

CHAPTER XV

DEBATING ¹

“How about the moral side?”

This question was asked the writer by the dean of a great university who was himself a friend of debating. Startling as the thought may be, it must be confessed that there is a danger to the morals of the student community in intercollegiate debating. It is not true that this is a great danger or that it constitutes a sufficient reason for giving up what may perhaps be called the undergraduates' most intellectual sport. If we recognize the existence of the evil, it is easily disposed of, but if we deny that there is any possible immorality in debating, we are more than likely to be surprised at some things which will develop in even the best governed institutions of learning. The danger of debating is that if it is wrongly conducted it may encourage cheapness, trickery, and deceit,—qualities which need no encouragement in the human race. But these qualities merely find their expression in the speech of men; they are not an inherent part of it. For a university to restrict or discourage debating because men will use their tongues to tell lies is about as sensible as for them to discourage religion because some men use their religion as a cloak to cover their sins. On the contrary, it seems that it should be the duty of every school and university

¹ This chapter is written by Mr. Stone, not in collaboration.

to encourage debating of the right sort in order that men may be taught the futility of argument of the wrong sort.

The danger of mendacity in debating seems to threaten in two ways, one obvious, and the other more subtle. The use of a lie is always evident at the first glance. The disadvantages, although ab-
Mendacity
solutely conclusive, are frequently not as clear. If a boy wishes to escape a whipping for a certain act, he denies that he has done it. If he is believed, he escapes the whipping. So in a debate, if a student in his argument is in a bad corner, the advantage of lying out of it is at once apparent. He may win the debate. If he needs statistics to prove his case and there are none, the advantage of manufacturing them is obvious. If they are not detected for an hour or more they may bring success to his side. If he can misquote a statement of his opponent and not get caught, he may be able to score a telling point in rebuttal. The temptation to do this exists and always will exist. It will bring temporary success sometimes but it is not common, is not encouraged any more among undergraduates in our colleges and universities than elsewhere in the world, and speedily brings its own punishment. The student body should and does look upon the man who lies in a debate as they look upon a football player who would bite his opponent in a scrimmage, or a baseball player who would go out of his way to spike the first baseman. It goes without saying that the only foundation for argument, no matter where it takes place is the truth, and the problem of finding out what is the truth is complex enough to engage a man's whole time without his spending any of it in dealing with things which are ob-

viously not the truth. The individuality of the men who are in charge of debating in any school or college is a sufficient guarantee of its honesty. An honest man will not be a trickster and will not allow others to be tricksters if it is within his power to prevent it.

The other danger of debating is much more subtle. It presents to us for consideration the old question as to

whether a man can argue against his beliefs.

Arguing
against belief The concrete case is presented about in this way. Is it advisable to ask a boy who

has a strong belief in free trade to debate for the honor of his college or school in favor of the policy of protection? Many critics have seen the danger and have pointed it out. To quote ex-President Roosevelt, "What we need is to turn out of our colleges young men with ardent convictions on the side of right, not young men who can make a good argument for either right or wrong as their interest bids them." The eminent critic's statement is one of those things that is so obvious that it needs no comment. The difficulty with giving up debating because young men may acquire facility in arguments which they may use for wrong purposes, is at once apparent. If the universities are to set up as their standard that their students shall excel only in those arts which cannot be misused, they should have closed their gates centuries ago. If you teach a man to write good English, and teach him nothing else, he may become a Wordsworth or an Oscar Wilde; and in the same way, if you teach him to speak good English, he may use his newly acquired art either to convince a Senate or to defend a rogue. Still, this is not the real answer to the critics of debating, because the real answer is not whether the practice of de-

bating may result in the misuse of argument but whether it tends to encourage it.

The solution, however, is simple in theory and should be simple in application. A student should be neither encouraged nor allowed to argue for that which he believes is wrong, and a conscientious student or a conscientious man will not, and cannot, successfully argue for principles in which he does not believe. The great trouble of those who thus criticize debating is that they do not give sufficient attention to the usual subjects that are debated. As a matter of fact, students in schools and colleges do not have settled beliefs upon many subjects. To them the immigration question, the tariff, woman suffrage, the increase of the navy, and the like, are merely topics for investigation, upon which they have at most only prejudices. And while we must admit that we do not want a student to argue against his beliefs, we cannot see but that it would be advantageous not only for the students in our universities, but for more mature men, to prepare themselves to argue either side of such a complicated matter of national importance as the question of the restriction of immigration. We are in danger in our colleges and universities of committing a far graver fault than turning out young men who can make a good argument for either right or wrong. Young men who guess at the right and wrong without investigation and without discussion, and then maintain it in face of everything, are suffering morally as much as those who take more time, investigate more thoroughly, and form their opinion with more discrimination. There is no better method of finding out whether your preconceived notions are true or not than

to try to construct a good argument against them, and we believe that the advantages of investigation, of friendly discussion, of balancing of evidence, upon questions, which although of prime importance are after all generally matters more of governmental expediency than of morals, outweigh many times the possible disadvantages. The rule, therefore, in debating should be for each individual never to debate against his settled moral convictions but to examine his mind carefully to find out how many settled moral convictions he has upon such subjects as are ordinarily under discussion by the general public.

But when everything has been said about debating, the fact remains that the students of American schools and **Debating of value as concrete expression of argument** universities have, during the last decade and a half, taken a subject which has its proper place in the curriculum and made a game of it. It is true that the game is fearfully and wonderfully made and has surrounding it an artificiality which makes it the most rigid form of argumentative discussion. Nevertheless, it is for the credit of the students that they have succeeded in removing some of the academic taint from one of the arts. Up to the inauguration of debating the great trouble with the teaching of argument was the lack of any decision of the question. You cannot expect students to be wildly interested in any argument that is addressed to no one, begins nowhere and ends in the same place. A man may write narration or description for the pleasure he has in producing his work, or possibly with the hope that it may be published; he may write poetry and bury it in his desk where he can admire it only by stealth; but he will not argue unless he has an opponent and unless his argument

may be of some purpose. In debating, the students, for their own enjoyment, have artificially created opponents and judges, and have in this way given a zest to the teaching of argument that it never could have acquired in any other way. Recognizing the dangers, it is submitted that they are no more than the dangers that attend any other college activity, and that debating is well worth encouragement as an intellectual exercise forming part of the general educational scheme.

As there are no set rules universally applied to debating, it is a little difficult to describe in detail exactly how a debate is conducted. The number of participants, the time occupied, the order of speakers, the method of decision, and other

**Conduct of
a debate**

details vary in the different schools and colleges. In a typical intercollegiate debate, however, there are three speakers representing each college. They speak alternately, beginning with the affirmative. Each of these principal speeches, as they are called, occupies twelve minutes. At the close of the last of these speeches, which is of course by the negative, each speaker has five minutes more in what is called rebuttal. In the rebuttal the negative begins, so that the last rebuttal speech comes from the affirmative, the affirmative thus opening and closing the debate. Three judges selected from citizens who are supposed to have no interest in any of the contestants decide which side has won the debate. This decision is sometimes made by ballot without consultation and sometimes as a result of consultation. In any event, the judges are supposed to decide upon the merits of the debaters and not upon their own views as to the merits of the question. Debates in the class room

generally have two speakers on a side, the length of time allowed varying according to the amount of time at the instructor's disposal. Usually, however, the participants are required to speak a second time in rebuttal and the time allotted approximates as closely as possible to the time allowed in the intercollegiate contests. In class debates the decision is rendered either by the teacher who criticizes the speeches or by a vote of the class. The time limit prescribed for the speeches in all debates is generally enforced rigorously, part of the training being that a man shall condense his speech within the time given. Usually the presiding officer signifies that a speaker's time is nearly completed by some prearranged signal, a bell or a stroke of the gavel one or two minutes before the actual expiration. At the actual expiration of the time, another signal is given and the speaker is required to terminate his speech. In the interests of finished speaking, it is generally provided that at the last signal the speaker may bring the sentence which he is then speaking to an appropriate end, but he is usually warned that the sentence had better not be made too long.

There is no standard set of rules. In some instances every contingency is provided for by an elaborate agreement which has many of the attributes of an international treaty. In others, the agreement is less formal. The intercollegiate debating agreement between Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, for instance, which is one of the oldest in the country, is largely a matter of custom, and extends from year to year. It is not expressed in any written document, and yet its provisions are fairly well understood by the participants. Perhaps a majority of the intercollegiate de-

Intercollegiate debating

bates are what is known as dual contests, in which only two colleges take part. An arrangement, however, that is growing in favor is to hold what is known as a triangular debate. In this each college presents two teams, one at home and one away from home, which debate with the other two colleges in the league, upon the same night and upon the same question. It is evident that this means that there are three debates, one at each college going on at the same time upon the same question. Obviously, any one of the colleges may win both of its debates, in which case it is the undoubted victor for that year, or, each college may win one, which means that there is a tie. The advantage of the triangular scheme is that it satisfies the undergraduate's desire for an even contest in which he may win a definite victory. It is evident that any advantage in wording the question or burden of proof is obviated as each college must both affirm and deny the proposition. Allowing for error in the decision of the judges, which is possible where the judgment is purely a matter of opinion, it is probable that this gives as fair a test of relative debating ability as can be devised. The objection to this system is one that the undergraduate does not fully appreciate. The preparation of a triangular debate requires so much more time that it seems to some observers that the quality of the debating is not as good as it was under the dual system where each team had an opportunity to perfect itself upon one side of the question.

One of the most difficult tasks in arranging a debate is the selection of a question. Even under the triangular system it is advisable that the question should be evenly balanced. It is also necessary for any debate that it

should be worded in accordance with the other principles set forth in the second chapter of this book. Inasmuch

as audiences seem to be necessary as an
The question for debate inspiration, at least, for the debaters, it has been found expedient that the question should be one which will attract general interest and should be one also which is not too intricate or too highly specialized for general understanding. To frame a question which will meet all these requirements, is no small task. Some of the books published upon argumentation give lists of questions for debates. Few of them would meet the tests outlined above and are valuable merely as suggestions. A list of the subjects adopted from 1892 to the present time in the universities of Harvard, Yale and Princeton, is appended as suggestive models, some not very good it must be admitted, of the way in which subjects may be framed.¹

The debating coach appeared as soon as intercollegiate debating was started. Experience has shown that the
The coach criticism and judgment of some person independent of the debaters, and to some extent, at any rate, in authority over them, is of great value in the construction of a debate. Generally, the task falls upon that instructor in the college who has charge of the work in oral English. In at least one institution,² however, a faculty regulation forbids any officer of instruction or government from assisting in the preparation of an intercollegiate debate. It would seem that the only instructor who should be allowed to take the position of coach is the instructor in oral English. If other members of the faculty are prominent in coaching, experience

¹ See pages 249-253.

² Harvard University.

shows that the debates may take on some of the characteristics of a contest between the learned faculties, as expressed through the mouths of their pupils, and this seems to be undesirable. The most desirable coach is some alumnus of the college who has special qualifications for the position and who takes it up as a labor of love. He has the advantage over the instructor, that he brings to the debate a mind which is not entirely confined in its operations to academic lines. While the instructor is generally fresher in his knowledge of the subject and his knowledge of the rules of presentation, nevertheless, under his guidance the debates are apt to take on a formal and academic nature. They bristle with terms familiar, it is true, to the readers of such a book as this, but fortunately unknown to the outside world. "Burden of proof," "main issues," "refutation," "fallacy," "honorable judges," "learned opponent" are hurled back and forth in a way which at times becomes bewildering to the audience. An alumnus of the university, who has been away long enough to lose a little of the academic polish, will probably compel his charges to talk in ordinary words and not in what we may call "debating English." But the burden falls only too often upon the poor instructor who, although he cannot escape, is frequently blamed because he is expected to prove that he is academic and unacademic at the same time. To such an unfortunate we can only say that he must realize that the audience and the judges can be assumed not only to be unfamiliar with the technical terms employed by teachers of argument, but also to have an almost supernatural reverence for what they call common sense.

After selecting the question and selecting the coach, and what is still more difficult, getting the coach to serve, the task of choosing the speakers is comparatively simple. It is ordinarily done by competition. A general call to all in the University is issued and anyone who cares to come is allowed to speak on either side of the question for five minutes. Judges composed of instructors or graduates of the University should be able to pick out at this trial the fifteen or twenty men who have some chance of making the team. If twenty men are selected at the first trial, even with such a meagre opportunity of showing one's ability as is afforded by a five minutes' speech, we may be fairly sure that that number will include the three best speakers who offer themselves. Upon another night, reasonably soon afterwards, these candidates speak for ten minutes, and this time the judges should have but little difficulty in finding the six best men. These are then assigned by lot to a debate held in strict conformity with the intercollegiate rules and in this third trial the team is selected. Where the triangular system is adopted it is more difficult because twelve men must be retained at the second trial. These men are divided by lot into four teams of three men each. Two of these teams can debate the question upon the afternoon of some day and the two other teams in the evening. If the same judges attend, while they will be somewhat weary at the end of the contest, they will be able to select the six men who will compose the debating team and three other men who can be used as a second or practice team from time to time. Whatever method is selected, undergraduate sentiment demands that the selection shall be upon a com-

petitive basis in which everybody has a fair chance. It seems necessary, moreover, that the speakers should be tested in actual debate. Debating is not a contest in oratory, and many a man who succeeds in presenting a set speech to the satisfaction of his admirers, fails utterly when confronted by an aggressive opponent. However the team is selected it should be a team of men trained in argument and not merely in rhetoric and elocution.

When selected, too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the idea that it is a team that has been chosen and not three individual speakers. One of the most interesting and instructive features of intercollegiate debates is the team-work that is displayed. It is comparatively easy to construct three separate speeches which do not conflict with one another, but a good debate goes further and consists of one extended argument delivered by three men. This, when done successfully, invariably challenges the admiration of even the most experienced public speakers whose minds are more mature than those of the contestants. It cannot be done, however, unless every man is willing to subordinate himself to the furtherance of the cause for which he pleads. The topics for discussion should be divided among the men so that each man will be placed where he can do the most good. All material that is acquired should be considered the property of the team and not the property of the individual who discovers it. Instances of sacrifice on the athletic field among our college students are indeed numerous and the spirit engendered is praiseworthy, but I doubt if the athlete suffers any more keenly than does the speaker who sees his pet idea, the product of his own brain, turned over to another man

**Need of
team-work**

who after all can never appreciate it quite as much as he who brought it forth.

To inculcate this spirit of unity is an important part of the work of the coach. He is the adviser, the critic, and dictator of the team. He should be careful to realize, however, that he is not one of the debaters. The debate should not be his, even in part. It is the work of the men under his direction, not his work. For this reason the coach should carefully abstain from looking up material, arranging arguments, and above all, should abstain from actually putting ideas into words. It is for the men to get the evidence, and for the men to arrange the case, and for the men to make their speeches. The coach's whole duty is performed when he criticizes, corrects, or, at the most, suggests methods of treatment. A speaker will always do better with a speech that is his own, imperfect as it may be, than with a speech of far more merit written by someone else and put into his mouth. The writer was recently a judge at an interscholastic contest where it seemed evident that one of the teams was merely repeating learned speeches which evidently had been prepared by older people. Inquiry made subsequent to the decision confirmed this suspicion. The other team had been prepared on a different principle and in an immature way were discussing the proposition to the best of their ability in words which betrayed their immaturity. There was no question but that the prepared speeches were better literary productions. Yet the audience, in which the friends of each school were present in about equal numbers, listened with interest and attention to the boys who were speaking their own thoughts, while during the

speeches of the others it was plain to see that the thoughts of the hearers were wandering. The unanimous decision of the judges was in favor of the more immature production and seemed to meet with the approbation of all concerned. Debating is a contest in which mind meets mind and the minds that must meet are those that are in evidence before the audience, not those that are behind the scenes. As the debate must be the work of the men who are to deliver it, the coach should take special care to see that it is their effort and that he neither is persuaded nor persuades himself to attempt any constructive work.

Moreover, the coach will find plenty to do without attempting to construct the debate itself. His first task is the selection of the case, as it is called.

As we have seen in the previous chapters **The selection of the case** of this book every argument should be the result of careful analysis. The proposition is to be proved by logical steps, not by the haphazard reiteration of even indisputable facts. The selection and arrangement of the issues which are to be presented, make up the cases of the respective sides, and this process is, as we have seen, the most important part of the debate.

It is easier to coach an affirmative team than to coach a negative one. The affirmative case is generally a simpler case than the negative. The affirmative also has the advantage, and it is no slight **The affirmative case** advantage, of having the last word. The corresponding advantage of the negative team which should counteract this seems to be more elusive, and students when they are on the negative do not seem to make the most of the fact that the burden of proof always rests upon their opponents. If the affirmative speakers do

their work well, they can select the line of attack, and it is difficult for the negative to keep from fighting the case upon the enemy's lines. If they do not meet the affirmative, they may leave an open way to victory.

The first affirmative speech can be a set speech. This does not mean written out and memorized. In fact, **The first affirmative speech** speeches should not be prepared in that way. It is true, however, that neither the coach nor the first speaker's colleagues should be surprised at anything that is said in his argument. It should be delivered on the night of the debate in substantially the form in which it has been worked out. If this is well done, there is a decided advantage in that it can be finished to a degree that no other speech can approach. This means that the affirmative has the opportunity of carefully thinking out its case and presenting it exactly as it has been planned, which is a decided advantage. Taken as a whole, the affirmative case should be simply constructed. The proposition should be proved by a logical sequence of arguments all direct in their application. Any complicated line of reasoning should be avoided even if logically correct. It is possible to construct an outline or a brief in which the issues may be divided and subdivided, almost without limit, and the result, though complex, may be, when presented on paper, perfectly logical. Upon close examination it is beyond criticism. Even a casual reading may give one a definite idea of the course of the argument. A speaker, however, who endeavors to produce for his audience in words this brief or outline, will inevitably fail. That which is presented to the eye lingers on the senses, and may be seen until the page is turned. What is spoken falls upon the

ear instantaneously. The mind receives it and appreciates it but only for an instant since another idea comes in the very next words of the speaker to take its place. Consequently any case, and especially any constructive affirmative case, must consist of a few simple points driven home as powerfully as possible, rather than of the reproduction of a complicated analysis.

The negative case varies with the subject, and as has been said, intercollegiate debaters do not seem to appreciate the advantage the negative has and do not seem to be successful in making the **The negative case** most of the burden of proof. They rarely get beyond the stage of asserting that the burden of proof is on their opponents. This assertion is undeniably true, but it does not seem to impress the average audience or the average judge with any degree of force. The duty of the negative is not to say the burden of proof is on the affirmative but by its arguments to place it there. While your hearers may not be impressed with the logical principle, they will be deeply impressed if you can keep in their minds the fact that the affirmative has the laboring oar. Theoretically, the negative only denies and is under no obligation to do any constructive work. Frequently, however, as a matter of practice, it has to present a constructive case. If the affirmative on any particular subject is successful in showing that there is an evil existing which must be met, or if it is evident to everyone without demonstration that such an evil exists, theoretically all that the negative need do is to show that the remedy proposed by the affirmative will not cure the evil, but as a practical matter they must, themselves, propose a remedy. They need not elaborate it to the extent the

affirmative is obliged to, but they must convince their hearers that the remedy proposed by the affirmative will not work and that their own probably will. Take for example the following question which was the subject for an intercollegiate debate: "The history of trade unionism for the past twenty years shows a general tendency detrimental to the best interests of the country." Theoretically, all that the negative needs to show is that the tendency is neither good nor bad. If trade unionism has had no effect, it follows that the affirmative has not made out its case. As a practical matter, however, it would be impossible successfully to defend the negative of that question without making a constructive case and arguing that the tendency was positively beneficial rather than detrimental. Occasionally, however, a question will be found where there is not the slightest moral obligation upon the negative to do anything except to attack and destroy. An effective negative case may then be worked out by centering a powerful and concerted attack upon one essential part of the affirmative proposition. The chain is no stronger than the weakest link, and there are questions in which the proper method of attack means to throw the whole weight of the negative argument directly against the weakest link of the affirmative case. In order to be successful in this, the negative must be able to convince its hearers absolutely that this particular link is an essential and necessary point of the affirmative case, and that without it the affirmative case must fall. When this can be done it is very effective and seems to produce what is known as a "good debate." It would be well, however, for any coach or any team that proposes to attack in this way to analyze the situation with great

care. The fact is the questions for debate in our schools and colleges are so worded that the negative case is really a constructive case upon one side of the question; that is to say, the affirmative supports the proposition and the negative supports the converse. An example of a debate, however, where the negative case could be largely destructive is the following: "All elective state officers should be subject to recall." The negative might well admit that all executive and legislative officers should be subject to recall and centre their entire attack upon the undesirability of recalling elective judiciary officers, such as judges of the Supreme Court. In any debate the aim of the negative should be to put the affirmative upon the defensive. The moment the affirmative ceases to carry its case forward, their proposition will seem to the hearers to halt and fail. The affirmative must be on the aggressive; the negative should always try to be.

By not having the burden of proof, the negative is at liberty to concede part of the affirmative case. If a political question in the United States is selected, the affirmative must be prepared to show that their proposed action is constitutional, unless that point is eliminated in some way previous to the debate. The negative is at liberty to attack the constitutionality but is under no obligation to do so. Again the affirmative in many questions must maintain that its view is both right and expedient. The negative can either contend that it is expedient but is not right, or that it is not wrong but inexpedient. The affirmative must anticipate and be ready to meet all effective negative methods of attack. The negative must be prepared, it is true, to meet any case

**Advantage of
the negative**

that the affirmative chooses to set up, but if the speakers appreciate the value of their position, it need not meet all its points. The affirmative, in short, must meet the negative on all their essential points; the negative has greater liberty and need not meet the affirmative upon every point that it makes.

One of the things that is bound to surprise a man who is coaching a debating team for the first time is the ignorance, which students of good oratorical ability frequently show, of the method of preparing a speech. Many a boy who has had considerable experience in declamation, proves to be ignorant of any idea how to prepare an argument. If left to himself he will write a speech, and having composed it to his satisfaction, learn it by heart, and then deliver it much as he has previously delivered his declamations. This is not a debate and cannot be made one. If a team of debaters has carefully analyzed its opponents' case, it should not be surprised at any position that is taken, but it is impossible to anticipate the arrangement or the manner in which the various ideas are presented. If a speaker cannot anticipate, he certainly cannot prepare a speech beforehand which will fit what his opponents are going to say. It follows, therefore, that it is impossible to prepare an effective speech word for word and memorize it. There must be a certain flexibility so that each speaker can adapt his speech to the speeches of the men who have preceded him. Indeed, debating would not be worth while if it were to consist of written essays learned and recited.

In order to secure this flexibility the first impulse is to adopt some artificial device. Frequently students will

prepare a speech that will take eight or nine minutes to deliver and leave the first few minutes free for what they call extemporaneous rebuttal. Nothing is more fatal to success. The effect generally produced is that of a speaker who is floundering around for two or three minutes with apparently nothing to say. After a time he glances at his watch or gets a signal and then suddenly swings into a fluent and easy style which renders it obvious that he has begun his carefully prepared speech. The transition is ludicrous and on one occasion where this remarkable change was unusually noticeable, an audience at an intercollegiate debate was moved to laughter to such an extent that the speaker was obliged to stop and join with them before he could make himself heard. The trouble with a speech that is prepared and learned lies in the fact that the mind is not thinking of the subject while the speech is being delivered, but is occupied solely in trying to remember written words, and even a speaker of great experience cannot conceal this fact from his audience.

**Danger in a
set speech**

If a student is to get real good out of a debate, and if the debate when finally delivered is to be a good one, he must be thinking upon his feet and weighing his words. He must be ready at a moment's notice to leave out something that he had intended to say, or to add something else to meet an emergency. To do this requires just as much preparation as it does to write a speech and learn it, but the preparation takes a different form. The first thing that a student should do is to amass his material. He should read what has been written upon the question, taking notes of the evi-

**Method of
preparation to
secure flexi-
bility**

dence that he thinks he would like to use in his own speech. He must discuss with his colleagues the different facts he obtains, and compare the advantages and the weaknesses. Indeed, for the first week, perhaps, of the time of preparation for a debate, informal conferences between the coach and his charges where matters are talked over freely without attention to form, are more advantageous than attempts to deliver formal speeches. As soon, however, as the speaker feels that his investigation is practically completed and his own ideas are pretty well formulated, he should outline his speech as carefully as possible. Then using his outline as a guide, and possibly standing before a mirror, he should start in to make his speech, thinking it out as he goes along. If he is to deliver a twelve-minute speech, it is quite probable that, the first time he tries it, he will use up the better part of an hour in covering the ground. By constant repetition, however, he will gain in conciseness, and as he goes along, certain phrases that he finds effective will fall into the proper place and will come naturally to his tongue when he reaches that part of the discussion. As the time approaches for the debate the essential ideas will be well fixed in his mind and the wording by which he intends to present them will be settled upon with a remarkable degree of definiteness. The night of the debate he will find himself presenting a speech with which he is thoroughly familiar, the phrasing of which is carefully prepared, and yet, a speech that is extremely flexible. A sentence or a paragraph can be left out if it is advisable without disturbing the rest of the speech or his own equanimity. If the previous speaker has brought up some point which he has anticipated but not expected, the proper answer to it will

come naturally to his tongue and will drop into the proper place so as to seem part of a well considered whole. Even if he is absolutely surprised and encounters evidence or arguments which he has never heard of before, he can make such answer as he desires and the audience may be left in ignorance that there has been any surprise accomplished. In other words, he will be thinking and talking, not remembering and talking, or, to put it a little differently, he will be a debater and not an essayist.

The advantages of this method of preparation when it comes to actual rebuttal are obvious. To memorize a rebuttal speech beforehand requires not only ability as a debater but also capacity as a **Preparation for rebuttal** prophet. Preparation for rebuttal is indeed difficult, but certainly it does not consist in writing anything out and then committing it to memory. The first essential is undoubtedly a thorough knowledge of the subject. The more familiar a debater is with the most minute details of his argument, the more ready he is to reply to anything that may be said. Considerable may be anticipated. The main points of the other side should be apparent upon analysis, and a certain amount of preparation can be made to meet them. In arguing the Woman Suffrage question, for instance, it is probable if not certain that anti-suffragists will bring forward in one form or another the argument that women do not want to vote and have proved this by not voting when they have had the opportunity. For the suffragists to go into debate without having considered the exact way in which they are going to meet this point, is to go into the debate without preparation.

The gravest danger in rebuttal speeches comes from

the natural desire of the students to refute too much, or rather, to refute too many points. A dozen things may

How many have been said to which one takes excep-
points should tion and for which he believes he has an
be refuted answer. If he endeavors in a five minutes'

speech, however, to deal with all the points, he will find that his so-called rebuttal will fall into a mere recital of the argument made by his opponent and a contradiction of it by himself. It is doubtful if anyone can present effectively more than three ideas in a rebuttal speech of five minutes, and it is often better to take up two, or even one of the points. It may be that your opponent is wrong here and there with regard to dates and figures, and it may be that the error is material, but it does not follow that it is worth while to devote much of your limited time to show that he is wrong in what may be, after all, a minor matter. The most successful rebuttal speeches are those in which the speaker controverts one of the main issues of his opponents frequently by stating in a new form and in new wording ideas already brought out on his side. As a rule, therefore, the speeches in rebuttal should meet comparatively few ideas, but those that they do meet should be the ideas of prime importance.

Where the debate is held under the ordinary inter-collegiate rules the coach and speakers upon the affirmative should not lose sight of this fact: since
A negative the last principal speech of the negative is
advantage followed by the first rebuttal speech of the
and an af- same side, there is a period of fifteen to
firmative task seventeen minutes when the affirmative is not heard. In
in rebuttal the hands of clever speakers on the negative this period may be used for a very effective attack. The first rebuttal

speaker on the affirmative should therefore pay special attention to these two speeches, and take care to counteract their effect.

The arrangement of speakers in a debate is a matter of prime importance, and yet, one to which little attention is given. There seems to be a feeling that the last speech is the most important and that the second is more important than the first. We frequently find speakers, therefore, arranged in what we may term the order of climax. There is no hard and fast rule, however, which can be followed, because everything depends upon the individuality of the three men with whom you have to deal. There are some general principles which can be adopted with success.

The first position is perhaps as important as any, and yet, it does not need necessarily the best speaker. It does need a man who is clear-headed and who, above all, possesses the faculty of what we may call "crystallization." He must be able to gather his thoughts together and to present clear mental pictures to the audience. The first speech is no place for a profuse or verbose man. On the other hand, it need not be made by a deep thinker or a profound student of the question. It needs one who is clear-headed, forceful in manner, and expository in his methods of presentation. Upon him more than anyone else depends the understanding which the audience is to get of the subject in the beginning when it is most essential that they should view the case along certain lines. At the same time, the first speaker need not be the most experienced of the debaters. Of all the speakers he has the smallest opportunity for rebuttal in

**Arrangement
of speakers**

**Qualities the
first speaker
should have**

his main speech. Quickness of wit and apprehension, and readiness and ability to extemporize will not be called upon here as in the later speeches. In other words, the first speaker need not be a finished debater nor the most eloquent speaker on the team. It is essential, however, that above all the others he should have the ability to express clearly his meaning in definite, unmistakable terms.

The second and third speeches are more alike. After the first speaker is selected, the other two men can be inter-

Character of the second speaker changed more than once until it has been settled in which order the team works best. The second speech, perhaps, calls for the greatest

mental ability. The man who is the best thinker can be utilized in this position, for it is here that the most original thinking seems to be required. It is in this speech that a strong team is likely to put a weak man upon the defensive, and the second speaker needs to be more versatile for that reason than the third. If there is one man who above his fellows is witty or humorous, this is the place to put him. The second speaker has more time to carry on the debate than either of his colleagues, for he does not have so much introductory matter as the first, nor does he have to spend as much time summing up as the last.

The third speaker should be the most persuasive of the three, and there is no rule of debating that will prevent

Character of the third speaker him from being eloquent if he knows how. Upon him devolves the duty of gathering the scattered threads together, tying up

some of the broken ones, and showing the complete whole. In some respects it seems that the man whom the audience will consider the strongest speaker should be placed last, but this rule cannot be followed uniformly because, as

has been pointed out, it is necessary to take into consideration the characteristics of the men. It is perhaps safe to say that the weakest man should never be put in the third place. If that is done, there is produced a distinct weakening as the case comes to a close and this is generally fatal to success.

It is the maxim of successful golf playing, and indeed it is true of almost any sport in which a ball is used, that the contestant should "keep his eye on the ball." Figuratively speaking it is equally true in debating. **The purpose of the debate** The coach should impress upon his men that their only endeavor is to prove that they are right. They are not there to make brilliant speeches nor to please individual peculiarities, supposed or real, of the judges; they are not there to use tricks to bring success; they have no new and untried methods which have lain undiscovered during all the thousands of years since oratory was young. While the desire to win is laudable, they can best accomplish it by proving the correctness of their side of the question. Their whole object should be, by the use of an art that is as old as the speech of man itself, to persuade an unprejudiced body that the proposition for which they contend is correct and should be adopted.

SUBJECTS ADOPTED FOR DEBATE IN THE HARVARD-
YALE AND HARVARD-PRINCETON DEBATES FROM
JANUARY 14, 1892, TO THE PRESENT TIME

1. (January 14, 1892.)
A young man casting his first ballot in 1892 should vote for the nominees of the Democratic party.
2. (March 25, 1892.)
Immigration to the United States should be restricted.
3. (January 18, 1893.)
The power of railroad corporations should not be further limited by national legislation.
4. (May 2, 1893.)
The time has now come when the policy of Protection should be abolished by the United States.
5. (January 18, 1894.)
Independent action in politics is preferable to party allegiance.
6. (April 27, 1894.)
The members of the cabinet should be given full membership in the House of Representatives.
7. (January 18, 1895.)
Attempts of employers to ignore associations of employees and to deal with individual workmen only, are prejudicial to the best interest of both parties.
8. (March 27, 1895.)
If it were possible a reasonable property qualification for the exercise of the municipal franchise in the United States would be desirable.
9. (March 13, 1896.)
Congress should take immediate steps to retire and cancel all of the United States legal tender notes.

10. (May 1, 1896.)

A permanent court of arbitration should be established by the United States and Great Britain.

11. (December 18, 1896.)

Assuming the adoption of adequate constitutional amendments, the United States should institute a system of responsible cabinet government.

12. (March 26, 1897.)

The United States should adopt definitely the single gold standard, and should decline to enter a bimetallic league, even if Great Britain, France and Germany should be willing to enter such a league.

13. (December 3, 1897.)

The United States should annex the Hawaiian Islands.

14. (May 11, 1898.)

The present restrictions on immigration into the United States are insufficient.

15. (April 5, 1899.)

A formal alliance between the United States and Great Britain for protection and advancement of their common interests, is advisable.

16. (May 12, 1899.)

The present method of electing United States Senators is preferable to a method of election by popular vote.

17. (December 15, 1899.)

England's claims in her controversy with the Transvaal are justifiable.

18. (March 30, 1900.)

Porto Rico should be included within the customs boundary of the United States.

19. (December 7, 1900.)

The permanent retention of the Philippine Islands by the United States is desirable.

20. (May 10, 1901.)

Congress was justified in imposing the terms embodied in the Platt Amendment to the army appropriation bill, as

20. (May 10, 1901)—*Continued*
conditions precedent to leaving the government and control of Cuba to its people, the condition with regard to the Isle of Pines being excepted.
21. (March 26, 1902.)
Mayor Low should strictly enforce the excise laws in New York City.
22. (May 12, 1902.)
The immigration of Chinese laborers into our insular possessions should be prohibited by law.
23. (December 12, 1902.)
Whenever in the event of continued domestic violence, lives and property are not adequately protected by a State, it is for the public good that the president should have the power to afford protection without the application of the State for Federal Aid.
24. (March 23, 1903.)
The United States should permit the European government to seize and hold permanently territory of the debtor state not exceeding in value the amount of the award.¹
25. (December 4, 1903.)
The history of trade unionism for the past twenty years shows a general tendency detrimental to the best interests of the country.

¹ The following facts were presupposed in connection with this debate:

1. The existence of money claims by a European government against a South American State.
2. Such claims submitted by consent of both parties to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration.
3. An award by said Tribunal in favor of the European government.
4. The time and amount of payment fixed by the award.
5. Default of payment according to terms of the award.
6. A system of absolute free trade existing in the debtor state.

252 SUBJECTS ADOPTED FOR DEBATE

26. (May 6, 1904.)

Laws should be passed compelling the management of a business undertaking which secures control of an industry to sell its products at reasonable rates and without discrimination.

27. (March 28, 1905.)

The free elective system is the best available plan for the undergraduate course of study.

28. (May 5, 1905.)

A commission should be given power to fix railroad rates.

29. (December 15, 1905.)

Intercollegiate football in America is a detriment rather than a benefit.

30. (March 30, 1906.)

It would be for the best interest of New York City to own its street railway system; the term "street railway system" being taken to mean elevated, surface and subway lines.

31. (December 7, 1906.)

Further restriction of immigration is undesirable. By further restriction is meant the application of additional tests with the object of diminishing materially the number of immigrants; but the nature and practicability of those tests is not to be discussed.

32. (March 22, 1907.)

The present distribution of power between the Federal and State government is not adapted to modern conditions, and calls for readjustment in the direction of further centralization.

33. (March 20, 1908.)

Further material increases in the United States navy are undesirable.

34. (May 1, 1908.)

It will be for the best interests of Cuba that the United States, before the end of the next two years, cease to have any part in the government of that island reserving only those rights included in the Platt Amendment.

35. (March 26, 1909.)
All corporations engaged in interstate commerce should be compelled to take out a Federal charter.
36. (March 21, 1910.)
The Federal Government should have the power to impose an income tax, not apportioned among the states according to population.
37. (April 3, 1911.)
All elective state officers should be nominated by direct primaries.
38. (March 29, 1912.)
The United States Government should accept the principle of monopoly control of industry and regulate prices in all cases where the monopoly has been brought about by the operation of economic laws.
39. (March 14, 1913.)
The United States Government should exempt our coast-wise trade from Panama Canal tolls.
40. (March 27, 1914.)
The women of the United States should be given the suffrage on equal terms with men.
41. (March 26, 1915.)
The best interest of the United States demand a prompt and substantial increase in her army and navy.
42. (March 24, 1916.)
The United States should adopt a system of compulsory military service modeled after that of Switzerland.

APPENDIX

NOTE BY AUTHORS

The following brief and argument were written by Mr. William T. Gunraj, when a senior in Harvard College in the year 1914. It was part of the required work in a course in English composition dealing with argument, and both brief and forensic received the highest grade. It is reproduced here for the following reasons:

1. As an illustration of a good type of work that can be done by students in courses in argument.

2. For the purpose of illustrating what has been set forth in the preceding pages. The marginal notes endeavor to point out both to students and teachers examples of the principles discussed in the preceding pages.

3. As a form or model for students to consider in writing their work.

The authors believe that an actual argument prepared in a course in composition by a student will be, on the whole, more helpful than classic illustrations drawn from the great masters of oratory. While the work merits approbation, it is not and does not pretend to be perfection.

In addition to the individual criticism which is set forth in the marginal notes, attention is especially directed to the following points:

1. The amount of evidence that is produced. There is nothing assertive in the entire argument. Every statement is proved not by a single fact, but by many pieces of evidence, and in nearly every instance the evidence is convincing.

2. The clearness of the entire argument, due to the adherence to the structure as set forth in the brief.

3. The closeness with which the brief is followed considered in connection with the lack of artificiality. Although the subdivisions of the brief are followed almost to their minutest de-

tails, the argument has little of the academic quality, and proceeds with a swing and force that is commendable.

4. The excellence of the style. The writer has a good vocabulary, excellent command of English, and a vivid, yet simple selection of words to express his meaning; all of these qualities render the argument readable. The last paragraphs furnish a good example of a purely persuasive peroration.

5. Its weakest point seems to be in refutation.

It may be advisable, although surely not necessary, for the authors to state that this work is offered only as a piece of English composition. Whether or not we agree with the conclusion to which its writer comes, we can at least see that it is a good presentation of the view which he holds.

A. P. S.

S. L. G.

SHOULD IRELAND HAVE HOME RULE ?

BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

- I. A reconsideration of the circumstances under which Home Rule was being granted to Ireland is of timely interest in that
 - A. The lull in the struggle brought on by the European war affords a suitable opportunity for a cool-headed discussion.
 - B. Many people are entertaining grave fears as to how Ireland will relate herself to the crisis in which England is involved.
 - C. Many others who believed in Home Rule are allowing their faith to be shaken by the separatist attitude of certain Irish-Americans.
- II. The history of the question is briefly as follows:
 - A. In 1801 the Irish Parliament voted for the Act of Union with England.
 - B. Since then Ireland has been in a state of chronic rebellion.
 - C. Two unsuccessful attempts were made by Gladstone to give Ireland Home Rule.
 - D. The present Home Rule Bill, introduced in 1912, passed Parliament finally in the summer of 1914.
 - E. Pending a settlement with Ulster, the bill had not yet been allowed to pass into law when the war broke out.

III. The contentions on either side in brief are as follows:

A. Those who oppose Home Rule say:

1. The Irish people show that they are not anxious to have Home Rule, in that
 - a. They are unwilling to support the struggle with their own means.
 - b. They let Americans and Australians support it.
2. The Irish people do not need Home Rule, inasmuch as
 - a. They are more prosperous now than they have been for a century, in that
 - (1) Their commerce is greater than ever.
 - (2) Their annual savings run far into the millions.
3. The present Home Rule bill will prove oppressive, in that
 - a. Under its working there will be two taxes where formerly there was but one.
 - b. It gives to Ireland little power over her industrial affairs.
4. Home Rule for Ireland will mean a weakening of the British Empire, in that,
 - a. Ireland will use Home Rule as a stepping-stone to complete separation.
 - b. Her Parliament will criticize in a hostile manner the acts of the British government to the detriment of its interests abroad.
5. Civil war is sure to ensue when Home Rule takes effect, inasmuch as
 - a. Ulster is prepared to resist by armed force every attempt to subject her to an Irish Parliament.

B. Those who advocate Home Rule say:

1. So far from not desiring Home Rule, the Irish people consider that their only salvation consists in being allowed to govern themselves.
2. Home Rule is necessary for the well-being of Ireland, inasmuch as
 - a. It alone can satisfy the national aspirations of the Irish people.
 - b. It will stop the hideous drain of emigration.
 - c. It will develop Irish character by making it responsible for its own destiny.
3. England is utterly unfitted for governing Ireland, inasmuch as
 - a. She is temperamentally incapable of understanding the temper of the Irish.
4. Home Rule for Ireland will be of great benefit to the Empire, in that
 - a. It will relieve Parliament of a great deal of work for which it has no time.
 - b. It will serve as a guide in bringing about federation.

IV. The foregoing contentions may be conveniently reduced, as follows:

A. This elimination may be made:

1. From the contentions of the negative we must omit all consideration of the present Home Rule bill, inasmuch as
 - a. All contentions about the inadequacy of any bill are extraneous to our question, in that
 - (1) They do not affect the desirability of granting Home Rule to Ireland.

Is not this too sweeping? The principles of this bill are perhaps typical.

B. The following combinations may be made:

1. In the contentions of the negative the question of Ulster may be conveniently discussed under the issue: Does Ireland want Home Rule? inasmuch as

a. Ulster is part of Ireland.

2. In the contentions of the affirmative the question of England's fitness to govern Ireland may be discussed under the issue: Does Ireland need Home Rule? inasmuch as

a. The incapability of England to govern Ireland only emphasizes Ireland's need of self-government.

V. We assume that federation is a desirable thing for the British Empire.

VI. The special issues then are:

A. Does Ireland really want Home Rule?

B. Does Ireland really need Home Rule?

C. Will Ireland when she gets Home Rule be a detriment to the interests of the British Empire?

PROOF

I. Ireland should have Home Rule, for

A. She wants it, for

1. She has been asking for it for the last thirty years in a peaceable way, for

a. She has been sending representatives to Westminster who have been overwhelmingly Home Rulers, for

(1) Since 1885 when Ireland got her full electoral rights she has elected 84 to 86 Home Rulers out of a total representation of 103.

2. She never sanctioned the Act of Union, for

a. The Irish Parliament that voted itself away did not represent the whole Irish people, for

*Refutation.
Violates Rule XI.*

(1) It represented only the Protestants who were decidedly in the minority.

b. Even the Protestants who alone had office-holding rights did not give their sanction, for

(1) They drew up resolutions protesting against the attempt to deprive them of their rights.

c. The Irish Parliament itself acted under compulsion, for

(1) Its members had received exorbitant bribes from outside sources.

3. She has been dissatisfied with British rule all along, for

a. She has been continually rebelling against British Rule, for

(1) In 1803 an insurrection under Robert Emmet took place.

(2) In 1825-29 there was a struggle for Catholic emancipation.

(3) In 1835-38 there was a war for the abolition of the tithe.

(4) In 1848 there was another rebellion.

(5) In 1882 some Irishmen murdered in broad daylight prominent British administrative officials in Dublin.

(6) Ireland has hindered peaceful administration, for

(a) Irishmen attack post-office men while delivering mail.

*Perhaps this vio-
lates Rule V*

- (b) They boycott individuals who obey the government in certain particulars where the people have sworn to disobey.
- 4. It is immaterial, according to the principles of democratic majority government by which the United Kingdom is governed, that Ulster does not want Home Rule, for
 - a. Ulster has only one-third of the population of Ireland.
 - b. Only a part of Ulster is unionist, for
 - (1) Of the 33 members from Ulster in the present Parliament only 17 are unionists.
- 5. It is not true that the Irish do not support Home Rule with their means, for
 - a. Contributions to the cause are regularly reported in leading periodicals.
 - b. The foreigners who contribute from abroad are none others than emigrated Irish who have felt the brunt of English misrule.
- B. Ireland needs to be allowed to govern herself, for
 - 1. England is incapable of understanding her, for
 - a. England is alien to Ireland in fundamentals, for
 - (1) The English are of Teutonic origin, whereas the Irish are of Celtic.
 - (2) The English are mainly Protestant, whereas the Irish are mainly Catholic.
 - 2. Under English rule the country has suffered tremendously in economic affairs, for

- a. All her industries have been systematically repressed, for
 - (1) British embargoes first destroyed the Irish cattle trade.
 - (2) The Irish woollen industry was destroyed by prohibitive legislation.
 - (3) The Irish linen industry, also, was later destroyed.
 - (4) The Irish merchant marine was destroyed by hostile navigation acts.
 - b. The country has been depopulated, for
 - (1) Whereas in 1841 there was a population of 8,175,124, in 1911 the population was only 4,381,951.
 - c. Owing to the industrial situation, famines have been frequent.
 - d. Even the condition of agriculture, the one unmolested industry of the Irish, has not been too salutary.
3. She can govern herself better than England has been able to govern her, for
- a. She understands her own needs better than England can understand them.
 - b. History shows that she governed herself well before England took away her Parliament.
4. The contention that the commerce of the Irish is increasing does not prove that the Irish are prosperous, for
- a. A comparison of Irish foreign commerce with that of other prosperous nations shows that that of the Irish is pitifully small, for

APPENDIX

- (1) In proportion to population Irish commerce is only one-fiftieth of that of Belgium.
- (2) In proportion to population Irish commerce is only one-hundredth of that of Holland.
- 5. The contention that the savings of the Irish are increasing does not prove Irish industrial prosperity, for
 - a. The increase in savings can be amply accounted for by the remittances from relatives abroad.
- C. Self-governing Ireland will not prove a detriment to the Empire, for
 - 1. The occasion for hostility will have passed away when Ireland gets self-government, for
 - a. The cause for her hostility is unsympathetic British legislation.
 - 2. So far from being a detriment, self-governing Ireland will contribute to the well-being of the Empire, for
 - a. She will be able to contribute means to its support, instead of being a burden on it, as now, for
 - (1) She will be more prosperous than now, for
 - (a) Her own Parliament will better provide for her industrial needs.
 - (b) History shows that, under the rule of the Parliament immediately preceding the Act of Union, Ireland attained to a degree of prosperity, the like of which she has not since seen.

Rule V (?)

- b. She will relieve the Westminster Parliament of much work, for
 - (1) She will attend to her own needs, leaving only certain reserved services for the Westminster Parliament to consider.
 - c. Irish Home Rule will serve as a guide in bringing about federation.
 - d. Irish self-government will enlist the good will of the Irish abroad in favor of the Empire.
3. It is not likely that Ireland will want to use Home Rule as a means to separate from the Empire, for
- a. It will be against her commercial interest to separate from Britain, for
 - (1) The bulk of her trade is with Britain, which trade she will lose if she separates.
 - b. Self-protection forbids separation from Britain, for
 - (1) Ireland has no navy of her own to defend herself.
 - c. The notable leaders of the nationalist party have been federalists, for
 - (1) Parnell was opposed to separation.
 - (2) Redmond, the present leader, is a staunch federalist.
4. It is not likely that the Irish Parliament will be disposed to criticize the actions of the British government, for
- a. It will be better disposed towards it, for
 - (1) The cause of hostility will have been removed when Home Rule is granted.

Rule V (f)

- (2) The Home Rule party, the party of hostility, will have disbanded.

CONCLUSION

- A. Ireland really wants Home Rule.
 - B. Ireland really needs Home Rule.
 - C. Home Rule will not mean a weakening of the British Empire.
- Therefore Ireland should have Home Rule.

SHOULD IRELAND HAVE HOME RULE?

BY

WILLIAM T. GUNRAJ

The recent turn in the Home Rule struggle bears a striking resemblance to the outcome of the ancient battle of the Frogs and the Mice. The assembled hosts of these doughty creatures had put forward their champions and were about to begin the contest for supremacy when a kite swooped down upon them and began indiscriminately to gobble them up. This great and calamitous war—the most terrible within the memory of man—was precipitated just at the time when Ulster with her marshalled forces was preparing to give battle rather than submit to the rule of a local parliament. It drew the attention of friend and foe to the danger which threatened all alike and put an end for a time to the civil strife. As it is, the lull in the Irish struggle affords us an excellent opportunity for reconsidering the circumstances under which Home Rule was being granted to Ireland.

The interest of the American people in the welfare of other peoples has never been wanting. I say it with a just pride, for I see in it a hopeful sign of the ultimate bringing about of the comity and concord among the nations that we so much desire. The hearty response of the rank and file of this nation to the needs of suffering Belgium is a lasting tribute to its good nature and humanity, and an indication of its willingness to

Introductory paragraph challenges attention and suggests the immediate cause for discussion

Uncouth phrase used intentionally

This and succeeding paragraph illustrate explanation of subject by means of the immediate cause for discussion

enter into relations which concern not only its own welfare, but the welfare of other races as well.

If considerations of humanity were all, the interest of the American people in Ireland would still be great, for Ireland has been a suffering nation for generations. The principles of sympathy and kindness lead us instinctively to side with the under-dog. But there are other considerations. Of the ninety million inhabitants of this republic fully ten per cent are Irish or of Irish stock. More than this, the fate of Ireland is closely bound up with that of Great Britain; and Britain, deep down in the sources from which nations spring, is indissolubly connected with America,—in lineage and history, in language and literature, in laws and customs.

*Beauty of style
produced by melody*

*Beginning of the
history of the ques-
tion. Note par-
ticularly that in
this and the next
paragraph the his-
tory is not given
in detail but
sketched rapidly
and yet clearly
enough for the
purposes of ex-
planation*

In order that we may intelligently understand the Home Rule struggle, it is necessary that we review rapidly the more important incidents which have led up to it. Ireland was a nation, long, long ago, with a king and council of her own. She had a civilization and a literature long before England had dreamt of either. But in the ups and downs of history she came under the sway of England. She did not take readily to English rule and had to be reconquered several times. Finally in 1801, her last parliament, which had been running for less than twenty years, was combined with that of England and the last vestiges of her independence were swept away.

If Ireland was unhappy before because she was governed by an alien race, a race which strove to repress her in every conceivable way, she was no less so after her parliament—her only means of palliating her hard lot—was taken from her. She passed into a chronic state of

obstinate rebellion. So serious did the condition appear to Premier Gladstone that twice during his career he endeavored to pass a Home Rule bill for Ireland. Both attempts, as we know, failed; but the Irish did not give up their struggle. Finally, in April, 1912, the present Home Rule bill was introduced in Parliament by Premier Asquith; and this, by the provisions of the famous Parliament Act of 1911, which, by the way, had been passed with the express purpose of getting such radical measures as the present Home Rule bill over the veto of the conservative House of Lords, passed its final stages in the summer of 1914. Owing to the war the whole struggle had to be suspended, for the bill, pending a settlement with Ulster, had not yet been put in operation.

The parties which are opposed to granting Home Rule to Ireland advance some weighty considerations in support of their position. They say that the Irish people do not really want Home Rule, inasmuch as they give the Home Rule cause scant moral and financial support, that most of the support comes from abroad, and that the whole agitation is mainly the work of politicians who prey upon the prejudices of the people in order to get into the limelight; that the Irish do not need Home Rule inasmuch as their economic condition is speedily improving, as their growing commerce and bank accounts prove. They say, further, that the present Home Rule bill will aggravate instead of improve the condition of the Irish people, for it will mean increased taxation for them, without any improvement in their economic condition; that civil war is bound to ensue as soon as Home Rule takes effect since Ulster is irreconcilable and is prepared to resist by armed force any

End of the history of the question. A definition of terms is not given. Query: Would a paragraph outlining the essential features of the present Home Rule Bill improve the Introduction? Cf. the brief, Introd., IV. A. 1.

Beginning of the conflict of opinion. This and the succeeding paragraph are slightly artificial and academic

attempt to subject her to an Irish parliament; and, finally, that the peace of the entire empire will be endangered, for Ireland will be free to use her peppery tongue in criticizing the acts of the British Government, to the detriment of its interest at home and abroad—to say nothing of the open threat of many Irishmen to use Home Rule as a stepping-stone to complete separation from the Empire.

Note the superiority of this beginning over, "The contentions of the negative are," or any similar phrase. It produces beauty of style by the avoidance of artificial phrase

The Home Rulers, on the other hand, are quite as sure that none of these predictions will prove true and, in return, meet objection with objection. They reply that the people of Ireland look upon Home Rule as their only means of salvation, that their present quiescence is but the lull of expectation, and that they will burst into redoubled fury if their hopes are disappointed. They say, also, that England is entirely unfitted to govern Ireland, inasmuch as she is an alien people that does not understand the temper of the Irish or their needs; that if the Irish are allowed to govern themselves, it will satisfy the aspirations they have had these many years and put an end to their discontent; and that Irish Home Rule, so far from becoming a detriment to the peace of the empire will prove a blessing, inasmuch as it will mean less work for the Westminster Parliament, and will serve as a guide in introducing the same changes in the other parts of the United Kingdom, preparatory to the creation of a federated British Empire.

This is far from being all of the case on either side of the question. The quarrel has been long and heated and very intricate, and has ramified into many departments of knowledge, and drawn its illustrations from many quarters of the globe; yet, in the main, the contest has been around these few points.

End of conflict of opinion

Now there are several ways in which we may treat the question. We may take up the several items on either side, one by one, and consider each exhaustively, or we may consider only these items which both the contestants deem important, or we may examine carefully the points on either side, see which have a direct bearing on the main question, eschew such as are indirect, and consign minor points to a subordinate place. Plainly, the first method will take us nowhere since it makes use of no common threshing-ground; the second is obviously partial and not thorough; the third is the only sensible method and the one which we must use if we would arrive at a fair and just solution.

This paragraph is somewhat formal and might perhaps be omitted

The question of Ulster is a secondary one for, since Ulster is only a small part of Ireland, her objection should not be allowed to have a *fundamental* bearing on a measure that concerns the whole island. The desires of Ulster, therefore, are to be considered under the general topic, the desires of all Ireland. England's unfitness to govern Ireland, too, is a point subordinate to the main question: Does Ireland need self-government? We must also omit all consideration of the present Home Rule bill, inasmuch as its defects do not at all affect the desirability of granting Home Rule to Ireland. In other words, that one Home Rule bill should fail in alleviating the condition of an oppressed people is no reason why the condition of that people should not be relieved.

Extraneous and trivial matter

The opposition might well question this and if they desired, criticize the general features of the present Home Rule bill as typical of the Home Rule Principle

Moreover, whether or not federation is desirable for the United Kingdom is a question too large for us to consider here. Besides, it is not necessary to our question to do so. Suffice it to say, that the consensus of opinion is distinctly in its favor. Both Home Rulers and Anti-Home Rulers agree that it is the goal at which British

Waived matter

politics seem to be pointing. We must assume therefore that federation is to all intents and purposes a desirable thing for the British Empire and treat our question with this assumption in mind.

Sifting the case thus, we begin to see that the contest has raged around three points, at once simple and fundamental, the consideration of which is necessary to a solution of our question:

First,—Does Ireland want Home Rule?

Second,—Does Ireland need Home Rule?

Third,—Will Ireland when she gets Home Rule be a detriment to the interests of the British Empire?

Statement of main issues. Could be made less artificial

Beginning of proof. First main issue

The question whether or not Ireland wants Home Rule is an important one, for if Ireland does not want Home Rule, it would be utter folly to force it upon her. If she is even indifferent to Home Rule, her indifference might be taken as proof enough that she does not want it, that she is satisfied with her present rule and should be left alone. But if, in our search into the matter, we should find that Ireland has used all the means in her power to bring about a change in her government, we shall be forced to concede that she does want Home Rule.

Statement of argument from cause to effect

Now there are but two ways in which a nation can express its desire. It can speak to the government directly through its representatives, or it can by its attitude toward her administration—friendly or hostile—show its pleasure or displeasure with it. The former of these methods is constitutional; the latter, if the attitude be hostile, unconstitutional. Frequently an oppressed nation resorts to the latter when it finds the former ineffectual; sometimes it uses the unconstitutional method merely to emphasize the constitutional. Clearly then, if we are to solve

our question, we must ask: "How has Ireland made use of these two ways of expressing herself? Has she used the constitutional method to show that she wants Home Rule? Has she used the unconstitutional method?" Facts, not opinions, must decide; not what some one thinks, but what Ireland has said and done.

Let us first consider the unconstitutional means which Ireland has resorted to in protesting against the Act of Union. In 1803, almost immediately after the Act was passed, a formidable uprising took place, headed by Robert Emmet. Then followed a tremendous struggle for Catholic Emancipation or the removal of the political ban which prevented the Catholics from holding office. Under the leadership of the celebrated O'Connell, the Catholic Association became strong enough to carry the elections. The Duke of Wellington, victor of Waterloo, who was the British Prime Minister at the time, was obliged to confess that the king's government could no longer be carried on and he had to introduce a bill granting emancipation in 1829. Then followed a war for the abolition of the tithe—a tax which the *Encyclopædia Britannica* calls "the most oppressive of all taxes." This was commuted in 1838, but only "in deference to clamor and violence."

Evidence—Statement of historical facts

In 1848 there was another considerable uprising; it failed, of course; but one of the men who escaped to America organized a formidable movement, well known in Irish history as the Fenian Brotherhood. This was a secret society pledged to a policy of terror. Under its direction many criminal outrages were committed in England.

In 1880 began the protest against the eviction of tenants by landlords. Parliament had passed

This paragraph shows the value of the concrete illustration as opposed to the abstract statement. Force

Force gained by concreteness expressed in vivid terms. Note the prevalence of short Anglo-Saxon words

a law empowering a landlord to turn out a tenant for failure to pay his rent. In September of that year, Parnell, perhaps the most eminent of Irish leaders, made a speech at Ennis in which he told the people to punish a man for taking a farm from which another had been evicted "by isolating him from his kind as if he was a leper of old." The first man to fall under the curse was a Captain Boycott from whom the system took its name. A description of its working by a resident of Munster, which appeared in *The Times* of Nov. 5, 1885, reads in part:—"Boycotting means that a peaceable subject of the Queen is denied food and drink, and that he is ruined in his business; that his cattle are unsalable at fairs; that the smith will not shoe his horse nor the carpenter mend his cart; that old friends pass him by on the other side, making the sign of the cross; that his children are hooted at the village school; that he sits apart like an outcast in his usual place of public worship: all for doing nothing but what the law says he has a perfect right to do." "The people," said the report of the Cooper Commission which inquired into the system, "are more afraid of boycotting than they are of the judgment of the courts of justice." It was in this way that Ireland showed her disapproval of one law that she did not like.

In August, 1881, Parliament passed an Irish Land Act which guaranteed to tenants the privileges of free sale of their occupation rights, security of tenure, as long as rent was paid, and fair rents. The Home Rule party with Parnell at the head objected to the Act most strenuously. Rent or no rent, there was to be no eviction. Parnell and two other Irish members of Parliament were thrown into gaol. Crimes became

frequent; in 1881, 4,439 agrarian outrages were reported. Cattle were cruelly mutilated. Suspects were punished and imprisoned by the Irish government, but still the outrages continued. Gladstone, the British Prime Minister at the time, was baffled and had to change his policy. He ordered the release of Parnell and his companions against the wishes of the leading British officials at Dublin, who promptly resigned. A few days after Parnell's release, on the 6th of May, 1882, the new officials, the Lord Lieutenant Lord Frederick Cavendish and his permanent under-secretary, Thomas Henry Burke, arrived in Dublin. That very afternoon they were both murdered in broad daylight in Phoenix Park. By the merest accident the conspiracy was discovered. Five were hanged and others sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The informer, on his way to South Africa, was murdered on board the ship in which he was travelling by an Irishman who was brought to England and hanged the following year.

*More convincing
if source of these
figures were given*

Even to-day lawlessness and violence go on. Policemen have a hard time performing their duty; the men who deliver mail often need to be accompanied by the police. And all is done with the deliberate purpose of resisting the government. Here is an editorial from the *Irish Freedom*, quoted by the *London Morning Post* of October 7, 1912: "To conclude, if Home Rule passes, our work will be constructive. If, on the other hand, it does not pass, our work will be destructive, and will be an attack all along the line on every English institution in Ireland. For that we must work—perhaps alone—but if possible, in league with England's enemies within and without the Empire; but whether alone or with outside aid, the work

*Single sentence
gives good transi-
tion from para-
graph to para-
graph thus secur-
ing coherence*

will be undertaken and it will be carried through."

Coherence

*Argument of fact
from authority*

Remember, too, that statements and acts such as these were not and are not to be attributed to any isolated section of the people. "In the House of Commons, on the 24th of May, 1882," says the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Gladstone said that boycotting required a sanction like every other creed, and that the sanction which alone made it effective was 'the murder which is not to be denounced.'" So general were acts of hostility against the government that they could not be called criminal. There was something radically wrong in the relations which existed between the Government and the people.

*Direct application
of effect deduced
from preceding
causes*

Do these acts and statements show satisfaction with British rule? Do they show indifference? Who, possessed of a shadow of a knowledge of them, can still presume to say that Ireland has ever been satisfied with the Act of Union?

How, then, some one asks, was the Act of Union ever passed? To understand, we must go back to the history of the times.

Refutation

It was the time of the Great Napoleon. The successes of the armies of the mighty Corsican were a source of constant uneasiness to the English across the Channel, who lived in fear of an invasion. Ireland, so the English thought, would offer a ready foothold to the invading foreigner. The Irish rebellion of 1798 was fresh in mind. What was to be done? The obvious thing to do was to invest the island with military forces, but this could not conveniently be done with an Irish Parliament in control. Added to the military situation was the jealousy of the English who had been looking with an evil eye at Ireland's growing prosperity in commerce

and industry. Pitt, England's Prime Minister, proposed to emancipate the Catholics who could not hold any public office on account of their religion on condition that the Irish give up their Parliament. Catholic Emancipation "was a bribe little likely to appeal to the Protestant minority which constituted the Irish Parliament." Even if the Protestants had been ready to accede to Pitt, the transaction could not be said to have received the sanction of the Irish people. But an Orange (Ulster) resolution of the time ran thus: "That we see with unspeakable sorrow an attempt made to deprive us of that Constitution, our rising prosperity, and our existence as a nation, and reducing us to the degrading situation of a colony of England." The members of the Irish Parliament had to be bought over in every conceivable way. Thirty-two of those who voted for the Act were created peers; over a hundred were given government positions; and bribes in excess of two million dollars were used in buying votes. Lord Castlereagh, who subsequently committed suicide, was said to have bought over twenty-five members. Byron wrote of him when he heard of his fate:

Paragraph lacks unity

"So Castlereagh has cut his throat!

The worst

Of this is—that he cut his country's the first!

So he has cut his throat at last!

He! Who!

The man who cut his country's long ago."

Force produced by concreteness

Pitt got his way; the Irish Parliament was amalgamated with that of England, but the Catholics never received their emancipation,—not till long afterward, and then they had to fight for it.

The Unionist historian, Lecky, looking back, was forced to say of the whole transaction: "It

Admission against interest

Argument from authority. Note the good introduction by a single phrase of each of the two historians

was a crime of the deepest turpitude." "The sacrifice of nationality was extorted by the most enormous corruption in the history of representative institutions." Professor Dicey, a prominent English writer on jurisprudence says: "The Act of Union was, in short, an agreement which, could it have been referred to a court of law, must at once have been cancelled as a contract hopelessly tainted with fraud and corruption." Said Mr. Gladstone: "I know no blacker or fouler transaction in the history of man, than the making of the Union between England and Ireland." These facts from history substantiated by statements from men whose integrity cannot be questioned, two of whom were, if anything, prejudiced against the Home Rule cause, prove conclusively that the Act of Union was a corrupt transaction which did not have the sanction of the Irish people.

Argument from effect to cause

Force by repetition

Argument from authority

The protest by constitutional means has been no less signal. As long as the voting population was restricted, the Home Rule party was held in abeyance. In 1885 the same electoral rights that Great Britain enjoyed were extended to Ireland. What happened? The Home Rule party in Parliament, which under Isaac Butt had numbered fifty-four, rose suddenly to eighty-four,—eighty-four out of a total Irish representation of 103 members! "This almost unanimous plebiscite of the Irish people against the legislative union with Great Britain," says the *Encyclopædia Britannica* in its supplement to the ninth edition, "at once put a new face upon the Irish question. It was not merely or chiefly the increased power to obstruct the course of imperial legislation—but the declaration of the great body of the Irish people that they regarded the union as an intolerable yoke

which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear." The split caused by Parnell's downfall did not last. The Home Rule party was again consolidated and remained firm till to-day. In the present Parliament 86 members out of the total Irish representation of 103 are Home Rulers.

That is all very well, says some one, but what about Ulster? You cannot deny that Ulster is part of Ireland and that she is almost irreconcilably opposed to Home Rule.

Statement of proposition to be refuted

Ulster, in reply, is indeed part of Ireland and is opposed to Home Rule. But she is only a part. Of a total population of 4,456,546 inhabitants in 1901, 1,581,351 belonged to Ulster, or about one in three. But note carefully that not the whole of the population of Ulster is opposed to Home Rule, for of the 33 members that Ulster sends to Parliament only 17 are unionists. In other words, only one-half of the people of Ulster is opposed to Home Rule, and this one-half constitutes only one-sixth of the total population of the island.

Refutation

Exposure of fallacy of hasty generalization

Suppose the legislature of Massachusetts to be considering a bill for which nearly all of the people of that state are clamoring, and the representatives from a certain district which contains one-sixth of the population to oppose. Could anything be more absurd than to say that the desire of the whole state should be denied because of the opposition of that one district? Yet this is no more absurd than the claim of the Anti-Home Rulers that Home Rule should be denied because Ulster opposes it. The most that Ulster may claim is to be herself exempt, and even this may be contested.

Argument from analogy; is the analogy good?

But why does Ulster oppose Home Rule? Ulster thinks that she is the wealthiest province

*Argument by
analogy (figurative
illustration)
Incoherent*

*Exposure of fal-
lacy arising from
inaccurate ob-
servation*

in Ireland and that under Home Rule undue burdens of taxation would be imposed upon her. Granting for a moment that Ulster is the wealthiest Irish province, is it reasonable to suppose that she will therefore be taxed unduly? Would it not be suicidal for a Home Rule Parliament to crush her, to chop off, as it were, the branch on which it sits, to kill the goose that lays the golden egg? But Ulster is far from being as wealthy as she claims. A prominent article in the *Westminster Review* of October, 1912, gives statistics which show that Ulster ranks third in the income-tax assessment of the island, Leinster coming first with an assessment of \$51 per inhabitant, Munster with \$30, and Ulster with \$28, Connaught being the only province with a lower assessment than Ulster. This fact as to Ulster's wealth is corroborated by the valuation of the ratable property of the island: statistics show that the average value of the property per inhabitant in Leinster and Munster is \$20 and \$13 respectively, while the average inhabitant of Ulster owns but \$12 worth of property. The surmises of Ulster on this score, therefore, are altogether visionary. Ulster further fears that, industrial as her economic interests largely are, she will suffer at the hands of a Parliament that must in the main be agricultural, but in fearing this, Ulster forgets that the rest of Ireland will not be long content to remain altogether agricultural, that it is only a matter of time when the economic interests of the island will have become comparatively uniform, calling for uniform legislative treatment. Ulster also fears that she will be persecuted by Catholic Ireland because of her religion, but it is worthy of note that Protestant Ulster has been far more bigoted and intolerant and discriminating than

the rest of Ireland. In Belfast, the leading city of Ulster, the population is one-third Catholic, but only 9 of the 437 salaried officials of this city are Catholics, and only \$3,800 of a total sum of \$340,000 are paid as salaries to Catholics. In the provinces where Catholics are preponderatingly in the majority, on the other hand, the treatment of Protestants is almost the reverse. Cities in these provinces have repeatedly nominated Protestant mayors. In Derry, although the Catholics are in a large majority, the Corporation pays \$33,000 in salaries to Protestant officials, and only \$850 to Catholics, without any regard to religion. Parnell, the greatest Home Rule leader, was a Protestant. Facts such as these show that religion has little or nothing to do with the nationalism of the Catholics of Ireland, that public life among them is mainly political, and that the fears of Ulster are merely the qualms of an uneasy conscience.

Argumentum ad hominem

The objection is also made: If the Irish want self-government, why do they not contribute to the support of the Home Rule cause? I reply that they do. Here are some figures from the *Cork Free Press* of March 7, 1912, which that journal is using to incriminate the Home Rule party. "How much has this faction made out of Ireland? In 1909 it received £23,000; in 1910 it received £33,000; last year it received £28,000. From America it extracted £40,000. From Australia according to yesterday's *Freeman* it has got £30,000. From the British Treasury it has got £29,000." This certainly does not sound as if the Irish were so niggardly in their support of the Home Rule cause. It is worthy of note, also, that the "foreigners" who contribute are none others than emigrated Irishmen.

More refutation

Admissions against interest and undesigned testimony

Viewed in the light of these facts, the objec-

*Recapitulation of
first issue*

tion to Home Rule on the ground that the Irish do not want it falls flat. History, as we have seen, testifies that the Irish people did not have a part in the Act of Union, and that they have used all the means in their power, both constitutional and unconstitutional, to protest against it. The opposition of Ulster, in so far as it aims to prevent Home Rule, is, according to the principles of democratic majority government, manifestly absurd; and her fears of discrimination and persecution under Home Rule are, to a large extent, imaginary and groundless. And lastly, the charge that the Irish do not support the Home Rule cause with their means is, as we have seen, unjustified. From all this we infer that if there has been anything the Irish have really wanted, it was Home Rule.

Statement of Second Issue. Note the good transition giving coherence to the whole composition

Let us turn now to the question: Does Ireland need Home Rule? This, too, like the last is fundamental, for if Ireland does not need Home Rule, why all this fuss about giving it to her? But how are we to tell whether she needs it or not? What is the criterion by which such a need is to be judged?

Should not this paragraph be shortened or omitted? It does not seem to advance the discussion

Plainly, the object of government is, or should be, the welfare of the governed. This is a proposition too well conceded to be denied. Some may conceivably contend that the object of a despotic government is not the welfare of the governed but of the rulers, but even despots have learned that the welfare of the governed best contributes to their own. But we are not here concerned with despotic governments. We who believe in the democratic principle and who partake of its blessings cannot for a moment hesitate to grant that the welfare of the people is the true object of government. Believing thus, we are forced to concede that a government

which fails to promote the happiness of the people it governs has failed in its purpose and needs to be supplanted by one more adequate.

The criterion, then, by which we are to judge Ireland's need of Home Rule is: Has the present form of government by a Parliament overwhelmingly British succeeded in promoting Irish welfare? And since the influence of government on the welfare of a people is most readily seen in industry, our question resolves itself mainly into a consideration of the effects of British rule on the economic life of the Irish people.

Before we proceed to the industrial question it might be well for us to note the racial and other differences between the English and the Irish and the results which have flowed from them—differences which in part explain England's attitude towards Irish industry, and which emphasize England's unfitness to govern Ireland. The Englishman is a Saxon, descended from his aggressive Teutonic forbears of northern Europe; the Irishman is a Celt, dwelling from time immemorial in the land he now occupies, comparatively peaceful and quiet. This essential difference in origin connotes a difference in habits and mental outlook, which is real. To this may be added the difference in religion. The wars of religious reformation that swept over England and northern Europe left Ireland untouched, for Ireland had little in common with these countries. These differences and the barbarities they led to were emphasized by the relation of the conqueror and conquered which existed between the two countries and which opened the way for England to inflict terrible atrocities on the weaker country, which her foreign racial and religious character may explain, but certainly does not justify.

*Argument from
cause to effect*

Trite expression

Cause to effect

Undesigned testimony

England, as the conqueror and ruler of Ireland, has at times engaged in a régime of unsurpassable cruelty and atrocity. Elizabeth sought to establish Protestantism in Ireland by wholesale extermination and confiscation. Speaking of Sir Walter Raleigh's operations in Munster, Froude says: "The entire province was utterly depopulated. Hecatombs of helpless creatures, the aged and the sick and the blind, the young mother, and the babe at the breast fell under the English sword." Another writer states that one gentleman informed the good queen that his friends had starved 30,000 to death by destroying the crops. Side by side with this extermination, the confiscation of land was carried on in favor of English and Scotch settlers. Some of the new landlords never set foot in Ireland; and thus began the system of absentee landlordism that has since been the bane of Irish peasant life. Lord Clare who with Castlereagh was most active in bringing about the Act of Union declared that upwards of 11,600,000 acres of land had been forfeited up to the rebellion of 1798.

Cromwell offered a reward of \$25 for the head of every Irish priest. Who has not heard of Drogheda? Cromwell had besieged this town for some time and was admitted on solemn promise of quarter. He waited until the garrison had laid down their arms and then commanded his soldiers to begin a massacre which lasted for five days and was attended with most savage brutality. In his official report to London Cromwell said of his exploit: "It has pleased God to bless our endeavors at Drogheda. I wish that all honest hearts may give the glory of this to God alone, to whom indeed the praise of this mercy belongs. I believe we put to the sword the whole number of defenders. I do not think

thirty of the whole number escaped with their lives; those that did are in safe custody for the Barbadoes." Of the bestial massacre of three thousand men, women, and children who had taken refuge in the Cathedral of Cashel, the historian says: "They were slaughtered without discrimination. Neither rank, dignity nor character saved the nobleman, the bishop or the priest: nor decrepitude nor his hoary head, the venerable sage bending down into the grave; nor her charms, the virgin; nor her virtues, the respectable matron; nor its helplessness, the smiling infant. Butchery was the order of the day, and all shared the common fate." But Cromwell was not satisfied with this; he ordered the exportation of tens of thousands of captured Irish, among whom were women and children, as slaves to America and the West Indies. Thirty thousand were sold to the American colonists; over a hundred thousand to West Indian planters. Acts such as these were not likely to increase the affection of the Irish for their masters, or to mitigate their misery.

These acts fully explain the failure of British government in Ireland, a failure which is openly admitted. Says Sidney Brooks, a prominent English writer on contemporary politics, in an article in the *Fortnightly Review* of November, 1911: "It is their (the Irish) misfortune to be governed by a nation that is, and always must be, temperamentally incapable of understanding them, a nation that has made in Ireland its one grand administrative failure." Again, he says: "It is, indeed, the supreme defect of our government in Ireland that it has failed to win the trust and good will and co-operation of the Irish people. It is just as much an alien government to them, just as out of touch with all their qualities, instincts, characteristics and points

*Authority. Note
good introduction*

*Effect produced by
causes stated in
preceding para-
graphs*

of view that make them a different people, as would be a German government in England."

Without stopping to detail any further atrocities, let us, with these facts in mind, proceed to consider the effects of British rule on Irish industry. The indictment I bring against the English people is not only that they have failed to promote Irish welfare, but that they have set themselves deliberately to repress and to destroy by legislation every Irish industry that has arisen. This repressive policy had been diligently pursued from very early times. As early as 1640 the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland wrote the king: "I am of opinion that all wisdom advises to keep Ireland dependent on England as long as is possible, and stopped from the manufacture of wool." The Earl of Nottingham said that the object of English rule in Ireland was "to cramp, obstruct and render abortive the industry of the Irish." In 1867 Lord Dufferin wrote: "From the reign of Queen Elizabeth, England never for a moment relaxed her relentless grip on the trades of Ireland. One by one her industries were strangled until at last every fountain of wealth was hermetically sealed."

*Evidence of facts
to establish premise*

Did Lord Dufferin mix metaphors?

Deprived of the ownership of their land, the Irish began to build up industries. They first engaged in cattle-raising and in shipping the meat to the continent. Embargoes were promptly placed by the British on the exportation of Irish cattle, pigs and sheep. Then the Irish turned to the woollen trade. Of this the Unionist historian Lecky says: "A real industrial enthusiasm had arisen in the nation. Many thousands of men were employed in the trade, and all the signs of a great rising industry were visible." But the English Parliament petitioned the king; and in 1699 the exportation of woollen

manufactures was absolutely prohibited. "So ended," says the historian, "the fairest promise Ireland had ever had of becoming a prosperous and happy country. The ruin was absolute and final." The same thing was repeated with the linen industry. Meanwhile the Irish merchant marine had been destroyed by repressive navigation acts. The distress of the people was at times pitiable in the extreme. "I have seen," says Bishop Berkeley, the well-known philosopher, "the laborer endeavoring to work at the spade, but fainting from want of food, and forced to quit it. I have seen the aged father eating grass like a beast, and in the anguish of his soul wishing for his dissolution. I have seen the helpless orphan exposed on the dunghill, and none to take him in from fear of infection, and the hungry infant sucking at the breast of the already expired parent." And so the miserable story continues—one long record of atrocious oppression, unrelieved by any acts of mercy.

*Force gained by
concrete illustrations*

Last fall a writer visited a National Exhibition of Irish industries in Dublin. He writes that "the real Irish showing was pitiful; scarcely a single article of industry shown, aside from agriculture, raw material or minerals, was made in Ireland. All wares bore English or Continental trade-marks."

To corroborate these statements I cite from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, eleventh edition: "The restraints placed by English commercial jealousy on Irish trade destroyed manufacturing industry in the south and west. Driven by the Caroline legislation against cattle into sheep-breeding, Irish graziers produced the best wool in Europe. Forbidden to export it, or to work it up profitably at home, they took to smuggling for which the indented coast offers great facili-

Authority

ties." Again, "Irish political history has largely affected the condition of agriculture. Confiscations and settlements, prohibitive laws (such as those which ruined the woollen industry), penal enactments against the Roman Catholics, absenteeism, the creation for political purposes of 40s. freeholders, and other factors have combined to form a story which makes painful reading from whatever point of view, social or political, it is regarded."

Nor have the effects of British rule on agriculture, the one unmolested industry of the Irish, been any too salutary. Says the *Encyclopædia Britannica* in its supplement to the ninth edition: "The industrial statistics of the island are as discouraging as those of population. The one great industry is agriculture. With every year the area under tillage diminishes. Twice since 1881 there have been severe local famines, although the island produces food far in excess of the needs of its people."

*Good transition
giving coherence to
the paragraph*

*Argument by
analogy*

*Statistics made
clear by concrete
application*

The objection to Home Rule on the ground that the Irish do not need it since their commerce and bank accounts are increasing is, in the light of such evidence, trivial. Any rise, even from nothingness, is still a rise, but does not necessarily prove industrial prosperity. Belgium, with a population of 7,400,000, less than twice that of Ireland, had in 1913, a foreign export trade a hundred times as great,—\$675,000,000 to Ireland's \$6,500,000; while Holland, with a population one-third greater than Ireland, had in the same year a foreign export trade of \$1,020,000,000—150 times that of Ireland. Moreover, the bulk of Irish trade, apart from foreign, is with England and consists in the exchange of farm products for manufactures, an exchange in every way beneficial to English interest and

derogatory to that of the Irish, since the English with their larger money incomes are the gainers, and the Irish with their lessened food supply are in constant danger of privation and famine. And whatever increase in the savings of the Irish there may have been, may be amply accounted for by the remittances which their relatives across the seas constantly make to them.

Refutation

The decrease in population has been phenomenal. In 1841 the population of Ireland (I take my figures for comparison from *Chambers' Encyclopædia*) was 8,175,124; in 1891 this had decreased to 4,706,162, a decrease of nearly one-half; while in the corresponding period, the population of Scotland rose from 2,620,184 to 4,025,647, or nearly doubled. The census of 1911 shows a further decrease in Ireland to 4,381,951 and this in spite of the fact that the annual birth-rate had exceeded the death-rate by over twenty per cent. I do not blame entirely on the government the tremendous emigration that has caused the depopulation. A large share of it may have been due to over-population. But a still larger share must have been due to the precarious industrial condition of the country and to the evictions of tenants by landlords, and for these, as we have seen, the government is responsible. Surely, there is no excess of population now if we compare Ireland with England, a country which had a density four times as great as Ireland, but still the depopulation continues. Had Ireland been reduced to silence, as any people less pugnacious would have been, we should have been forcibly reminded of the Latin historian who said of the Romans: "They make a desert and call it peace."

Argument of effect to cause

It is a gloomy page which tells of the political and industrial life of Ireland under English rule.

*Summary of
second issue*

*Incoherent sen-
tence*

*Transition not as
good as when the
writer took up the
second issue*

Refutation

Cause to effect

England, as the conqueror of Ireland, has ruled with an iron hand in a way little short of savage tyranny; as Ireland's legislator, she has used every means in her power in effectually blocking the avenues to industrial prosperity, with a consequent destruction of Irish industry, and a decimation of Irish population unparalleled in modern history. The motives which have guided England in her policy have been partly commercial, partly religious and race rivalry. The great wrongs which Ireland has suffered call aloud for reparation. England has signally failed as a ruler in promoting Irish welfare, and the only thing she can do to atone in a measure for her unjustifiable treatment is to make Ireland autonomous and allow her to work out her own destiny.

Let us proceed now to the imperial question: Will Ireland prove a detriment to the Empire when she gets Home Rule?

Wherein can a part of a federated empire be a drag to it? By maintaining a policy of hostility, by attempting to separate, and by refusing to carry out its share of the agreement. Will Ireland be inclined to do any of these?

If Ireland continues to show the same attitude she has manifested all along, she will certainly prove a drag on the empire. But will she be likely to continue it? When the cause of hostility is removed, is it not more likely that hostility will also cease? We should remember that when Home Rule is granted, the Home Rule party, the party of agitation, will have ceased to exist since its task will have ended. Those who assume that when Ireland has received Home Rule, she will consider it her duty to give England all the trouble she can, are also assuming that the old feud and hostility will continue.

They should remember that Ireland will have too much to do at home to think of making trouble abroad; that she will have the eyes of all the world on her, watching to see how she will use her responsibility—a factor which cannot but exert a steady influence. They should remember, too, that Natal which, fourteen years ago, was England's bitterest foe, is now a most loyal colony; that the man who then led the armies of the Boers is now a governor under England's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;—and all by a policy of liberality. Is it not reasonable to expect that Ireland, more intimately connected with England in every way, will adopt a similar attitude?

Argument from analogy

It is not likely that Ireland will want to separate either. Separate to do what? She has no colonies, no foreign trade, no navy to protect herself. Will it not be very much against her interest to separate? England is at present her sole commercial support; what will Ireland do with all the produce if she separates. New markets take a long time to find. Will not separating mean a death-blow to Ireland's trade, even if England were willing to stand by and see her do it? Furthermore, the great leaders of the Home Rule party have been avowed federalists. Here are Parnell's words before the Parnell Commission on May 1, 1899: "I have never gone further, either in my thought or actions, than the restitution of the legislative independence of Ireland." Here is what Mr. Redmond said in his speech on the second reading of the present Home Rule Bill, May 9, 1912. He quotes a speech he had made in 1886 and proceeds: "Therefore, I say, that all my life I have been a federalist, and I welcome the declaration that this is the first step in a

Fallacy of mistaken causal relation

Attempt at generalization

great system of federation." Why not take such sentiments at their face value than be unreasonable prophets of evil?

Effect to cause

Post hoc ergo propter hoc?

So far from being a drag on the Empire, it is reasonable to expect that Ireland will contribute to its well-being. There is no question but that the prosperity of the component parts of an empire conduces to the success and prosperity of the empire itself. This prosperity, so far as Ireland is concerned, is far more likely to come under Home Rule than under the present. Says the historian Lecky: "From the concession of free trade in 1779 to the rebellion of 1798, the rational progress of Ireland was rapid and uninterrupted. In ten years from 1782 the exports more than trebled." Needless to say these were the years immediately preceding the Act of Union, when the local Parliament was in full swing.

Does this beg the question?

At the present time not only does Ireland give the administration a great deal of trouble, but her revenue does not always balance with her expenditure, and the deficit has to be paid out of the imperial treasury. The *Irish Independent* of November 11, 1912, gives the estimated revenue and expenditure of Ireland for that year in detail. This estimate makes the total expenditure £12,381,500, the total revenue £10,850,000, with a deficit of £1,531,500. When under Home Rule industry begins to flourish again, Ireland will not only pay her own way, but will be able also to contribute to the support of the Empire.

A Home Rule Parliament will benefit the Empire in other ways. At the present time the Westminster Parliament has to consider the local needs of every part of the United Kingdom; consequently, it has a great deal more than it can do. With the local affairs of Ireland off its hands—a task which it has filled so ill these

many years—the British Parliament will have a great deal more time to devote to more vital concerns. The Irish representation in the Parliament will also discontinue its filibustering both on account of lack of necessity to continue it and on account of its greatly decreased numbers.

Furthermore, it is to be hoped that Irish Home Rule is the forerunner of a system of federation, with local parliaments for England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, each contributing men to form an imperial Parliament. Such a federation, in which the great colonies across the seas will be asked to join, will allow for the free interplay of local needs, while conserving and consolidating the interest of the Empire as never before. The success of the plan in this great republic, the country that first adopted it in modern times, and in Canada, Australia and the German Empire, gives strong reasons for the hope that it will work well in the British Empire also.

Last but not least, Home Rule will directly contribute to the foreign interests of the Empire by enlisting the good will of the Irish and their descendants abroad in favor of the Empire. At the present time this good will is alienated from Great Britain. Irishmen look upon England as their foe. Suppose, for instance, American relations with England, where it is important for England to win: with German sentiment opposed and the Irish alienated, is it difficult to see what becomes of England's case? Here is a statement by Earl Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, recently uttered in the House of Commons: "The good will of the Irish race is worth having. It counts for something in every part of the world that we care most for." When Home Rule is granted and the cause of hostility

Does the writer lay himself open to attack in this paragraph?

Undesigned testimony

removed, is it not likely that this good will will be shown towards the Empire?

*Summary of third
issue*

The objection to Home Rule, then, on the grounds that it will be disadvantageous to the Empire is unreasonable, for Ireland will cease to be hostile for the cause of her hostility will have been removed; Ireland, further, will not want to separate from the empire for it will be against her interest to do so. It is more reasonable to expect that Home Rule for Ireland will prove an advantage to the Empire, since it will tend to increase Irish prosperity, it will relieve Parliament of a great deal of work, it will serve as a guide in bringing about federation, and enlist Irish sentiment abroad in favor of the Empire.

*Beginning of con-
clusion. Slightly
artificial*

To sum up, the objection to Home Rule on the ground that the Irish do not want it is utterly base and unfounded, since for the past hundred years and more they have never ceased from rebelling against British Rule, while at the same time they have made full use of the constitutional means in their power. The investigation of the claim that the Irish do not need Home Rule has disclosed the great wrongs that the British people have heaped upon the Irish both politically and economically, and has emphasized the unfitness of the English to govern Ireland and the consequent need of Ireland to govern herself. The pessimistic prophecies to the effect that Home Rule will be disastrous to the Empire have appeared hollow and unreasonable on consideration; and quite the reverse has been seen to be the more likely to take place. From all this we have concluded that Ireland should have Home Rule.

Recapitulation

In this statement of the case of Ireland I have studiously avoided all unnecessary flourishes, because I have felt that the bare, unvarnished facts are eloquent enough to rouse the righteous

Hackneyed phrase

indignation of the entire civilized world. To goad a peaceful and God-fearing nation into criminality and despair; to cow the spirits of that nation by repeated and tyrannous subjugation; to deprive that nation of its God-given right of utilizing for its own progress its mental and physical resources,—these are faults, to say the least, deserving of the severest censure. The civilized world has long since placed its ban on an institution which held in its fetters an unfortunate race whose place in society has not yet been definitely determined. But here is a race whose abilities have entitled it to a place among the highest, a race which has contributed such wholesome natures as Bishop Berkeley, Jonathan Swift, Thomas Moore, Edmund Burke, and Oliver Goldsmith into the vocabulary of our common knowledge,—shall we stand aside and see such a race degraded and dragged in the dust forever? Is not such a race deserving of the sympathy and just regard of all mankind?

It is the duty of the strong to support the weak, not crush them; it is the duty of the rich to assist the poor, not fleece them; it is the duty of the wise to instruct the ignorant, not despise them. In this higher duty the British people have been entirely lacking in their relations with Ireland. In presenting this case to the American people it is to this higher sense of duty that I appeal, to their nobility of nature, their justice and their love of fair play. When a nation has fought so long and so tenaciously as the Irish have done, when that nation has suffered such gross and insufferable wrongs, when the cause for which that nation has struggled has been in such thorough accord with higher aims, and higher interests, should we at all hesitate in deciding in its favor?


Good balance

Climax

Final paragraphs intentionally persuasive. Actual conviction practically ended in preceding paragraph

Good use of the rhetorical question

Antithesis



AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT¹

Maximilien Robespierre

When the news was brought to Athens that Athenian citizens had been sentenced to death in the town of Argos, the people hastened to the temples to implore the gods to divert the Athenians from thoughts so cruel and so baleful. I come to urge, not the gods, but the legislators, who should be the organ and the interpreters of the eternal laws the Divinity has dictated to men, to strike from the French code the laws of blood, which command judicial murder—which are repugnant to their habits and their new Constitution. I will prove to them: First, that the death penalty is essentially unjust; secondly, that it is not the most repressive of punishments, but that it increases crimes much more than it prevents them.

Outside of civil society, let an inveterate enemy attempt to take my life, or, twenty times repulsed, let him again return to devastate the field my hands have cultivated, as I can only oppose my individual strength to his, I must perish or I must kill him, and the law of natural defence justifies and approves me. But in society, when the strength of all is armed against one single individual, what principle of justice can authorize it to put him to death? What necessity can there be to absolve it? A conqueror who causes the death of his captive enemies is called a barbarian! A man who causes a child that he can disarm and punish, to be strangled, appears to us a monster! A prisoner that society convicts is at the utmost to that society but a vanquished, powerless, and harmless enemy. He is before it weaker than a child before a full-grown man. Therefore, in the eyes of truth and justice, these death scenes which society orders with so much preparation are but cowardly assassinations—solemn

¹ Delivered in the French Constituent Assembly, May 30, 1791.

crimes committed, not by individuals, but by entire nations, with due legal forms.

However cruel, however extravagant these laws may be, be not astonished. They are the handiwork of a few tyrants; they are the chains with which they load down humankind; they are the arms with which they subjugate them! They were written in blood! "It is not permitted to put to death a Roman citizen"—this was the law that the people had adopted; but Sylla conquered and said: "All those who have borne arms against me deserve death." Octavius, and the companions of his misdeeds, confirmed this law. Under Tiberius, to have praised Brutus was a crime worthy of death. Caligula sentenced to death those who were sacrilegious enough to undress before the image of the emperor. When tyranny had invented the crimes of *lèse-majesté* (which might be either trivial acts or heroic deeds), he who should have dared to think that they could merit a lighter penalty than death would himself have been held guilty of *lèse-majesté*.

When fanaticism, born of the monstrous union of ignorance and despotism, in its turn invented the crimes of *lèse-majesté* against God—when it thought, in its frenzy, to avenge God himself—was it not obliged to offer him blood and to place him on the level of the monsters who called themselves his images?

The death penalty is necessary, say the partisans of antiquated and barbarous routine! Without it there is no restraint strong enough against crime. Who has told you so? Have you reckoned with all the springs through which penal laws can act upon human sensibility?

The wish to live gives way to pride, the most imperious of all the passions which dominate the heart of man. The most terrible punishment for social man is opprobrium; it is the overwhelming evidence of public execration. When the legislator can strike the citizens in so many places and in so many ways, how can he believe himself reduced to employ the death penalty? Punishments are not made to torture the guilty, but to prevent crime from fear of incurring them.

The legislator who prefers death and atrocious punishments to the mildest means within his power outrages public delicacy, and

deadens the moral sentiment of the people he governs, in a way similar to that in which an awkward teacher brutalizes and degrades the mind of his pupil by the frequency of cruel chastisements. In the end, he wears and weakens the springs of government, in trying to bend them with greater force.

The legislator who establishes such a penalty renounces the wholesome principle that the most efficacious method of repressing crimes is to adapt the punishments to the character of the various passions which produce them, and to punish them, so to speak, by their own selves. He confounds all ideas, he disturbs all connections, and opposes openly the object of all penal laws.

The penalty of death is necessary, you say? If such is the case, why have several nations been able to do without it? By what fatality have these nations been the wisest, the happiest, and the freest? If the death penalty is the proper way to prevent great crimes, it must then be that they were rarer with these people who have adopted and extended it. Now, the contrary is exactly the case. See Japan; nowhere are the death penalty and extreme punishments so frequent; nowhere are crimes so frequent and atrocious. It is as if the Japanese tried to dispute in ferocity the barbarous laws which outrage and irritate them. The republics of Greece, where punishments were moderate, where the death penalty was either very rare or absolutely unknown—did they produce more crimes or less virtues than the countries governed by the laws of blood? Do you believe that Rome was more disgraced by heinous crimes when, in the days of her glory, the Porcian law had abolished the severe punishments applied by the kings and by the decemvirs, than she was under Sylla who had revived them, and under the emperors who exerted their rigor to a degree in keeping with their infamous tyranny? Has Russia suffered any upheaval since the despot who governs her suppressed entirely the death penalty, as if he wished to expiate by that act of humanity and philosophy the crime of keeping millions of men under the yoke of absolute power?

Listen to the voice of justice and of reason; it cries to us that human judgments are never certain enough to warrant society in giving death to a man convicted by other men liable to error. Had you imagined the most perfect judicial system; had you

found the most upright and enlightened judges, there will always remain some room for error or prejudice. Why interdict to yourselves the means of reparation? Why condemn yourself to powerlessness to help oppressed innocence? What good can come of the sterile regrets, these illusory reparations you grant to a vain shade, to insensible ashes? They are the sad testimonials of the barbarous temerity of your penal laws. To rob the man of the possibility of expiating his crime by his repentance or by acts of virtue; to close to him without mercy every return toward a proper life, and his own esteem; to hasten his descent, as it were, into the grave still covered with the recent blotch of his crime, is in my eyes the most horrible refinement of cruelty.

The first duty of the lawmaker is to form and to conserve public morals, as the source of all liberty, the source of all social happiness. When, to attain some special aim, he loses sight of this general and essential object, he commits the grossest and most fatal of errors. Therefore the laws must ever present to the people the purest model of justice and of reason. If, in lieu of this puissant severity, of this moderate calmness which should characterize them, they replace it by anger and vengeance; if they cause human blood to flow which they can prevent—which they have no right to spill; if they exhibit to the eyes of the people cruel scenes and corpses bruised by tortures—then they change in the hearts of the citizens all ideas of the just and of the unjust; they cause to germinate in the bosom of society ferocious prejudices which in their turn again produce others. Man is no longer for man an object so sacred as before. One has a lower idea of his dignity when public authority makes light of his life. The idea of the murder fills us with less horror when the law itself sets the example and provides the spectacle; the horror of the crime diminishes from the time law no longer punishes it except by another crime. Have a care not to confound the efficacy of punishment with excess of severity; the one is absolutely opposed to the other. Everything favors moderate laws; everything conspires against cruel laws. It has been remarked that in free countries crimes are of rarer occurrence and the penal laws lighter; all ideas are linked together. Free countries are

those in which the rights of man are respected, and where, consequently, the laws are just. Where they offend humanity by an excess of rigor, it is a proof that there the dignity of man is not known and that the dignity of the citizen does not exist. It is a proof that the legislator is but a master who commands slaves and punishes them mercilessly according to his whim.

THE MOUSETRAP QUOTATION¹

"If a man can write a better book, preach a better sermon, or make a better mousetrap than his neighbor, though he build his house in the woods, the world will make a beaten path to his door."

In the February, 1911, issue of *The Docket*, there appeared a Confession from a member of the advertising department of the West Publishing Company which precipitated a discussion of national extent as to the authorship of the aphorism which heads this article. Subscribers all over the country sent in suggestions as to possible, probable, and putative authors, while literati and librarians everywhere were besought to really justify their existence for once by settling the matter authoritatively with a verified citation. Various journals, including *Life*, flung the inquiry broadcast over the country, playing the deeps and shallows as an angler plays a stream.

The first definite result established by the inquiry was the fact that this statement does not appear in any of Emerson's published works. The minute examination to which they have been subjected, as well as the statement of Dr. E. W. Emerson, the son and literary executor of Ralph Waldo Emerson, removes all hope in that direction. Although Emerson has been credited with the statement for nearly a quarter of a century, it is impossible to justify that popular impression by any reference to his published works. So much for that point.

The next point to consider is the oldest authority for giving the credit to Emerson. This distinction belongs, so far as present search has revealed, to a little book entitled "Borrowings," compiled by Mrs. Sarah S. B. Yule and Mary S. Keene, and published by the Dodge Publishing Company. Mrs. Yule is authority for the statement that the work was compiled in

¹ Reprinted from *The Docket*, with the permission of the West Publishing Company.

1889. It was published in 1893. Asked to give her authority for the credit, Mrs. Yule writes as follows:

"To the best of my memory and belief, I copied it in my handbook from an address delivered long years ago, it being my custom to write everything there that I thought particularly good, if expressed in concise form; and when we were compiling 'Borrowings' I drew from this old handbook freely. It will seem strange to you, as it does to me, that Emerson never incorporated this in any of his essays."

Mrs. Yule's impression thus corresponds with the deduction of Dr. E. W. Emerson, who wrote, "I presume it may have been used in a lecture, and reported in a paper," and would justify the widespread popular impression that the Sage of Concord gave original utterance to the dictum. Apparently, however, it must forever remain "not proven."

Mr. Elbert Hubbard's connection with the mousetrap quotation deserves a chapter to itself. A number of our subscribers wrote us, suggesting Mr. Hubbard's name as a candidate for the crown of authorship, if we were unable to find the paragraph in Thoreau, Herbert Spencer, Voltaire, or R. L. S. Some of the Fra's admirers evidently wrote to him also, and, after some modest hesitancy, he gradually admitted the soft impeachment.

When the question was first raised, and there was still a good possibility that some one might, by searching Emerson, find out the truth, Mr. Hubbard left the answering of inquiries to his assistant superintendent, who admitted that he had spent sleepless nights poring over Emerson in an endeavor to find the quotation, and that he had had his suspicions turned in the direction of the Fra by that gentleman's "far-away, quizzical smile."

When the inquiry had been pending for some months, and the possibilities of a verdict in favor of Emerson or any one else began to look dubious, the Roycrofters, "per E. R. S.," wrote more definitely, though still somewhat cautiously, to an inquirer: "As you say, this has the ring of Emerson. It was written by Mr. Hubbard, but inspired by Ralph Waldo Emerson. Trusting this information will be *almost* satisfactory, we remain." [Italics ours.]

The third stage and the last of this Roy-crafty pretense appears in an advertisement published in *The Fra*, in May, 1911, and which reads as follows:

"Mr. Hubbard, like all writers of epigrams, has attributed some of his good Class A product to other writers. For instance, he was once writing about the Roycrofters, and, having in mind the number of visitors who come to see us, he wrote this: 'If a man can write a better book, preach a better sermon, or make a better mousetrap than his neighbor, though he build his house in the woods, the world will make a beaten path to his door.'

"It was a little strain on his ego to let this thing go under his own stamp, so he saved his modesty, and at the same time gave the epigram specific gravity, by attributing it to one Ralph Waldo Emerson.

"The world took it up, and Emerson's writings have been scoured with finetooth combs in the endeavor to locate this particular epigram, when it is simply one of the things that Emerson would have said, if it had occurred to him.

"Mr. Hubbard may have found a few mental mavericks in Emerson, which in moments of aberration he has branded as his own; but, if so, the debt is more than offset by things which he has attributed to Emerson that Emerson never wrote."

It is almost a pity to spoil the perfection of this Progress of the Pretender by any comment, but it may be well to point out that Mr. Hubbard claims to have been inspired to make the mouse-trap comparison by noting the number of visitors who came to see the Roycrofters, who conduct a shop at East Aurora, and publish the *Philistine* and other of the Fra's literary compositions. Now, it appears to be historically established that Mr. Hubbard's first "Little Journey" was published in December, 1894, and the *Philistine* was begun in 1895. The Roycroft shop as a Mecca for pilgrims did not come into existence until after the location had been advertised to the world by the editor and owner of the *Philistine*.

When we recall that "Borrowings" was published in 1893, and was compiled by Mrs. Yule in 1889, from scrapbook notations which had been in progress of collection during many years, we must either conclude that this quotation is one of the mental

mavericks of Emerson, which Mr. Hubbard, in a moment of aberration, has branded as his own, or that Mr. Emerson was guilty of that old ecclesiastical aberration, "plagiarism by anticipation," from the productions of Mr. Hubbard which had not yet taken form in language. In any event, the verdict as to Mr. Emerson may be expressed in the Scotch formula, "Not Proven."

Mr. Hubbard being disposed of, and the claim as to Emerson seeming to be beyond proof, another claimant appeared in the field, and for the last two years the caption, "That Emerson Quotation Located at Last," has appeared in a number of papers in all parts of the country. The mystery was pronounced "solved" by attributing the quotation to Dr. John R. Paxton, who was a pastor of the West Presbyterian Church, New York City, from 1882 to 1893.

The credit for this discovery has been given to Mr. Calvin Dill Wilson, of Glendale, O.; and the editor of *The Docket*, in pursuit of exact information, corresponded with Mr. Wilson in the hope of securing a conclusive demonstration of Dr. Paxton's authorship. Mr. Wilson was unable to refer to any copy of the sermon, but he was confident that it had been published in the *Treasury Magazine*, in 1889, a publication now out of print, and that it occurred in a sermon entitled "The Unhidden Christ." *The Docket* then appealed to the Librarian of Congress to make examination of the files of the *Treasury* for 1889; and the Chief Bibliographer of the Library reported that an examination of the magazine failed to disclose the quotation in question, the nearest approach to that sentiment in Dr. Paxton's sermon being the following:

"You may begin business in any obscure place, but if there is ability, power, and a mastery of affairs in you, then all the steamboats in the river will whistle for you, and the railroads say, 'Come over and manage us.' You cannot be hid. On the other hand, if you have nothing the world wants, if you have no power to paint a picture, or manage business, you are hidden already. You may live in your front windows, and drive on Fifth avenue; but you are hid."

The confident assertion of the newspapers that the quotation

has been located can hardly be said to stand the tests which lawyers are trained to apply to testimony.

But now appear the Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, never heretofore published. Mr. Hugh K. Wagner of St. Louis, Mo., sends us a clipping from a St. Louis paper, the astute editor of which has been reading the Journals to good purpose, for on page 528 of volume 8, covering Emerson's Journal, written in 1855, appears the following memorandum jotted down by the Sage of Concord:

"If a man has good corn, or wood, or boards, or pigs, to sell, or can make better chairs or knives, crucibles or church organs, than anybody else, you will find a broad, hard-beaten road to his house, though it be in the woods. And if a man knows the law, people will find it out, though he live in a pine shanty, and resort to him."

Emerson's so-called Journals were really notebooks, or commonplace books, in which he jotted down, not events, but the rough material of his lectures and essays. Thoughts that are familiar to the world through his published works will be found scattered through these Journals in the rough and fragmentary form in which they first came to him, and he frequently recast his idea in both verse and essay form. These parallelisms are well known to students of Emerson, and are one of the most interesting indications of the growth of a thought in his mind.

The note in his 1855 Journal does not use the word "mouse-trap," but it so closely parallels the quotation which Mrs. Yule credits to him in her book of "Borrowings," and which, "to the best of her memory and belief," she says she copied into her handbook from an address delivered by Emerson, that it would seem to establish Emerson's authorship beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase the famous quotation:

"If a man can phrase a telling thought, though he write it in his private journal, or speak it in a lyceum lecture, the world will catch it up and blazon his name on post cards."

EXERCISES

CHAPTER I

ARGUMENT

I. Let the class consider the editorial page of one of the current newspapers with a view to distinguishing the passages that are contentious from those that are argumentative.

II. Assign the speeches of Brutus and Antony in *Julius Cæsar* for consideration, asking the class to consider to what extent either of them is contentious.

III. Ask each member of the class to bring in a sample of the different kinds of composition, description, narration, and exposition, and then show how each would have to be changed to become argumentative.

IV. In the specimen forensic (page 267), assign certain passages for consideration, asking the students to comment upon them with regard to whether they are chiefly convincing or persuasive.

CHAPTER II

THE SUBJECT

I. Criticise the following questions used in the Harvard-Yale, and Harvard-Princeton Debates: ¹ numbers 3, 8, 15, 16, 21, 31, 32, 33, 38, 41.

II. Construct two questions under each of the following general heads.

1. Military training.
2. College entrance examinations.
3. Commission government.

¹ See pages 249-253, Appendix.

4. Direct legislation.
5. Student self-government.
6. Intercollegiate athletics.
7. Arctic explorations.
8. Qualifications for franchise.
9. Intoxicating liquors.
10. Labor and capital.
11. Courses of study.
12. Arbitration.
13. Immigration.
14. War.

III. Frame two questions from which you are to select one to write an argument. Indicate how these questions fulfill the four requirements of this chapter.

IV. What fault do you find in the following subjects for debate?

1. All men should vote.
2. The steam engine has done more for civilization than the printing press.
3. Under certain conditions a man is justified in committing murder.
4. Christianity should be the universal religion.
5. The United States should maintain a neutral position in the event of foreign wars as long as its national honor is not involved.
6. The rates charged by railroads in the United States should be subject to control by a body of men selected by the government which should have the power to consider cases of injustice and enter decrees which the railroads should be compelled to obey through the intervention, if necessary, of the federal government.
7. If war had ensued between Great Britain and the United States as a result of the Venezuelan dispute in President Cleveland's administration, the United States would have been compelled to sue for peace within two years.
8. The English form of government is more democratic than that of the United States.
9. Country life is preferable to city life.

10. The salary of the President of the United States should not be increased.

11. The principle of compulsory athletics in those preparatory schools in which the students do not return to their homes at the close of each day.

12. Wood is more valuable to mankind than iron.

13. The use of drugs and narcotics should constitute a criminal offence.

14. A pleasant day in October is preferable to a pleasant day in May.

15. Divorces should be granted in the United States as a matter of right upon the application of either of the contracting parties.

CHAPTER III

EXPLANATION

1. Present in outline form the details of the necessary steps of the explanation of some question, preferably one on which you are to write an argument. If you decide to omit any steps, give reasons for doing so.

2. Select three of the Harvard-Yale-Princeton debate questions (pp. 249-253), in which it is desirable to omit one or more of the steps of the explanation. Give reasons for your answer.

3. In the specimen forensic how would you answer the query on page 269. Give reasons for your answer.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

1. Let the teacher form a conflict of opinions on a subject within the knowledge of the class, such as the "honor system" or the "large against the small college." All the arguments suggested by the class should be written in parallel columns on the black-board. This conflict should then be reduced as the class shall decide by crossing out all matter to be excluded and by combining all related points. The uniformity of the main issues

resulting from year to year should be called to the attention of the class.

2. Let each student in similar fashion find the main issues of a question on which he is to write an argument.

3. What are the issues in "The Mousetrap Quotation," in the appendix? Would the article be clearer if the issues were categorically enumerated? What possible justification is there for not enumerating the issues?

CHAPTER V

BRIEFING

1. Tell what rule or rules are violated in the following examples of bad briefing. Give the correct form.

(a)

A. The average voter will not read or understand the numerous questions submitted under a referendum, for

1. He finds it difficult, for
 - a. Nobody likes hard work.

(b)

D. Government ownership is practicable, for

1. The argument of the negative is unsound, for
 - a. The borrowing power of the United States is unlimited, for
 - (1) It would not be necessary to borrow anyway, for
 - (a) Bonds of the government would be given for the stocks taken over.

(c)

B. The large college has more money, therefore

1. This enables it to purchase better equipments, and
 - a. This improves the health of the students.
 - b. It can give unusual educational opportunities to its students.

(d)

1. The Mexicans plotted against the Americans and fired across the Texas border, for
They hated the Americans,
b. (1) Which explains the attack.

(e)

Conclusion

- I. Therefore, in consideration of all the aforesaid reasons, the Philippines should be given immediate self-government.

(f)

- III. The conflicting opinions are as follows:—
 - A. The affirmative makes these contentions:
 1. The United States should intervene in Mexico, for
 - a. Peace would be restored there.
 1. a. Which would benefit the world,
 - b. Which is sorely needed.

(g)

Introduction

- I. The need of reform.
- II. Previous efforts to reform city government.
- III. How the mayoralty system has failed.
- IV. How both political parties have failed.
- V. The only remedy—commission government.

(h)

- I. The Filipinos need self-government and they have shown their desire for it, for
 - A. Mass meetings have been held and constant uprisings have occurred demanding self-government.
 - B. While their daily papers make self-government their watchword.

(i)

III. The affirmative makes these contentions.

A. England was justified in declaring war on Germany for these reasons.

1. a. England owed a duty to Belgium and to the world due to Belgium's treaty with England, and
b. Due to Belgium's helpless position.

(j)

a. The affirmative is mistaken in this matter, for

1. The large cities all voted against suffrage, for

(a) The population of the city is more intelligent than that of the country, for

- (1) Such cities as Boston and New York were over two to one against the amendment.

2. Construct a brief of the proof of Robespierre's speech in the appendix.

3. Construct a brief of "The Mousetrap Quotation" in the appendix.

4. Let the teacher assign for consideration any other matter which is suitable for briefing and then require the class to construct a brief upon it. (For examples of such matter see Appendix, Baker and Huntington's *Principles of Argumentation*.)

CHAPTER VI

EVIDENCE

1. Criticize the following as authorities on the large and small college question:

- a. President Hyde of Bowdoin, a graduate of Harvard.
- b. President Hibben of Princeton.
- c. Jesse Willard, champion heavyweight boxer.
- d. Honus Wagner, professional baseball player.
- e. Jim Smith, a Yale undergraduate and football player.

- f. John Williams, a graduate of Beloit College but now a student in the Harvard Law School.
 - g. James Bryce, former ambassador to the United States, and author of "The American Commonwealth," the standard treatise on American institutions.
 - h. Leonard Ayres, director of the division of education of the Russell Sage Foundation.
 - i. Alfred Noyes, English poet, now lecturing at Princeton.
 - j. Theodore Roosevelt, a graduate of Harvard.
2. Bring to class five good authorities on each of five subjects selected from the appendix.
3. In what ways is the "Encyclopaedia Britannica" a good authority?
4. Are the following sources of evidence good?
- a. A conductor testifying in favor of the railroad company for which he works.
 - b. A conductor testifying against the railroad company for which he works.
 - c. A conductor testifying against the railroad company by which he has been discharged.
 - d. An inmate of an insane asylum testifying against the superintendent.
 - e. The remarks made by a man when asleep.
 - f. A doctor testifying that he had sold to the defendant for \$10.00 a prescription for a dangerous drug.
 - g. A foreigner testifying on the day of his arrival in the United States that the American girl as a class is rude and hoyden.
 - h. A child six years old.
 - i. A celebrated surgeon testifying with regard to the necessity of an operation upon a man whom he has never seen but whose symptoms have been described to him.
5. Criticize the following pieces of evidence:
- a. The claim of a man that while crossing the street he jumped forward to escape a street car coming toward him on his right, and was knocked down by another coming from the left on the other track.

- b. The claim that high license has succeeded because Bangor, Maine, has decided to raise its license fee from \$500 to \$1000.
 - c. "We see the sense of the Crown, and the sense of Parliament on the productive nature of a revenue by grant. Now search the same journals for the produce of revenue by imposition. Where is it? Let us know the volume and the page. What is the gross; what is the net produce? To what service is it applied? How have you appropriated the surplus? What! Can none of the many skillful index-readers that we are now employing find any trace of it?" (Burke.)
 - d. "The hammer throw should be abolished in inter-collegiate contests because it requires more than three years to become really proficient at it. It is also not advisable for college men to give prominence to an athletic event which can only be practiced by athletes whose only qualifications seem to be big bodies and brute strength."
6. Mention and classify the pieces of evidence to be found in the "Mousetrap Quotation." (Appendix.)

CHAPTER VII

REASONING

Classify the following examples of reasoning:—

- (1) Within twenty minutes the whole police force of Boston is searching for the murderer. An accurate description is sent out and soon all over New England the police are watching for him. Notwithstanding this he is so bright and capable and his plans are so well laid that he is enabled to elude the vigilance of all the best officers and detectives and make his escape to Canada. These facts laugh at this defence of insanity.
- (2) This was the act of an intoxicated man, for which of the members of this reputable society would so lower himself to insult a respectable old woman if he were in his

right senses? Moreover, of all the men present, the evidence is indisputable that the defendant alone had an excessive wine bill.

- (3) The continued success of this old, conservative, low-priced house is evidence enough of the character, individuality, and durability of its material and workmanship, as well as of the truth of its advertisements and the courtesy of its management.
- (4) Business to-day must be on a large scale to be successful. Science plays an important part, and that is why big consolidations are better for any business as a whole. The small concerns cannot afford to hire men of the highest ability, because the overhead expense is too great.
- (5) Do you remember "The Beloved Vagabond," and "Septimus," and the other whimsical Locke characters? Then you surely want to meet Fortinbras, the central figure of William J. Locke's new novel.
- (6) All nations that have pursued a military policy have decayed.

Gone are "the glory that was Greece,
And the grandeur that was Rome."

Is there any doubt that Germany, too, will follow in the footsteps of her illustrious predecessors?

- (7) The United States must adopt a policy of preparedness for war. We must be so armed that no nation will dare to cope with us.
- (8) The United States should adopt a policy of complete disarmament. Peace cannot be kept with a chip on the shoulder and boxing gloves on the hands. If we are not armed, we shall not look for trouble, but we shall be peaceable with all nations, and it takes two to make a quarrel.
- (9) The proposal to take the street cars off Washington Street in order to aid business by relieving congestion borders on the absurd. Congestion does not make business bad, but good. As the gentleman from Portland said: "I see in your papers the complaint of con-

gested streets. We should like to see some of that congestion here."

- (10) The gentleman asks that the Supreme Court of the United States should give heed to the dictum expressed in a decision by one of the judges of the Supreme Court of New York. It is surely a novel theory of jurisprudence that a higher court shall consider itself bound by the erroneous inferences drawn by a court of inferior jurisdiction. Because my lady's lap-dog chooses to chase his tail 'round and 'round upon the carpet of her chamber, is it any reason that the lordly elephant should gyrate after his caudal appendage? Because the Jersey mosquito sings his song in a dulcet soprano, is it any reason that the lion should roar in high "C"?

CHAPTER VIII

FALLACIES

1. Explain how *hasty generalization*, *false analogy*, and *mistaken causal relation* are fundamentally special cases of *begging the question*.

2. Classify the following fallacies:—

- (1) The life of all great athletes is short. Yale's greatest football captains of a decade were Gordon Brown, Jim Hogan, and Tom Shevlin, and all died in early manhood.
- (2) A Boston paper printed an editorial on "Our Grammatical Decay." It regrets the general failure to observe distinctions like those in "should" and "would," "who" and "that," and so on. Yet on the same editorial page are to be found at least three cases of "will" used for "shall."
- (3) You should use White's hen food. It will make your hens lay, for it is made of cod-fish, and the cod-fish lays more than 10,000 eggs a day.
- (4) Athletic victories increase the attendance of a school, for in 1910-1915, A. Academy defeated M. School in

football, and the attendance at A. increased from 180 to 210.

- (5) "President Eliot spoke last Sunday to us workingmen about 'The Joy of Work!'" said the speaker and paused. Then as he lifted his head from his manuscript and looked out over the crowded hall, a sound of derisive laughter spread in wave after wave over the audience. There was but one thing to think of such an idea as "The Joy of Work." It was a bitter joke. To the workmen present, it was really ludicrous that a man could be so foolish, so ignorant of manual work, as to believe that there is any enjoyment in it. (Cabot, *What Men Live By*, p. 21.)
- (6) One need not be discouraged if a job starts out slowly and unsatisfactorily, for well-begun is only half-done.
- (7) Have you abandoned your intemperate habits yet?
- (8) The practice of spending generously and not of saving should be encouraged, for it enormously increases trade and makes the whole country more prosperous.
- (9) He is the richest man in the world, because he is the richest man in the United States, and the United States is the richest country in the world.
- (10) Man, says Mr. Huxley, is descended from the ape. The ape is a wild beast. It therefore follows, according to Mr. Huxley, that man is a wild beast.
- (11) I went to many doctors and was treated for hook-worm with little success. They told me that six months of rest and good food was all that would cure me. After taking only ten bottles of your medicine in four months I feel as good as new. I am glad to recommend ———— Remedy for anyone in a run-down condition.
- (12) The scriptural account of Jonah and the Whale is true for it is trusted by the long generations of divines who believe in the Bible.
- (13) The good effects of the Czar's decree establishing national prohibition in Russia are everywhere apparent.

This is sufficient guaranty that national prohibition would work well in the United States.

- (14) Professor Channing's suggestion that perhaps Washington did not take command of the American Army under the Washington elm is erroneous, for the elm is there with the tablet to prove it.
- (15) The modern writers who criticize Cooper because he falsely idealized the character of the American Indians would do well to consider the last of the Mohicans. No better example of true manly virtue can be found.
- (16) Mr. ——— attempts to bolster up his plea for non-sectarianism in schools by asking, "What is truth?" This is the same question that came from the evil mouth of Pontius Pilate centuries ago. It is but natural that men of the same irreligious beliefs should express themselves in the same way. It would be sacrilegious for us even to consider the views of the honorable gentleman.
- (17) I must confess, gentlemen, that I cannot see any need of increasing the navy of the United States. It has always been sufficient for our needs. The valor and virtue of American men has kept the sacred folds of Old Glory waving at the head of the procession of civilization since it was first flung to the winds of heaven over a century ago. That same valor and that same virtue may well remain our protection in the days that are to come.
- (18) "I have struck a city—a real city, and they call it Chicago. Having seen it, I urgently desire never to see it again. It is inhabited by savages. ——— The girls of America are above all others. They are clever, they can talk—yea, it is said that they think. Certainly they give an appearance of so doing which is delightfully deceptive." (Kipling.)
- (19) The enemies of athletics erroneously but strenuously insist that athletics interfere unduly with studies. Yet four men on last year's football team graduated

with honors and six were elected to class offices. Moreover men in the business world seem more inclined to employ young men with sound bodies rather than those that have an extensive knowledge of Greek and Latin. After all, good physical development and a clear head may be of more value to a student than mere scholastic attainment.

- (20) The people of the city are much more literate than the people of the country. The reason is that there are a great number of schools for each 1,000 of children in the population. The city people have had their eyes opened by a good education; they therefore have intelligence enough to see the need of schools.

CHAPTER X

CLEARNESS

1. Criticize the unity, coherence, and mass of the following paragraphs and of the sentences composing them. Rewrite the paragraphs if they are faulty.

- (1) The United States soldier brought the Mexican and the burro before the general who decided that as he had lived there three years longer than he had, he should believe his word rather than the other's. But the Mexican contended that the donkey had been given him by his grandfather. Which was a flagrant violation of the truth because he had died three years before. Anyway the Mexican's hatred of the greaser was very plainly shown and proves that intervention will surely be followed by war and will moreover cost a lot of money.
- (2) The submarine is a weak defenceless thing and it would be unmerciful to allow it to be fired on by an armed merchantman because it would sink it with a six inch shell. The Germans have perfected this new instrument of warfare and why should we prevent their taking advantage of its effectiveness? Simply

because of envy and jealousy. This nation is afraid, when the war is over, that Germany will attack us.

- (3) The requirements of unity in the sentence are essentially similar to the requirements of unity in the paragraph. The sentence must contain one complete, but only one, thought; the paragraph must contain a single central idea. A sentence without unity is like a teacup full of sugar and nails; a paragraph without unity is like a china closet full of cups and saucers, and saws and hammers. The difference is not at all one of kind, but merely one of degree.
- (4) The tariff should be lowered, for the tax will fall heaviest on the poor, for sugar has risen 20% in a year so that a breakfast costs more by two cents and therefore a man must skimp his lunches and candy has become a luxury. The rich man laughs at the slight increase in the cost of living, but these cause the poor to wail and gnash his teeth. It causes anarchism and unemployment and it results in a much greater loss to the government in police salaries and in the support of asylums for the poor.

2. "While leading this vagrant and miserable life, Johnson fell in love."

This is an initial sentence of a paragraph in Macaulay's "Life of Johnson." The paragraph containing the sentence tells of Johnson's love affair; the preceding paragraph tells of the vagrant and miserable life he has been leading. Such a topic sentence not only suggests the substance of the paragraph of which it is a part, but it also hints at the substance of the preceding paragraph. The sentence is therefore called a transitional topic sentence. It is doubly good because it tends to secure not only unity in the paragraph of which it is a part, but also coherence with the preceding paragraph.

Write two paragraphs on each of the following transitional topic sentences. Make the second paragraph begin with the given sentence.

- (1) While unity is essentially the same in the paragraph and in the sentence, it is attained by different methods.

- (2) While in a large college the boy goes through more college, in a small one more college goes through the boy.
- (3) In some cases the honor system may break the boy, but in most cases it will make him.
- (4) After a long course of unchecked crime in his own country, Villa finally crossed the border and attacked an American town.
- (5) Not only the Filipinos of the higher class, but also those of the lower class have shown an active desire for independence.
- (6) The elective system, besides allowing each individual to pursue the kind of work he desires to do, also raises the standard of the work done.

CHAPTER XI

FORCE

I. Let the class recast the paragraph giving the main issues in the specimen forensic (p. 272), securing a more forcible presentation of them by repetition of ideas.

II. Let the class write a paragraph giving a more forcible presentation of one or more of the following sentences by means of repetition. (Refer to the original to see how the author himself accomplished the same result.)

1. "I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands," etc.

Shakespeare—*Merchant of Venice*.

2. "Discourage litigation."

Notes from a law lecture, from "Little Masterpieces Series." *Lincoln*, p. 8, Doubleday, Page and Co.

3. "He finds his house in ruins, his farm devastated, his slaves free."

Description of the returning Confederate soldier,
from

The New South by Henry Grady.

4. "It is not so bad, then, to be misunderstood."

Self Reliance by Ralph Waldo Emerson.

5. "When men's lives . . . hang on the decision of the hour. Then words have lost their power, rhetoric is in vain and all elaborate oratory contemptible. . . . Then patriotism is eloquent, etc.

True Eloquence by Daniel Webster.

III. Have the class rewrite some work which they have already done, in half the number of words originally used.

IV. Have the class write a short speech using no word of more than three syllables and no colloquial or foreign words.

V. The following examples contrast abstract and concrete paragraphs, sometimes by the same author. Have the class write another concrete statement paraphrasing such of these paragraphs as the teacher may select.

ABSTRACT

1. A philosopher from the very nature of his science is not dealing with plain and evident matters. His surroundings are vague and indistinct, he is trying to ascertain something that is indefinite even if it really exists.

2. It is unwise to run the risk of losing caste in the eyes of other nations and of meriting their accusation that we break our solemn treaty, to obtain a right that is commercially disadvantageous to us.

—*Student debate.*

3. We should enlarge our

CONCRETE

1. A philosopher has been likened to a blind man in a dark cellar hunting for a black cat that is not there.—*Argumentation and Debating*, W. T. Foster.

2. A man who steals a watermelon is wicked but a man who steals a green watermelon is worse; he is a fool.

—*Student debate.*

3. Milton used eight thou-

vocabularies. A man today has need of more words than the celebrated authors of past centuries because there are many more objects to be described and many new ideas to be considered.

4. On the whole the result of the Civil war was a benefit to the South. The civilization of the time before the war gave way to a better civilization and a more universal prosperity. Out of defeat came a better chance for economic advancement.

5. I am never for an offensive war, and if war can come only through our initiative, it will not begin. Neither the consciousness of our strength, nor the trust in our alliances will prevent us from continuing with our accustomed zeal our accustomed efforts to keep peace.

—*Bismarck*.

6. Inventions of wondrous analytical subtlety have marked epochs in the progress of the telephone service, but in an art or industry or system made up of many interdependent operations and services, each new idea, no matter how controlling, must be adapted to what already exists to make it serviceable.—*American Tel. & Tel. Co., Annual Report, 1914*.

7. The public speaker should lead his audience to forget his own personality. They will not

sand words, Shakespeare fifteen thousand. We have all the subjects to talk about that these early speakers had; and in addition we have bicycles and sciences and strikes and political combinations and all the complicated living of the modern world.—*George Herbert Palmer*.

4. The South found her jewel in the toad's head of defeat.

—*Henry Grady*.

5. Fire must be kindled by some one before it can burn, and we will not kindle it.—*Bismarck*.

6. While milestones mark progress made, steps make the progress.—*American Tel. & Tel. Co., Annual Report, 1915*.

7. What you are speaks so loud I cannot hear what you say.

—*Emerson*.

listen to him if their attention to what he has to say is distracted by his manner, action or personal appearance.

8. The army of the United States consists of 70,000 men which is manifestly inadequate.

—*Student argument.*

9. Napoleon III excited the attention of the civilized world. His least actions were treated as matters of great importance and published by the press of every country.

10. It is unfortunate that the custom of viewing the stage as an amusement ever prevailed; for the stage is an institution higher and finer than any amusement. But even viewing it as one of the amusements, no man has a right to degrade its character or impair its usefulness. If we overwork ourselves as a community, let us quit that injurious custom. The time for going to the play is when you are well and can appreciate what you see and hear.—*William Winter.*

11. The expenditure for pensions to soldiers and sailors in the United States is enormous in comparison with that of other countries.

8. You can seat the army of the United States comfortably in the Yale Bowl.

—*Student argument.*

9. Thirty eager newspaper correspondents inform the world that he has frowned and every electric wire quivers if he raises his little finger.—*Victor Hugo.*

10. If we are "tired" and "nervous" we can surely rest and refresh the nerves without turning the stage into a play ground for idiots and making the theatre a hospital for victims of dyspepsia.

Sick persons are in no fit condition to comprehend the drama, and, even if they were, the actor is not an apothecary.

—*William Winter.*

11. In 1891, France paid for military and naval pensions \$30,000,000; Germany \$13,000,000; Austria \$12,245,000; Russia \$18,000,000; England \$25,000,000. From but thirteen millions in 1866 our pension expenditure has run up to \$165,000,000 in this same year, 1891, a sum in excess of the cost of maintaining any of the great standing armies.

CHAPTER XII

BEAUTY

I. Assign for class reading any of the following: *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, Wendell Phillips; *The New South*, Henry Grady; *Father Damien*, R. L. Stevenson; *The XXIII Psalm*; *Speech on Conciliation*, Edmund Burke. Let the class then with the texts before them designate the means, as suggested in this chapter, by which beauty of style is manifested.

II. Let the students in class criticise each other's work with especial reference to beauty of style.

III. Have the students bring into class *and read aloud* passages which they have selected to illustrate the four principle characteristics of beauty of style.



INDEX

- Addressing the audience, 205
- Admissions against interest, 96-97
- Admitted matter in conflict of opinions, 46-47; when excluded from consideration, 47
- Against Capital Punishment*, Robespierre, appendix, 297
- Ambiguity in wording the question, 21
- Analogy as a form of induction, 103; false analogy, 122-123
- Analysis, 10-12; exercises, appendix, 309
- Appendix: brief of Home Rule question, 257-266; argument on Home Rule, 267-295; authors' note on brief and argument, 255-256; exercises, 307-324; Robespierre's argument *Against Capital Punishment*, 297; *The Mousetrap Quotation*, 302
- Argument: definition, 1; not contentiousness, 2; purpose of, 4; parts of, 7; writing of, *Chapter XIII*; exercises, appendix, 307
- Argumentum ad hominem*, 125-126
- Argumentum ad populum*, 125-126
- Arnold, *Deathbed of*, cited, 156
- Artificiality, avoidance of, 179-180
- Assertion, 71
- Authority, argument from: nature of, 74-75; test of, 75-79
- Balance of sides in a good proposition for argument, 14-15
- Basis of judgment, common, need of, 18
- Beauty: *Chapter XII*; the term, 165; how acquired, 167-168; characteristics of, 168; purity, 168-169; melody, 169-171; imagination, 171-176; exercises, Appendix, 325
- Begging the question*, 117-118; see Fallacies
- Brief: *Chapter V*; value of, 51-53; definition of, 53; distinguished from outline, 54; distinguished from speakers' notes, 55; danger of following the brief too closely in writing out the argument, 182-183
- Briefing, Rules for: need of uniform, 56; a good system of, 57-68; exercises, Appendix, 310
- Burden of going forward distinguished from burden of proof, 22-23
- Burden of proof: in wording of question, 22-23; how to find, 23-26; how affected by audience, 26-27
- Burke quoted, 156

- Capability of decision, proposition for argument must have, 17-18
- Causal relation or causation, 104-114
- Cause, false, 123-124
- Circle, reason in, 119
- Circumstantial evidence, 80-82; 111-112
- Clearness: *Chapter X*; secured by principles of unity, coherence, and mass, 142; exercises, Appendix, 319
- Cleveland, President, quoted, 140
- Conciseness in wording the question, 19-21
- Coherence: defined, 142-143; in the whole composition, 144-145; in the paragraph, 148-149; in the sentence, 150-151
- Conciseness as a principle of force, 158-161; defined, 159; use of, 159-160; 182
- Conclusion: as part of an argument, 8-9; fallacies of, 125-128; writing the conclusion of the argument, 196-200
- Concreteness as a principle of force, 161-163; defined, 161-162; appeal of, 162-163; value of, 182
- Conflicting or conflict of opinions, 41-42; 189-190
- Contentiousness, 2-3
- Debating: *Chapter XV*; danger of mendacity in, 223-224; arguing against belief in, 224-226; value of debating, 226-227; conduct of a debate, 227-228; intercollegiate debating, 228-247; the question, 229-230; the coach, 230, 231; choice of the speakers, 232-233; need of team work, 233-234; duties of coach, 234-235; the affirmative case, 235-236; first affirmative speech, 236-237; the negative case, 237-240; method of preparing speeches, 240-243; danger of set speech, 240-241; rebuttal, 243-245; arrangement of speakers, 245-247
- Declaration of Independence as an argument, 69
- Deductive reasoning, 100-102; see Reasoning.
- Definition of terms: 33-36; need of, 34-35; artificial, 36; in the completed argument, 187
- Definition or equivocation, fallacy of, 127-128
- Delivery: *Chapter XIV*; how to address the audience, 205; posture, 207-208; gesture, 209-212; mannerisms, 213-214; emphasis, 215; enunciation, 215-217; pronunciation, 217-219; use of charts and diagrams, 219-220; reading a selection, 220
- Direct evidence, 80-82
- Emphasis in delivery, 215
- Emphasis or mass as a principle of clearness, 143-153; see Mass.
- Enthymeme, 102
- Enunciation, 215-217

- Equivocation, fallacy of, 127-128
- Everett, Edward, cited, 171
- Evidence: *Chapter VI*; in law and in argument, 72-73; the argument from authority as evidence, 73-80; direct and circumstantial evidence, 80-82; testing evidence as to consistency, 83-87; as to source, 87-94; kinds of evidence not affected by bias, 94-98; exercises, Appendix, 312
- Exercises: Appendix; *Chapter I, Argument*, 307; *Chapter II, The Subject*, 307; *Chapter III, Explanation*, 309; *Chapter IV, Analogy*, 309; *Chapter V, Briefing*, 310; *Chapter VI, Evidence*, 312; *Chapter VII, Reasoning*, 314; *Chapter VIII, Fallacies*, 316; *Chapter X, Clearness*, 319; *Chapter XI, Force*, 321; *Chapter XII, Beauty*, 325
- Explanation of proposition: *Chapter III*, need of, 28; steps in, 28-29; exercises, Appendix, 309
- Extraneous matter, 42-43
- Fact, question of, 15-16
- Fallacies: *Chapter VIII, in the premise*, 116-119; of observation, 116-117; of begging the question, 117-118; of reasoning in a circle, 119; *in the reasoning process*, 118-124; in deduction, *non sequitur*, 120; in inducting, hasty generalization, 121-122; false analogy, 122-123; mistaken causal relation or false cause, 123-124; *in the conclusion*, 125-128; ignoring the question, 125-126; shifting ground, 126-127; definition or equivocation, 127-128; exercises, Appendix, 316
- False analogy, 122-123
- False cause, 123-124
- Figures of speech, suggestions for using, 173-176
- Force: *Chapter XI*, defined, 154; ways of securing, 155; repetition, 155-158; conciseness, 158-161, 182; concreteness, 161-163, 182; exercises, Appendix, 321
- Generalization, 102; hasty, 121-122
- Genius and attention, 163
- Gesture, 209-212
- Good-nature, an attribute of persuasion, 133-134
- Good taste, an attribute of persuasion, 135-136
- Good use, 149
- Grady, Henry W., cited, 177
- Henry, Patrick, 156
- Hibben, President, 109, 111-114
- History of the question, 32-33; purpose of, 32; extent of, 33, 186
- Horace, quoted, 161
- Ignoring the question, 125-126
- Imagination as a characteristic of beauty, 171-176; hackneyed phrases, 173; figurative language, 173-176

- Independence, Declaration of, as an argument, 69
- Inductive reasoning, 102-114; see Reasoning
- Intercollegiate debating, 228-247; see Debating
- Interest, immediate, of question, 29-32; need of statement of, 30; a natural starting point, 31
- Introduction to an argument, 7, 183-190
- Issues, main: *Chapter IV*, nature of, 39-40; how found, 40-50
- James, William, 162
- Judgment, necessity of common basis of, 18
- Legal evidence, 72-73
- Lincoln: letter to McClellan, 31; notes for speaking, 55; Gettysburg Address, 140, 181-182; remark about Grant, 177
- Locke, 154-155
- Main issues, *Chapter IV*, see Issues
- Mannerisms of delivery, 213-214
- Mass: a better term than emphasis, 143; distinguished from force, 143; of the whole composition, 144; of the paragraph, 147-148; of the sentence, 152-153
- Melody, a characteristic of beauty, 169-171
- Mistaken causal relation, or false cause, 123-124
- Mousetrap Quotation*, Appendix, 302
- Nature, good, 133-134
- Negative testimony, 95-96
- Non sequitur*, 120
- Observation, fallacy of, 116-117
- Opening of an argument, requirements for a good, 183-186
- Opinions, conflict of or conflicting: nature of, 41, 187-189; method of reducing, 42, 189-190
- Outline, use of, 53-55
- Paragraphs: unity of, 145-146; mass or emphasis of, 147-148; coherence of, 148-149
- Pasteur Medal at Harvard University, 13
- Persuasion: *Chapter IX*, and conviction, 129-130; use justifiable, 146; as affected by character and attitude of audience, 131-132; attained by good nature of speaker, 133-134; tact, 134-135; good taste, 135-136; sincerity and essential quality for, 136-138; simplicity, 138-141
- Plan: need of in argument, 51; value of to writer, 52; to reader, 52-53
- Policy, questions of, 15-16
- Posture on platform, 207-208
- Premise, fallacies in, 116-119; see Fallacies
- Procuring of evidence must be possible, 17
- Pronunciation, 217-219
- Proof: the body of an argument, 7-8; nature of, 69-70; defini-

- tion of, 70; not assertion, 71;
writing of the proof of an argument, 191-195
- Proposition: need of to argue, 12-13; requirements of substance in, 14-18; of wording, 18-27
- Purity, a characteristic of beauty, 168-169
- Question begging, 117-118; see Fallacies
- Quotation, *The Mousetrap*, Appendix, 302
- Reading a selection in a debate, 220
- Reasoning: *Chapter VII, deductive*, 100-102; the syllogism, 101; tests of deduction, 101; the enthymeme, 102; *inductive*, 102-114; generalization, 102; analogy, 103; causal relation, kinds of, 104-109; tests of, 110-114; exercises on reasoning, Appendix, 314
- Reasoning in a circle, 119; see Fallacies
- Refutation: in introduction, 189-190; in the proof, 193-195
- Repetition as a way of securing force, 155-158; nature of its forcibleness, 157-158; danger of, 158
- Robertson, Rev. Frederick W., 147-148
- Robespierre, *Against Capital Punishment*, Appendix, 297
- Sentence: unity of, 149-150; coherence of, 150-151; mass of, 152-153; bad loose, 149; periodic, 152
- Shifting ground, 126-127; see Fallacies
- Simplicity, a quality of persuasiveness, 138-141; general value in argument, 180-182
- Sincerity, a quality of persuasiveness, 136-138
- Speakers' notes distinguished from brief and outline, 55; of Lincoln, 55
- Subject of an argument: *Chapter II*, requirements of form, 18-27; of substance, 14-18; exercises, Appendix, 307
- Subjects for debate used in the Harvard-Yale-Princeton series, 249-253
- Suggestions for writing an argument, 201-202
- Syllogisms, 101; see Reasoning
- Tact, an attribute of persuasion, 134-135
- Taste, good, an attribute of persuasion, 135-136
- Testimony, unbiased, 94; kinds of, 94-97
- Twain, Mark, quoted, 139
- Undesigned testimony, 94-95
- Unity: definition, 142; of the whole composition, 143-144; of the paragraph, 145-147; of the sentence, 149-150
- Use, good, 149
- Visual aids, use of, in debates, 219-220
- Waived matter in the conflict of opinions, 44-46

Webster, Daniel, 157

Whole composition: unity of, 143-144; coherence of, 144-145; mass or emphasis of, 144

Wit, a characteristic of beauty, 176-178

Writing the argument: *Chapter XIII*; avoidance of artificiality, 179-180; the value of simplicity, 180-182; concreteness, 182; conciseness, 182; danger of following the brief too closely, 182-183; how to write the opening of an argument, 183-186; the history of

the question, 186; the definition of terms, 187; the conflict of opinions, 187-189; how to exclude matter from the conflict of opinions, 189-190; how to introduce the proof of each issue, 191-192; how to conclude the proof of each issue, 192-193; how to treat refutation, 193-195; the desirability of not writing the whole argument at one time, 195-196; how to write the conclusion, 196-200





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